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§4.1: at a fixed reserve, πPmono(R)<πPex(R)<πPdir(R)\pi^{mono}_P(R)<\pi^{ex}_P(R)<\pi^{dir}_P(R)πPmono​(R)<πPex​(R)<πPdir​(R) (corrected: M>RM>RM>R, R<1R<1R<1)

Proved
AuctionsOfAuctions.revenue_ranking_fixed_reserve

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsfirst-price-auctionintermediationmechanism-designp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1reserve-price

For every reserve R∈[0,1)R\in[0,1)R∈[0,1):

  1. for every M∈(R,1]M\in(R,1]M∈(R,1], the bids the publisher faces satisfy
R=γmono(M;R)<γex(M;R)=σ~(M;R)<γdir(M;R)=β(M;R);R=\gamma^{mono}(M;R)<\gamma^{ex}(M;R)=\tilde\sigma(M;R)<\gamma^{dir}(M;R)=\beta(M;R);R=γmono(M;R)<γex(M;R)=σ~(M;R)<γdir(M;R)=β(M;R);
  1. the publisher's revenues satisfy
πPmono(R)<πPex(R)<πPdir(R),\pi^{mono}_P(R)<\pi^{ex}_P(R)<\pi^{dir}_P(R),πPmono​(R)<πPex​(R)<πPdir​(R),

with πPmono(R)=R(1−F4(R))\pi^{mono}_P(R)=R(1-F^4(R))πPmono​(R)=R(1−F4(R)) of (8), πPex(R)=∫R1σ~(M;R) dF4(M)\pi^{ex}_P(R)=\int_R^1\tilde\sigma(M;R)\,dF^4(M)πPex​(R)=∫R1​σ~(M;R)dF4(M) of (18) and πPdir(R)=∫R1β(M;R) dF4(M)\pi^{dir}_P(R)=\int_R^1\beta(M;R)\,dF^4(M)πPdir​(R)=∫R1​β(M;R)dF4(M) of (4).

At any fixed reserve the competing-exchange arrangement is less profitable for the publisher than direct bidding and more profitable than a monopoly exchange. With the optimality of the direct reserve this gives the publisher's half of Proposition 2.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: valuations drawn iid from a distribution FFF with support [0,1][0,1][0,1] (p.7) → F(x)=∫0xfF(x)=\int_0^x fF(x)=∫0x​f, with fff continuous on [0,1][0,1][0,1], f≥0f\ge0f≥0 on [0,1][0,1][0,1], f>0f>0f>0 on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) and ∫01f=1\int_0^1 f=1∫01​f=1; reason: the paper writes f=F′f=F'f=F′, divides by f(x)f(x)f(x) for x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1) and differentiates its revenue integrals in RRR (A18), which uses a continuous density; f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0 and f(1)=0f(1)=0f(1)=0 are allowed
  • encoding: Stieltjes integrals ∫g dFk\int g\,dF^k∫gdFk in (3), (4), (5), (13), (18) → ∫g(x) kF(x)k−1f(x) dx\int g(x)\,kF(x)^{k-1}f(x)\,dx∫g(x)kF(x)k−1f(x)dx (interval integrals); reason: FFF is absolutely continuous with density fff; same instances
  • generalization: the standing assumption that FFF is regular (p.7) → not assumed; reason: the statement holds for every distribution of the model; regular distributions are instances
  • correction: "for every M≥RM\ge RM≥R, R=γmono(M;R)<γex(M;R)<γdir(M;R)R=\gamma^{mono}(M;R)<\gamma^{ex}(M;R)<\gamma^{dir}(M;R)R=γmono(M;R)<γex(M;R)<γdir(M;R)" → for every M∈(R,1]M\in(R,1]M∈(R,1]; reason: at M=RM=RM=R all three bids equal RRR (any FFF, any R∈(0,1)R\in(0,1)R∈(0,1)), so the strict inequalities fail there
  • correction: "for any fixed reserve price" → R∈[0,1)R\in[0,1)R∈[0,1); reason: at R=1R=1R=1 (and any R≥1R\ge1R≥1) the impression is never sold and all three revenues are 000, so the strict ranking fails
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AuctionsOfAuctions_Model
Formal statement
namespace AuctionsOfAuctions

/-- **Revenue ranking at a fixed reserve**, Zeithammer–Choi, *Auctions of Auctions*, Management
Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.1, text after (18), p.16 (PDF 17): "for every
`M ≥ R`, `R = γ^mono(M; R) < γ^ex(M; R) < γ^dir(M; R)`. It follows that, for any fixed reserve
price, the exchange mechanism is less profitable for the publisher than the direct mechanism, but
more profitable than the monopoly benchmark".

For every reserve `R ∈ [0, 1)`:
(1) for every `M ∈ (R, 1]`, `R < σ̃(M; R) < β(M; R)` (the bids the publisher faces with a monopoly
exchange, `γ^mono = R`, with competing exchanges, `γ^ex = σ̃`, and directly, `γ^dir = β`);
(2) `π^mono_P(R) < π^ex_P(R) < π^dir_P(R)`, with `π^mono_P` of (8), `π^ex_P` of (18) with
`γ^ex = σ̃`, and `π^dir_P` of (4).

**Formalization Note.** At `M = R` all three bids equal `R`, so the pointwise ranking is strict
only for `M > R`. At `R = 1` the item is never sold and all three revenues are `0`, so the strict
ranking is stated for `R < 1`. -/
theorem revenue_ranking_fixed_reserve (D : ValuationDist) (R : ℝ) (hR : R ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1) :
    (∀ M ∈ Set.Ioc R 1, R < D.sigmaTilde M R ∧ D.sigmaTilde M R < D.beta M R) ∧
    D.revMono R < D.revEx R ∧ D.revEx R < D.revDir R := by sorry

end AuctionsOfAuctions
Source
Zeithammer–Choi, Auctions of Auctions, Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.1, text after eq. (18), p.16 (PDF 17)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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