(3.5), p. 16 — market-maker flow profit: π_r = 2(1 − ω)ρ/((1 + ω)N_r) − 2ν
ProvedPegProtect.Equilibrium.equation_3_5market-makingmarket-microstructurep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sniping
Under the standing market restrictions, for and a positive mass of market makers, the expected flow profit of a market maker who keeps both a bid and an offer at the best bid and offer is
Investor market orders reach each side at rate and find no contra-side midpoint liquidity with probability ; the loss to snipers occurs at rate on each side. Setting yields the equilibrium mass (3.7).
Formalization Note A positive maker mass keeps the per-maker payoff within its economic domain; Lean division assigns a junk value at .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PegProtect_Equilibrium_Model
Formal statement
namespace PegProtect.Equilibrium
theorem equation_3_5 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (ω Nr : ℝ)
(h0 : 0 ≤ ω) (h1 : ω < 1) (hNr : 0 < Nr) :
piR P ω Nr = 2 * ((1 - ω) * P.ρ / ((1 + ω) * Nr)) - 2 * P.ν := by sorry
end PegProtect.Equilibrium
Source
Aldrich & Friedman, Order Protection through Delayed Messaging, SSRN 2999059 (version of March 3, 2019), p. 16, §3.4, (3.5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.