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§6, p. 15 — a monopsonist pays wage 0: the startup earns v_s, the acquirer v_a

Proved
AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo.monopsony_wage_zero

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

acquihiringmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1private-information

Consider the private-benefit model of §6: the employee's benefit at the startup is b∼U[0,B]b \sim U[0,B]b∼U[0,B], her outside option is worth 000, and 0<B<min⁡{va,vs}0 < B < \min\{v_a,v_s\}0<B<min{va​,vs​}, vs−B<va<vs+2Bv_s - B < v_a < v_s + 2Bvs​−B<va​<vs​+2B.

Suppose the startup is a monopsonist and offers wage yyy. A type-bbb employee stays exactly when y+b≥0y + b \ge 0y+b≥0, so the startup's expected profit is

Πs(y)=1B∫0B(vs−y) 1{y+b≥0} db.\Pi_s(y) = \frac1B\int_0^B (v_s - y)\,\mathbf 1\{y+b \ge 0\}\,db .Πs​(y)=B1​∫0B​(vs​−y)1{y+b≥0}db.

Then:

  1. for every c∈[0,B]c \in [0,B]c∈[0,B], the wage −c-c−c (hiring only types with benefit at least ccc) yields Πs(−c)=(vs+c)(B−c)/B\Pi_s(-c) = (v_s + c)(B-c)/BΠs​(−c)=(vs​+c)(B−c)/B;
  2. Πs(0)=vs\Pi_s(0) = v_sΠs​(0)=vs​;
  3. every wage y≠0y \neq 0y=0 yields Πs(y)<vs\Pi_s(y) < v_sΠs​(y)<vs​, so 000 is the unique optimal wage.

Likewise, a monopsonistic acquirer offering wage xxx (the employee has no benefit at the acquirer and accepts iff x≥0x \ge 0x≥0) earns vav_ava​ at x=0x = 0x=0 and strictly less at every x≠0x \ne 0x=0.

This is what makes Lemma 2 of the paper apply to acquihiring with wage floor 000: the startup's stand-alone profit is vsv_svs​, the price an acquisition must beat, and after the acquisition the employee is paid 000.

Formalization Note The optimization ranges over all real wages, not only the page's [−B,0][-B, 0][−B,0]; uniqueness of the maximizer is the page's "it follows that the startup would set a wage of ws=0w_s = 0ws​=0".

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_PrivateInfo_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo

theorem monopsony_wage_zero (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
    (∀ c ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) P.B, monoProfitS P (-c) = (P.vs + c) * (P.B - c) / P.B) ∧
    monoProfitS P 0 = P.vs ∧ (∀ y : ℝ, y ≠ 0 → monoProfitS P y < P.vs) ∧
    monoProfitA P 0 = P.va ∧ (∀ x : ℝ, x ≠ 0 → monoProfitA P x < P.va) := by sorry

end AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), p. 15 (PDF 16), §6, fifth paragraph
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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