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Lemma 1 — endogenous-regulation adoption equilibrium

Proved
WangGreenTech.Regulation.lemma_1

by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

global-gamesoperations-researchp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1regulation

Let p=(ϵ,b,q,r,f1,fL,fH,mL,mH)p=(\epsilon,b,q,r,f_1,f_L,f_H,m_L,m_H)p=(ϵ,b,q,r,f1​,fL​,fH​,mL​,mH​) satisfy ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, b≥0b\ge0b≥0, 0≤q<10\le q<10≤q<1, r>0r>0r>0, f1,fL>0f_1,f_L>0f1​,fL​>0, fH≥fLf_H\ge f_LfH​≥fL​, and mL≤mH≤0m_L\le m_H\le0mL​≤mH​≤0. Signals and the common fundamental are real. Conditional on signal xxx, the specified posterior is uniform on [x−ϵ,x+ϵ][x-\epsilon,x+\epsilon][x−ϵ,x+ϵ]. Followers form a unit-mass population on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1); the leader has zero population mass. Both choose action 1 at indifference.

For C≥0C\ge0C≥0, define

B(ϵ,C,r)=inf⁡({2ϵ+Ctrt:0<t≤1}∪{2ϵ+C(1−sr)1−s:0≤s<1}).B(\epsilon,C,r)=\inf\left(\left\{\frac{2\epsilon+Ct^r}{t}:0<t\le1\right\}\cup\left\{\frac{2\epsilon+C(1-s^r)}{1-s}:0\le s<1\right\}\right).B(ϵ,C,r)=inf({t2ϵ+Ctr​:0<t≤1}∪{1−s2ϵ+C(1−sr)​:0≤s<1}).

Write b(2)=B(ϵ,(1−q)(fH−mL),r)b^{(2)}=B(\epsilon,(1-q)(f_H-m_L),r)b(2)=B(ϵ,(1−q)(fH​−mL​),r) and b(1)=B(ϵ,(1−q)(mH−mL),r)b^{(1)}=B(\epsilon,(1-q)(m_H-m_L),r)b(1)=B(ϵ,(1−q)(mH​−mL​),r).

The bound satisfies b(2)>2ϵb^{(2)}>2\epsilonb(2)>2ϵ and is strictly increasing in ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and in the positive difference fH−mLf_H-m_LfH​−mL​, with q,rq,rq,r fixed. If b≤b(2)b\le b^{(2)}b≤b(2), the profile

σ(i,x)=1⟺x≥t,t=b2+fL−fH+rr+1(1−q)(fH−mL)\sigma(i,x)=1\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad x\ge t,\qquad t=\frac b2+f_L-f_H+\frac r{r+1}(1-q)(f_H-m_L)σ(i,x)=1⟺x≥t,t=2b​+fL​−fH​+r+1r​(1−q)(fH​−mL​)

is an adoption equilibrium for R(α)=q+(1−q)αrR(\alpha)=q+(1-q)\alpha^rR(α)=q+(1−q)αr. Its aggregate is At(θ)=min⁡{1,max⁡{0,(θ+ϵ−t)/(2ϵ)}}A_t(\theta)=\min\{1,\max\{0,(\theta+\epsilon-t)/(2\epsilon)\}\}At​(θ)=min{1,max{0,(θ+ϵ−t)/(2ϵ)}}.

The conclusion constructs a pure symmetric switching equilibrium by checking both follower actions against the actual aggregate and payoffs.

Formalization Note No uniqueness of all equilibria is asserted. Endpoints and adoption at indifference are retained. Integrability and the aggregate formula are conclusions of equilibrium construction. Beliefs are the prescribed kernels (F3).

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_WangGreenTech_Regulation_Policies

set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace WangGreenTech.Regulation

open Set

theorem lemma_1 (p : Model) (hp : p.Valid) :
    2 * p.ε < followerBound p ∧
    StrictMonoOn (fun ε => competitionBound ε ((1 - p.q) * (p.fH - p.mL)) p.r) (Ioi 0) ∧
    StrictMonoOn (fun d => competitionBound p.ε ((1 - p.q) * d) p.r) (Ioi 0) ∧
    (p.b ≤ followerBound p →
      AdoptionEquilibrium p (regulation p) (thresholdProfile (adoptionCutoff p)) ∧
      (∀ θ, adoptionMass p (thresholdProfile (adoptionCutoff p)) θ =
        thresholdMass p (adoptionCutoff p) θ) ∧
      (∀ i ∈ Ico (0 : ℝ) 1, ∀ x,
        thresholdProfile (adoptionCutoff p) i x = true ↔ adoptionCutoff p ≤ x)) := by sorry

end WangGreenTech.Regulation
Source
Wang, Cho and Scheller-Wolf, Green Technology Development and Adoption: Competition, Regulation, and Uncertainty—A Global Game Approach, Management Science forthcoming artifact, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3538, body pp. 15–16 (PDF 15–16), Lemma 1; Appendix A pp. 1–3 (PDF 34–36), equations (4)–(7)
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-opus-5-5

Hypotheses. For every valid model p=(ε,b,q,r,f1,fL,fH,mL,mH)p=(\varepsilon,b,q,r,f_1,f_L,f_H,m_L,m_H)p=(ε,b,q,r,f1​,fL​,fH​,mL​,mH​), meaning

