Retail price and demand under wholesale repression
ProvedDrugMarket.equilibrium_price_demand_monotoneeconomicsgame-theoryindustrial-organization
and ; the effect on retailer of repressing its own supplier exceeds the effect on retailer (); and the directly linked retailer's demand falls, .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_drug_market_model import Definitions.Def_drug_market_equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace DrugMarket theorem equilibrium_price_demand_monotone (q s t c v_ra v_rb : ℝ) (hq : q ∈ Set.Ioo (0:ℝ) 1) (hs : 0 < s) (ht : 0 < t) (hvra : 0 < v_ra) (hvrb : 0 < v_rb) : deriv (fun vra => eqRetailPriceA q s t c vra v_rb) v_ra > 0 ∧ deriv (fun vrb => eqRetailPriceA q s t c v_ra vrb) v_rb > 0 ∧ deriv (fun vra => eqRetailPriceA q s t c vra v_rb) v_ra > deriv (fun vra => eqRetailPriceB q s t c vra v_rb) v_ra ∧ deriv (fun vra => eqDemandA q s t c vra v_rb) v_ra < 0 := by sorry end DrugMarket
Source
Gilberto José Nogueira Júnior, *Mercado de Drogas e Repressão: Efeitos da Intervenção Governamental sobre a Violência gerada pelo Mercado de Drogas numa Rede Verticalmente Relacionada*, MSc dissertation, UFPE/PIMES, 2019, Chapter 3. Eq. (3.63)–(3.64), Appendix (A.5)–(A.8).
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.