Theorem 1.1 — Main theorem
ProvedSecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency.half_first_bestIn every multidimensional two-sided market with the stated finite supports, independent agents, arbitrary within-agent correlation and arbitrary nonempty downward-closed feasibility family, there exists a direct mechanism with nonnegative buyer payments and seller receipts that is Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and strongly budget balanced at every report profile, such that
The equivalent benchmark conclusion is retained:
The witness is an actual admissible mechanism. The theorem includes zero gains from trade, empty trade sets and isolated agents; it imposes no item-independence, regularity, scalar-type, matching or positive-FB restriction.
This is the full existential guarantee of Theorem 1.1, rather than only an inequality for a relaxed or dual benchmark.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: finite agent, trade and support sets with product-prior expectations → Fin labels, an injective nonnegative-vector support embedding, and finite product-weighted sums; reason: bijections cover every finite source market, and summing an overwritten own coordinate multiplies by its total probability one
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SecondBestTrade_HalfEfficiency_Mechanisms open scoped BigOperators NNReal open MeasureTheory set_option autoImplicit false noncomputable section
namespace SecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency
/-- Theorem 1.1, printed p. 2 (PDF p. 3). -/
theorem half_first_best (N : Market) :
(∃ m : Mechanism N, admissible N m ∧ (1 / 2 : ℝ) * FB N ≤ GFT N m.x) ∧
(1 / 2 : ℝ) * FB N ≤ SB N := by sorry
end SecondBestTrade.HalfEfficiency
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.