0<ε, 0≤b, 0≤q<1, 0<r, 0<f1, 0<fL≤fH, mL≤mH≤0,0<\varepsilon,\ 0\le b,\ 0\le q<1,\ 0<r,\ 0<f_1,\ 0<f_L\le f_H,\ m_L\le m_H\le0,0<ε, 0≤b, 0≤q<1, 0<r, 0<f1​, 0<fL​≤fH​, mL​≤mH​≤0,

write:

  • β(ε,C,r)\beta(\varepsilon,C,r)β(ε,C,r) for the real infimum of {(2ε+Ctr)/t:t∈(0,1]}∪{(2ε+C(1−sr))/(1−s):s∈[0,1)}\{(2\varepsilon+Ct^r)/t:t\in(0,1]\}\cup\{(2\varepsilon+C(1-s^r))/(1-s):s\in[0,1)\}{(2ε+Ctr)/t:t∈(0,1]}∪{(2ε+C(1−sr))/(1−s):s∈[0,1)} (taken as 000 if unbounded below);
  • βF=β(ε,(1−q)(fH−mL),r)\beta_F=\beta(\varepsilon,(1-q)(f_H-m_L),r)βF​=β(ε,(1−q)(fH​−mL​),r) for the follower bound;
  • t∗=b2+fL−fH+rr+1(1−q)(fH−mL)t^*=\frac b2+f_L-f_H+\frac r{r+1}(1-q)(f_H-m_L)t∗=2b​+fL​−fH​+r+1r​(1−q)(fH​−mL​) for the adoption cutoff;
  • σt∗\sigma_{t^*}σt∗​ for the threshold profile, σt∗(i,x)=true  ⟺  t∗≤x\sigma_{t^*}(i,x)=\text{true}\iff t^*\le xσt∗​(i,x)=true⟺t∗≤x.

Conclusions. All of the following hold:

  1. 2ε<βF2\varepsilon<\beta_F2ε<βF​.
  2. ε′↦β(ε′,(1−q)(fH−mL),r)\varepsilon'\mapsto\beta(\varepsilon',(1-q)(f_H-m_L),r)ε′↦β(ε′,(1−q)(fH​−mL​),r) is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  3. d↦β(ε,(1−q)d,r)d\mapsto\beta(\varepsilon,(1-q)d,r)d↦β(ε,(1−q)d,r) is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  4. If b≤βFb\le\beta_Fb≤βF​, then all of the following hold:
    • (a) (ρ,σt∗)(\rho,\sigma_{t^*})(ρ,σt∗​) is an adoption equilibrium, where ρ(α)=q+(1−q)αr\rho(\alpha)=q+(1-q)\alpha^rρ(α)=q+(1−q)αr. This means:

      • σt∗\sigma_{t^*}σt∗​ is jointly measurable;
      • for every xxx and both actions aaa, θ↦uρF(a,θ,A(θ))\theta\mapsto u^F_\rho(a,\theta,A(\theta))θ↦uρF​(a,θ,A(θ)) is integrable against the uniform law on [x−ε,x+ε][x-\varepsilon,x+\varepsilon][x−ε,x+ε];
      • for every i∈[0,1)i\in[0,1)i∈[0,1) and every xxx, the action σt∗(i,x)\sigma_{t^*}(i,x)σt∗​(i,x) gives a posterior expected follower payoff at least that of either action, and it is "adopt" whenever the two actions tie.

      Here A(θ)A(\theta)A(θ) is the adoption mass of σt∗\sigma_{t^*}σt∗​, and the follower payoff is

uρF(true,θ,α)=−fL+θ−bα+ρ(α)mH+(1−ρ(α))mL,uρF(false,θ,α)=ρ(α)(mH−fH).u^F_\rho(\text{true},\theta,\alpha)=-f_L+\theta-b\alpha+\rho(\alpha)m_H+(1-\rho(\alpha))m_L,\qquad u^F_\rho(\text{false},\theta,\alpha)=\rho(\alpha)(m_H-f_H).uρF​(true,θ,α)=−fL​+θ−bα+ρ(α)mH​+(1−ρ(α))mL​,uρF​(false,θ,α)=ρ(α)(mH​−fH​).
  • (b) For every real θ\thetaθ, the adoption mass of σt∗\sigma_{t^*}σt∗​ equals
min⁡(1,max⁡(0,θ+ε−t∗2ε)).\min\Bigl(1,\max\bigl(0,\tfrac{\theta+\varepsilon-t^*}{2\varepsilon}\bigr)\Bigr).min(1,max(0,2εθ+ε−t∗​)).
 The adoption mass is the Lebesgue integral over $i\in[0,1)$ of the probability, under the uniform law on $[\theta-\varepsilon,\theta+\varepsilon]$, that $\sigma_{t^*}(i,x)$ is true.
  • (c) For every i∈[0,1)i\in[0,1)i∈[0,1) and every xxx: σt∗(i,x)=true\sigma_{t^*}(i,x)=\text{true}σt∗​(i,x)=true iff t∗≤xt^*\le xt∗≤x. This is the defining property of the threshold profile.

Degenerate cases. Validity forces ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, r>0r>0r>0 (so r+1≠0r+1\ne0r+1=0), and (1−q)(fH−mL)>0(1-q)(f_H-m_L)>0(1−q)(fH​−mL​)>0. Consequently no zero divisions or zero-measure posteriors arise. The conclusions of item 4 are asserted only when b≤βFb\le\beta_Fb≤βF​, and the statement gives nothing otherwise.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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