Lemma 2 — supplier delays against every manufacturer best response
ProvedCollabProject.TimeDep.lemma_2_supplierSuppose the supplier's first- and second-period penalty shares satisfy . For every manufacturer cost type satisfying the model's standing assumptions, and for every strategy that best-responds after each supplier move, the supplier's payoff from delaying is strictly greater than its payoff from keeping:
This is the supplier clause of Lemma 2 and identifies a regime where the supplier's equilibrium action does not depend on which manufacturer type it faces.
Formalization Note The paper's proof compares the supplier's two choices against each manufacturer's best response. The statement uses that reading of “dominant”; it does not claim dominance against arbitrary, nonoptimal manufacturer strategies. Positive savings are explicit in the standing predicate.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CollabProject_TimeDep_Model
namespace CollabProject.TimeDep
/-- Lemma 2, supplier clause, with dominance interpreted against each possible
manufacturer type's best-response strategy as in the paper's proof. -/
theorem lemma_2_supplier (S : SType)
(hS : S.p11 < S.p21 ∧ S.p21 < S.s1) :
∀ (M : MType), Standing S M →
∀ (σ0 : Act → Act), (∀ a, IsBR0 M a (σ0 a)) →
u1 S .keep (σ0 .keep) < u1 S .delay (σ0 .delay) := by sorry
end CollabProject.TimeDep
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.