Theorem 1 (“if” direction), p. 14 — a payoff linear in the stake is Sybil resistant
ProvedBondVoting.Sybil.theorem_1_ifLet be the commitment horizon and an agent's payoff function. Suppose that
- for every the payoff is linear in the stake: there are (depending on ) with for all ;
- for all , and for all (the boundary conditions of Assumption 1).
Then is Sybil resistant: for no budget , no number of identities , and no stakes with and commitments is
This is the half of Theorem 1 that the paper applies to bond voting.
Formalization Note. Theorem 1 is stated "given Assumptions 1 and 2" for mechanisms with non-increasing influence of tokens; the proof of the "if" direction (p. 16) uses only linearity and the boundary conditions, so the curvature and continuity conditions of Assumption 1 and Definition 3 are not hypotheses here, which makes the statement stronger. (Bond voting itself violates Assumption 1's continuity at .) The "only if" direction is not part of this statement.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_BondVoting_Sybil_Model
namespace BondVoting.Sybil
theorem theorem_1_if (π : ℝ → ℝ → ℝ) (T : ℝ) (hT : 0 < T)
(hlin : ∀ t ∈ Set.Ioc 0 T, ∃ α β : ℝ, ∀ q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q → π q t = α + β * q)
(h0 : ∀ t : ℝ, π 0 t = 0) (hq0 : ∀ q : ℝ, π q 0 = 0) :
SybilResistant π T := by sorry
end BondVoting.Sybil
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.