App. A.2(ii), p. 3352 — SW^D − SW^U = v²(θH − θL)²λ/(2D²U²) with the quartic λ
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.welfare_gain_identityp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1; write and . For every uniform-pricing optimum and every discrimination optimum,
where
The sign of the welfare change is therefore the sign of , which reduces Proposition 2(ii) to a polynomial inequality.
Formalization Note. The page's denominator prints inside ; it is . is transcribed term by term as printed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem welfare_gain_identity (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
welfareD v b θH θL y - welfareU v b θH θL x =
v ^ 2 * (θH - θL) ^ 2 * lam b θH θL / (2 * Dden b θH θL ^ 2 * Uden b θH θL ^ 2) := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3352, App. A.2(ii), display SW^D − SW^U and the definition of λ
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.