Proof of Theorem 1, pp. 33–34 (PDF 34–35) — at q = 0 the law is g0(0) = 1, gn(0) = 0, and the best response is π̄(0) = 1
ProvedOpaqueQueue.Equilibrium.best_response_at_zerobest-responsep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1rational-inattention
Under the standing assumptions, take . Then for all , so the steady-state law (21) is the point mass at the empty system:
and the customer's problem (9) under this prior has the unique solution : a customer who is certain the system is empty joins with certainty.
This is the left endpoint of the fixed-point argument: the best response at lies strictly above .
Formalization Note The page computes through the consistency map (22); the formalization states it for the maximizer of (9), which is the best response used in the rest of the proof. Uniqueness of the maximizer at uses , i.e. .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_OpaqueQueue_Equilibrium_Model
Formal statement
namespace OpaqueQueue.Equilibrium theorem best_response_at_zero (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) : stat P 0 0 = 1 ∧ (∀ n : ℕ, 1 ≤ n → stat P 0 n = 0) ∧ ∀ x : ℝ, IsOptimal P (stat P 0) x ↔ x = 1 := by sorry end OpaqueQueue.Equilibrium
Source
Canyakmaz & Boyacı, Opaque Queues: Service Systems with Rationally Inattentive Customers, ESMT Working Paper 18-04 (September 24, 2018), pp. 33–34 (PDF 34–35), proof of Theorem 1, Existence
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.