Theorem 2 — the fair allocation rule is , the Shapley value of the graph-restricted game
ProvedCooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_2Let be a game in characteristic function form and let be the fair allocation rule for , i.e. satisfies the efficiency condition (7) and the equity condition (10). Then
where is the Shapley value operator and is the graph-restricted game. In particular, .
The fair allocation rule is therefore computed by an explicit formula (later called the Myerson value), and at the complete graph it reduces to the Shapley value.
Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as . "The unique fair allocation rule" is stated as "every fair allocation rule"; existence and uniqueness are Theorem 1. is the platform's Supermodularity.Cooperative.ShapleyValue applied after setting the game's value at to . is the complete graph ⊤.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule
open Finset
open scoped Classical
/-- Theorem 2 (p. 8): the fair allocation rule `Y` for `v` satisfies `Y(g) = φ(v/g)` for every
graph `g`; in particular `Y(ḡ^N) = φ(v)`. -/
theorem theorem_2 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) (Y : Rule n) (hY : IsFair v Y) :
(∀ g : SimpleGraph (Fin n), Y g = shapley (restrict v g)) ∧ Y ⊤ = shapley v := by sorry
end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.