(6.1) — joining changes player i's payoff by ψ(v_{S∪{i}})(i) − cⁱ
ProvedMondererShapley.Participation.eq_6_1game-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-games
Let be a solution, , a TU game, and the payoffs of the participation game . For every player and every profile , with the other participants,
This identity reduces the potential property of to a condition on coalitions; it is the first step of the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Formalization Note and are Function.update ε i true and Function.update ε i false. No hypothesis on or is needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MondererShapley_Participation_participationPayoff
Formal statement
namespace MondererShapley.Participation
/-- (6.1): `uⁱ(ε⁻ⁱ, 1) − uⁱ(ε⁻ⁱ, 0) = ψ(v_{S∪{i}})(i) − cⁱ` with `S = {j ≠ i : εʲ = 1}`. -/
theorem eq_6_1 {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] (ψ : Solution ι) (c : ι → ℝ)
(v : Finset ι → ℝ) (i : ι) (ε : ι → Bool) :
participationPayoff ψ c v i (Function.update ε i true) -
participationPayoff ψ c v i (Function.update ε i false) =
ψ (Finset.univ.filter (fun j => j ≠ i ∧ ε j = true) ∪ {i}) v i - c i := by sorry
end MondererShapley.Participation
Source
Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games, Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996), p. 137 (PDF p. 14), proof of Theorem 6.1, (6.1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.