Incentive compatibility is equivalent to monotonicity
ProvedAGT.ic_iff_monotoneA social choice function is incentive compatible if and only if it is monotone (Proposition 9.6 of Algorithmic Game Theory). Incentive compatibility says no voter can move the outcome to one they strictly prefer (under their true preference) by misreporting; monotonicity says that when a single voter's change of vote moves the outcome from to , that voter ranked above in the old vote and above in the new one. The two properties quantify over the same data — a profile, a voter, an alternate vote — and the book calls the equivalence "a more combinatorial point of view" of strategyproofness.
A note on the rendering. No finiteness, cardinality, or nonemptiness assumptions appear: the equivalence is pure quantifier rearrangement and holds for arbitrary sets of voters and alternatives.
import Definitions.Def_agt_social
namespace AGT
/-- **Proposition 9.6 of *Algorithmic Game Theory***: a social choice
function is incentive compatible if and only if it is monotone. The two
notions quantify over the same data — a profile, a voter, and an alternate
vote — and the proposition is the book's "combinatorial point of view" on
strategyproofness; no finiteness or cardinality assumptions are needed. -/
theorem ic_iff_monotone {A ι : Type*} [DecidableEq ι]
(f : (ι → A → A → Prop) → A) :
IncentiveCompatible f ↔ SCFMonotone f := by
sorry
end AGTRead-back
What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5
Read-back: ic_iff_monotone
Setting. Let and be arbitrary types ( the "alternatives", the "individuals"), with equality on decidable. A profile is a family assigning to each a binary relation on ; the profile is called admissible (the bundle's IsPrefProfile) when every is a strict total order on , i.e. irreflexive, transitive, and trichotomous (for all : , or , or ). For a profile , an individual , and a relation , write for the profile that agrees with at every coordinate except , where it is .
The theorem. For every function mapping profiles (arbitrary families of binary relations on , admissible or not) to single alternatives in , the following two properties of are equivalent (a genuine biconditional — each side implies the other):
Left side (IncentiveCompatible f). For every admissible profile , every individual , and every strict total order on : it is not the case that the relation holds of the pair
that is, does not relate the outcome of the modified profile (first argument) to the outcome of the original profile (second argument). Only the truthful relation appears in the conclusion; enters only through the modified profile.
Right side (SCFMonotone f). For every admissible profile , every individual , and every strict total order on : if the two outcomes differ, , then both of the following hold:
i.e. the original relation relates the original outcome (first argument) to the modified outcome (second argument), and the replacement relation relates the modified outcome (first argument) to the original outcome (second argument) — the two conclusions point in opposite orientations. When this side imposes no condition at all for that .
Quantifier fine print.
- On both sides, ranges over all strict total orders on , including itself; nothing requires the deviation to actually change 's relation.
- There are no further hypotheses on : it need not send admissible profiles to any distinguished alternative, need not be onto, and its values on inadmissible profiles are unconstrained (both properties only ever evaluate at admissible profiles, since replacing one coordinate of an admissible profile by a strict total order yields an admissible profile).
- If is empty, the quantification over on both sides is vacuous, so both properties hold trivially and the equivalence is trivially true. Likewise, if has at most one element, irreflexivity of and makes both sides hold vacuously.
- The equivalence is asserted for every such individually; nothing existential is claimed.
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).