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App. A.2(ii), p. 3352 — SW^D − SW^U = v²(θH − θL)²λ/(2D²U²) with the quartic λ

Proved
TwoSidedPD.Baseline.welfare_gain_identity

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare

Consider the baseline two-sided platform with θH>θL>0\theta_H>\theta_L>0θH​>θL​>0, b>0b>0b>0 and Assumption 1; write U=8−(2b+θH+θL)2U=8-(2b+\theta_H+\theta_L)^2U=8−(2b+θH​+θL​)2 and D=4−2b2−θH2−θL2−2b(θH+θL)D=4-2b^2-\theta_H^2-\theta_L^2-2b(\theta_H+\theta_L)D=4−2b2−θH2​−θL2​−2b(θH​+θL​). For every uniform-pricing optimum and every discrimination optimum,

SWD−SWU=v2(θH−θL)2 λ2D2U2,SW^D-SW^U=\frac{v^2(\theta_H-\theta_L)^2\,\lambda}{2D^2U^2},SWD−SWU=2D2U2v2(θH​−θL​)2λ​,

where

λ=32−24b4−7θH4+2θH3θL+28θL2−7θL4−48b3(θH+θL)−2θLθH(12−θL2)+14θH2(2−θL2)+2b(θH+θL)(16−13θH2+2θHθL−13θL2)+2b2(16−25θH2−22θLθH−25θL2).\lambda=32-24b^4-7\theta_H^4+2\theta_H^3\theta_L+28\theta_L^2-7\theta_L^4-48b^3(\theta_H+\theta_L)-2\theta_L\theta_H(12-\theta_L^2)+14\theta_H^2(2-\theta_L^2)+2b(\theta_H+\theta_L)(16-13\theta_H^2+2\theta_H\theta_L-13\theta_L^2)+2b^2(16-25\theta_H^2-22\theta_L\theta_H-25\theta_L^2).λ=32−24b4−7θH4​+2θH3​θL​+28θL2​−7θL4​−48b3(θH​+θL​)−2θL​θH​(12−θL2​)+14θH2​(2−θL2​)+2b(θH​+θL​)(16−13θH2​+2θH​θL​−13θL2​)+2b2(16−25θH2​−22θL​θH​−25θL2​).

The sign of the welfare change is therefore the sign of λ\lambdaλ, which reduces Proposition 2(ii) to a polynomial inequality.

Formalization Note. The page's denominator prints θl\theta_lθl​ inside UUU; it is θL\theta_LθL​. λ\lambdaλ is transcribed term by term as printed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline

theorem welfare_gain_identity (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
    (hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
    ∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
      welfareD v b θH θL y - welfareU v b θH θL x =
        v ^ 2 * (θH - θL) ^ 2 * lam b θH θL / (2 * Dden b θH θL ^ 2 * Uden b θH θL ^ 2) := by sorry

end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2(ii), display SW^D − SW^U and the definition of λ
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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