Table 1 — stage-1 implementation payoffs
ProvedPPDifferentiation.ShortRun.table_1hotellingp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1payoff-matrixpersonalized-pricing
Let and . The firms choose PP or uniform pricing (U) before positioning. For every optimal uniform-leader price in each asymmetric continuation, the net stage-1 payoff matrix, with A's payoff first, is
Every entry evaluates a gross pricing-stage payoff at the corresponding positioning outcome; is subtracted only from a firm that implements PP. This matrix supplies the comparisons in Proposition 5.
Formalization Note The theorem is conditional on the two leader prices being optimal; Proposition 5 also asserts those optima exist. The asymmetric continuation with B implementing PP is obtained by reflection of the source's A-implements-PP case.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_PPDifferentiation_ShortRun_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PPDifferentiation.ShortRun
theorem table_1 (t F : ℝ) (ht : 0 < t) (hF : 0 ≤ F) :
∀ p₀ p₁ : ℝ, PPDifferentiation.Costless.IsLeaderOpt t (1/2) (-1/2) p₀ →
PPDifferentiation.Costless.IsLeaderOpt t (1/2) (3/2) p₁ →
stage1A t F p₀ p₁ .PP .PP = t/8 - F ∧
stage1B t F p₀ p₁ .PP .PP = t/8 - F ∧
stage1A t F p₀ p₁ .PP .U = t/4 - F ∧
stage1B t F p₀ p₁ .PP .U = t/2 ∧
stage1A t F p₀ p₁ .U .PP = t/2 ∧
stage1B t F p₀ p₁ .U .PP = t/4 - F ∧
stage1A t F p₀ p₁ .U .U = 3*t/4 ∧
stage1B t F p₀ p₁ .U .U = 3*t/4 := by sorry
end PPDifferentiation.ShortRun
Source
Li, Wang, Nault, Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate?, working paper, SSRN abstract 3881900 (version of August 3, 2021), §6, p. 25, Table 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.