Proposition 5.1 — in a two-person game, every mixed subjective equilibrium payoff is an objective mixed equilibrium payoff
ProvedAumann1974.TwoPerson.two_person_mixed_equilibrium_objectiveLet be a two-person game (not necessarily zero-sum): players with finite pure strategy sets , a finite outcome set , an outcome function onto , and utilities . Let be a randomizing structure satisfying Assumption II, and assume that the two subjective probabilities have the same null events:
Then for every equilibrium point in mixed strategies there is an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies with the same payoff vector:
Aumann's Example 2.3 shows that with three players, pegging strategies on subjective events can yield a mixed equilibrium better for every player than any objective mixed equilibrium. This proposition shows that with two players it cannot: subjectivity alone, without correlation, adds no new equilibrium payoffs. Example 2.9 shows the hypothesis "mixed" cannot be dropped.
Formalization Note The players are 0, 1 : Fin 2. Equilibrium points allow deviations to any strategy measurable with respect to the deviator's information. (5.2) is imposed on all -measurable events. Each coordinate of is computed under that player's own subjective probability.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_Aumann1974_TwoPerson_RandomizingStructure import Definitions.Def_Aumann1974_TwoPerson_Payoffs
namespace Aumann1974.TwoPerson
open MeasureTheory
/-- **Proposition 5.1** (Aumann 1974, *Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies*,
J. Math. Econ. 1, p. 78, PDF p. 12): let `G` be a 2-person game (not necessarily 0-sum,
footnote 16), and assume that
(5.2) for any event `B`, `p₁(B) = 0` if and only if `p₂(B) = 0`.
Then for each equilibrium point `s` in mixed strategies, there is an equilibrium point `t` in
objective mixed strategies such that `H(s) = H(t)`.
**Formalization Note.** The two players `1, 2` are `0, 1 : Fin 2`. The game has finite pure
strategy sets `S 0`, `S 1`, a finite outcome set `X`, an outcome function `g` onto `X` and
utilities `u`; the randomizing structure `R` satisfies Assumption II (standing assumption,
p. 75). (5.2) is imposed for every `ℬ`-measurable `B` (the paper's events). An equilibrium point
(`IsEquilibrium`) is a profile of strategies against which no player gains by deviating to
**any** strategy. `s` is assumed mixed for both players; the conclusion requires `t` to be both
objective and mixed for both players. `H(s) = H(t)` is equality of payoff vectors: each player's
payoff is computed under that player's own `pᵢ`. -/
theorem two_person_mixed_equilibrium_objective {Ω X : Type*} {mΩ : MeasurableSpace Ω}
{S : Fin 2 → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [Fintype X]
(R : RandomizingStructure (Fin 2) Ω mΩ) (hII : AssumptionII R)
(g : (∀ i, S i) → X) (hg : Function.Surjective g) (u : Fin 2 → X → ℝ)
(h52 : ∀ B : Set Ω, MeasurableSet[mΩ] B → (R.p 0 B = 0 ↔ R.p 1 B = 0))
(s : ∀ i, Ω → S i) (hs : IsEquilibrium R u g s) (hmix : ∀ i, IsMixed R i (s i)) :
∃ t : ∀ i, Ω → S i, IsEquilibrium R u g t ∧
(∀ i, IsObjectiveStrategy R (t i) ∧ IsMixed R i (t i)) ∧
(fun i => H R u g s i) = fun i => H R u g t i := by sorry
end Aumann1974.TwoPerson
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.