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Lemma 1 — equilibrium ex post sourcing quantities and profits of the buyers

Proved
SupplierAudit.Competition.lemma_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cournotgame-theoryp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain

Consider the stage-2 game in which buyer BiB_iBi​ with nin_ini​ offending suppliers has demand intercept A(ni)A(n_i)A(ni​) (α\alphaα if ni=0n_i = 0ni​=0, α−dM\alpha - d_Mα−dM​ otherwise) and unit cost c(ni)=(2−ni)w+niw^c(n_i) = (2-n_i)w + n_i\hat wc(ni​)=(2−ni​)w+ni​w^, and the buyers play the linear differentiated Cournot duopoly with substitution parameter β∈[0,1]\beta \in [0,1]β∈[0,1]. Under the standing assumptions of the model, for each of the five scenarios with n1≤n2n_1 \le n_2n1​≤n2​ the unique pure Nash equilibrium (q1∗,q2∗)(q^*_1, q^*_2)(q1∗​,q2∗​) is:

(n1,n2)(n_1,n_2)(n1​,n2​)q1∗q^*_1q1∗​q2∗q^*_2q2∗​
(0,0)(0,0)(0,0)α−2w2+β\frac{\alpha-2w}{2+\beta}2+βα−2w​α−2w2+β\frac{\alpha-2w}{2+\beta}2+βα−2w​
(0,1)(0,1)(0,1)α2+β+βdM−(4−β)w+βw^4−β2\frac{\alpha}{2+\beta} + \frac{\beta d_M-(4-\beta)w+\beta\hat w}{4-\beta^2}2+βα​+4−β2βdM​−(4−β)w+βw^​α2+β−2dM+2(1−β)w+2w^4−β2\frac{\alpha}{2+\beta} - \frac{2d_M+2(1-\beta)w+2\hat w}{4-\beta^2}2+βα​−4−β22dM​+2(1−β)w+2w^​
(1,1)(1,1)(1,1)α−dM−w−w^2+β\frac{\alpha-d_M-w-\hat w}{2+\beta}2+βα−dM​−w−w^​α−dM−w−w^2+β\frac{\alpha-d_M-w-\hat w}{2+\beta}2+βα−dM​−w−w^​
(1,2)(1,2)(1,2)α−dM2+β−2w+2(1−β)w^4−β2\frac{\alpha-d_M}{2+\beta} - \frac{2w+2(1-\beta)\hat w}{4-\beta^2}2+βα−dM​​−4−β22w+2(1−β)w^​α−dM2+β−(4−β)w^−βw4−β2\frac{\alpha-d_M}{2+\beta} - \frac{(4-\beta)\hat w-\beta w}{4-\beta^2}2+βα−dM​​−4−β2(4−β)w^−βw​
(2,2)(2,2)(2,2)α−dM−2w^2+β\frac{\alpha-d_M-2\hat w}{2+\beta}2+βα−dM​−2w^​α−dM−2w^2+β\frac{\alpha-d_M-2\hat w}{2+\beta}2+βα−dM​−2w^​

Moreover, for every realizable pair (n1,n2)(n_1,n_2)(n1​,n2​) (both at most 222, differing by at most 111, in either order), the closed-form quantities q1∗(n1,n2)q^*_1(n_1,n_2)q1∗​(n1​,n2​) and q1∗(n2,n1)q^*_1(n_2,n_1)q1∗​(n2​,n1​) of the model are strictly positive, form a Nash equilibrium, and buyer B1B_1B1​'s equilibrium payoff equals the model's stage-2 profit

π1b(n1,n2)=q1∗(n1,n2)2.\pi^b_1(n_1,n_2) = q^*_1(n_1,n_2)^2 .π1b​(n1​,n2​)=q1∗​(n1​,n2​)2.

Together with uniqueness, this shows that the model's stage-2 profits are exactly the equilibrium profits of the table, the squares of the quantities.

Formalization Note The page tabulates the case n2≥n1n_2 \ge n_1n2​≥n1​ and says the other case is symmetric; the second part of the statement covers both orders. Strict positivity of the quantities is the purpose of the three conditions of p. 8 and is stated explicitly.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Competition_Model
Formal statement
namespace SupplierAudit.Competition

theorem lemma_1 (P : Params) :
    (∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) q₁ q₂ ↔
        q₁ = (P.α - 2 * P.w) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - 2 * P.w) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
    (∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 0) (unitCost P 0) (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) q₁ q₂ ↔
        q₁ = P.α / (2 + P.β) + (P.β * P.dM - (4 - P.β) * P.w + P.β * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2) ∧
        q₂ = P.α / (2 + P.β) - (2 * P.dM + 2 * (1 - P.β) * P.w + 2 * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2)) ∧
    (∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) q₁ q₂ ↔
        q₁ = (P.α - P.dM - P.w - P.wh) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - P.dM - P.w - P.wh) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
    (∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 1) (unitCost P 1) (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) q₁ q₂ ↔
        q₁ = (P.α - P.dM) / (2 + P.β) - (2 * P.w + 2 * (1 - P.β) * P.wh) / (4 - P.β ^ 2) ∧
        q₂ = (P.α - P.dM) / (2 + P.β) - ((4 - P.β) * P.wh - P.β * P.w) / (4 - P.β ^ 2)) ∧
    (∀ q₁ q₂ : ℝ,
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) (intercept P 2) (unitCost P 2) q₁ q₂ ↔
        q₁ = (P.α - P.dM - 2 * P.wh) / (2 + P.β) ∧ q₂ = (P.α - P.dM - 2 * P.wh) / (2 + P.β)) ∧
    (∀ n₁ n₂ : ℕ, n₁ ≤ 2 → n₂ ≤ 2 → n₁ ≤ n₂ + 1 → n₂ ≤ n₁ + 1 →
      0 < stage2q P n₁ n₂ ∧
      IsCournotNash P.β (intercept P n₁) (unitCost P n₁) (intercept P n₂) (unitCost P n₂)
        (stage2q P n₁ n₂) (stage2q P n₂ n₁) ∧
      cournotPayoff P.β (intercept P n₁) (unitCost P n₁) (stage2q P n₁ n₂) (stage2q P n₂ n₁) =
        stage2Profit P n₁ n₂) := by sorry

end SupplierAudit.Competition
Source
Chen, Qi, Dawande, Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains, accepted manuscript (SSRN 2889889), Lemma 1, p. 9; proof p. ec3 (PDF 31)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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