(46), p. 28 (PDF p. 31), with (39), p. 27 — under D(a) = ½φa² the optimal diversion is a* = (1 − (β − s))/φ
ProvedCommonOwnership.Governance.eq46_optimal_diversioncommon-ownershipcorporate-governancep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1private-benefits
Let and , and let the deadweight loss be . A blockholder who has sold the stake chooses the diverted fraction to maximize
Then the rule
is an optimal diversion rule, and every optimal diversion rule coincides with it on .
This is the closed form (46) of the first-order condition (39), : the smaller the blockholder's residual stake, the more he diverts.
Formalization Note The assumption is a disclosed pin that keeps in for every (the paper assumes an interior ).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CommonOwnership_Governance_Model import Definitions.Def_CommonOwnership_Governance_DiversionModel
Formal statement
namespace CommonOwnership.Governance
/-- (39) and (46), pp. 27–28: under the quadratic deadweight loss (45) with `φ ≥ 1`, the
blockholder's optimal diversion at stake `s ∈ [0, β]` exists, is unique, and equals
`a*(s) = (1 − (β − s))/φ`. -/
theorem eq46_optimal_diversion (β φ : ℝ) (hβ : 0 < β) (hβ1 : β ≤ 1) (hφ : 1 ≤ φ) :
IsOptDiversion (divCost φ) β (fun s => (1 - (β - s)) / φ) ∧
∀ adiv : ℝ → ℝ, IsOptDiversion (divCost φ) β adiv →
∀ s ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) β, adiv s = (1 - (β - s)) / φ := by sorry
end CommonOwnership.Governance
Source
Denicolò & Panunzi, Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance, ECGI Finance Working Paper 927/2023 (SSRN 4523644, July 24, 2023; Management Science DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467), p. 28 (PDF p. 31), (45), (46); p. 27 (PDF p. 30), (38), (39)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.