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Theorem 4.6 — UDPmin⁡\mathrm{UDP}_{\min}UDPmin​ is an assortment problem under a regular choice model, with uniform pricing = revenue-ordered assortments

Proved
RevenueOrdered.UDPmin.udpmin_reduction

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

assortment-optimizationdiscrete-choicep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricingreduction

Fix a UDPmin⁡\mathrm{UDP}_{\min}UDPmin​ instance with items [n][n][n], consumers [m][m][m] (m≥1m\ge 1m≥1), interest sets BiB_iBi​ and valuations vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, and let (C,r,P)(\mathcal C,r,\mathcal P)(C,r,P) be the assortment instance of the proof of Theorem 4.6: C=[n]×{v1,…,vm}\mathcal C=[n]\times\{v_1,\dots,v_m\}C=[n]×{v1​,…,vm​}, r((x,v))=m⋅vr((x,v))=m\cdot vr((x,v))=m⋅v, P=1m∑iPi\mathcal P=\frac1m\sum_i\mathcal P_iP=m1​∑i​Pi​. Then:

  1. P\mathcal PP is a regular discrete choice model;
  2. r(y)>0r(y)>0r(y)>0 for every y∈Cy\in\mathcal Cy∈C;
  3. the two instances have the same optimal revenue: max⁡S⊆C∑y∈SP(y,S)r(y)=OPTUDP\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal C}\sum_{y\in S}\mathcal P(y,S)r(y)=\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{UDP}}maxS⊆C​∑y∈S​P(y,S)r(y)=OPTUDP​;
  4. for each consumer iii, the assortment {y′∈C:r(y′)≥m vi}\{y'\in\mathcal C: r(y')\ge m\,v_i\}{y′∈C:r(y′)≥mvi​} has the same revenue as the uniform price viv_ivi​ on every item;
  5. for each y∈Cy\in\mathcal Cy∈C there is a consumer iii such that the assortment {y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)}\{y'\in\mathcal C: r(y')\ge r(y)\}{y′∈C:r(y′)≥r(y)} has the same revenue as the uniform price viv_ivi​ on every item.

Items 4 and 5 are the paper's two bullets: uniform pricing on the pricing instance and revenue-ordered assortments on the assortment instance are the same strategy.

Formalization Note The paper states Theorem 4.6 as "one can define an instance"; it is formalized here for the explicit instance of its proof, since the bare existence of a regular instance with the same optimum is met by a single product. In the paper's first bullet the threshold is r(y)r(y)r(y) for some y∈Cy\in\mathcal Cy∈C; item 4 names it, r((x,vi))=m vir((x,v_i))=m\,v_ir((x,vi​))=mvi​ for any item xxx.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Model
import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Pricing
import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Reduction
Formal statement
namespace RevenueOrdered.UDPmin

/-- Theorem 4.6 (Berbeglia–Joret, arXiv:1606.01371v3, p. 17), for the explicit instance of its
proof: the choice model `redP I` on `𝒞 = X × {v_1, …, v_m}` with revenues `r((x, v)) = m·v` is
regular with positive revenues, has the same optimal revenue as the `UDP_min` instance, and
its threshold sets have exactly the revenues of the uniform valuation prices. -/
theorem udpmin_reduction {X M : Type*} [Fintype X] [DecidableEq X] [Fintype M] [Nonempty M]
    (I : Instance X M) :
    IsRegular (redP I) ∧
    (∀ y : RedProd I, 0 < redRev I y) ∧
    RevenueOrdered.Ratio.opt (redP I) (redRev I) = optUDP I ∧
    (∀ i : M, RevenueOrdered.Tightness.rev (redP I) (redRev I)
        (thresholdSet (redRev I) ((Fintype.card M : ℝ) * I.v i)) = revenue I (fun _ => I.v i)) ∧
    (∀ y : RedProd I, ∃ i : M, RevenueOrdered.Tightness.rev (redP I) (redRev I)
        (thresholdSet (redRev I) (redRev I y)) = revenue I (fun _ => I.v i)) := by sorry

end RevenueOrdered.UDPmin
Source
Berbeglia & Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, p. 17, Theorem 4.6 (proof pp. 17–19)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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