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The key path is a Schnorr check of the output key

Proved
BitcoinTaproot.keypath_handler

by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip341bip342bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusformal-verificationschnorrtaproottapscript

For a single-element witness [sig], the Taproot handler equals checkSchnorrSignature of sig against the 32-byte program under the key-path execution data (no annex, no tapleaf, code separator 0xFFFFFFFF).

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTaproot
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinVerify
open BitcoinTaproot BitcoinSer BitcoinSig BitcoinVerify
open BitcoinScript hiding Bytes Byte
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinTaproot.keypath_handler (spent : List TxOut) (c : BitcoinVerify.Ctx) (sig q : Bytes) :
    BitcoinTaproot.taprootHandler spent c [sig] q =
      BitcoinTaproot.checkSchnorrSignature c.tx spent c.nIn sig q false ⟨false, [], [], 0xFFFFFFFF⟩ := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyWitnessProgram (version 1), ExecuteWitnessScript, EvalScript under SigVersion::TAPSCRIPT, EvalChecksigTapscript, CheckSchnorrSignature, SignatureHashSchnorr, ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTapbranchHash, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot, VerifyTaprootCommitment, src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp; XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak, ComputeTapTweakHash, src/pubkey.cpp; secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check, src/secp256k1/src/modules/extrakeys/main_impl.h; IsOpSuccess, src/script/script.cpp; BIP340, BIP341, BIP342 at bips revision 100ba872c808946155b1eeb8c4568058f2eea0a7
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinTaproot.keypath_handler

Binders. spent\mathrm{spent}spent : a list of transaction outputs (integer value, byte-string script); ccc : a verification context BitcoinVerify.Ctx with fields flags\mathrm{flags}flags (the consensus flag set: Booleans p2sh, witness, taproot, dersig, cltv, csv, nulldummy), tx\mathrm{tx}tx (a transaction), nIn∈N\mathrm{nIn} \in \mathbb{N}nIn∈N and amount∈Z\mathrm{amount} \in \mathbb{Z}amount∈Z; sig,q\mathrm{sig}, qsig,q : byte strings.

Hypotheses. None.

Conclusion (an equality of Booleans).

taprootHandler(spent)(c,[sig],q)  =  checkSchnorrSignature(c.tx,spent,c.nIn,sig,q,false,(false,[ ],[ ],0xFFFFFFFF)),\mathrm{taprootHandler}(\mathrm{spent})(c, [\mathrm{sig}], q) \;=\; \mathrm{checkSchnorrSignature}\big(c.\mathrm{tx}, \mathrm{spent}, c.\mathrm{nIn}, \mathrm{sig}, q, \mathrm{false}, (\mathrm{false}, [\,], [\,], \texttt{0xFFFFFFFF})\big),taprootHandler(spent)(c,[sig],q)=checkSchnorrSignature(c.tx,spent,c.nIn,sig,q,false,(false,[],[],0xFFFFFFFF)),

where the last argument is the ExecData record with annexPresent =false= \mathrm{false}=false, empty annexHash, empty tapleafHash, and codeseparatorPos =232−1= 2^{32} - 1=232−1.

The left side, unfolded. taprootHandler(spent)\mathrm{taprootHandler}(\mathrm{spent})taprootHandler(spent) is the function of a context ccc, a witness list WWW and a program byte string qqq that: returns false\mathrm{false}false if WWW is empty; otherwise forms the Tapscript context (flags cltv, csv, nulldummy taken from c.flagsc.\mathrm{flags}c.flags, c.txc.\mathrm{tx}c.tx, spent\mathrm{spent}spent, c.nInc.\mathrm{nIn}c.nIn); decides hasAnnex(W)\mathrm{hasAnnex}(W)hasAnnex(W), which is "∣W∣≥2|W| \ge 2∣W∣≥2 and the last element of WWW is non-empty and its first byte is 0x50\texttt{0x50}0x50"; sets the annex to the last element when hasAnnex(W)\mathrm{hasAnnex}(W)hasAnnex(W) and removes it from WWW to get the stack, else the stack is WWW; builds e0=(annex present,SHA256(CompactSize(∣annex∣)∥annex) or [ ],[ ],0xFFFFFFFF)e_0 = (\text{annex present}, \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{CompactSize}(|\mathrm{annex}|)\Vert\mathrm{annex}) \text{ or } [\,], [\,], \texttt{0xFFFFFFFF})e0​=(annex present,SHA256(CompactSize(∣annex∣)∥annex) or [],[],0xFFFFFFFF); and, if the stack has exactly one element xxx, returns checkSchnorrSignature(c.tx,spent,c.nIn,x,q,false,e0)\mathrm{checkSchnorrSignature}(c.\mathrm{tx}, \mathrm{spent}, c.\mathrm{nIn}, x, q, \mathrm{false}, e_0)checkSchnorrSignature(c.tx,spent,c.nIn,x,q,false,e0​) (the key path); otherwise it takes the script path (control block and script popped from the end, control-block size checks, verifyTaprootCommitment\mathrm{verifyTaprootCommitment}verifyTaprootCommitment, and either executeTapscript\mathrm{executeTapscript}executeTapscript for leaf version 0xc0\texttt{0xc0}0xc0 or true\mathrm{true}true for any other leaf version). For W=[sig]W = [\mathrm{sig}]W=[sig]: WWW is non-empty, ∣W∣=1<2|W| = 1 < 2∣W∣=1<2 so there is no annex, the stack is [sig][\mathrm{sig}][sig] of length 111, e0=(false,[ ],[ ],0xFFFFFFFF)e_0 = (\mathrm{false}, [\,], [\,], \texttt{0xFFFFFFFF})e0​=(false,[],[],0xFFFFFFFF), and the key path is taken. The flag c.flags.taprootc.\mathrm{flags}.\mathrm{taproot}c.flags.taproot and c.amountc.\mathrm{amount}c.amount are not consulted by the handler.

The signature check, unfolded. checkSchnorrSignature(tx,S,i,sig,pk,τ,e)\mathrm{checkSchnorrSignature}(\mathrm{tx}, S, i, \mathrm{sig}, \mathrm{pk}, \tau, e)checkSchnorrSignature(tx,S,i,sig,pk,τ,e) (with SSS the spent-output list, iii the input index, τ\tauτ the tapscript flag, eee the ExecData) is the Boolean computed as follows: if ∣sig∣≠64|\mathrm{sig}| \neq 64∣sig∣=64 and ∣sig∣≠65|\mathrm{sig}| \neq 65∣sig∣=65, false\mathrm{false}false; otherwise let t:=t := t:= the last byte of sig\mathrm{sig}sig as a natural if ∣sig∣=65|\mathrm{sig}| = 65∣sig∣=65, else t:=0t := 0t:=0, and sig′:=sig\mathrm{sig}' := \mathrm{sig}sig′:=sig without its last byte if ∣sig∣=65|\mathrm{sig}| = 65∣sig∣=65, else sig\mathrm{sig}sig; if ∣sig∣=65|\mathrm{sig}| = 65∣sig∣=65 and t=0t = 0t=0, false\mathrm{false}false; otherwise compute sigHashSchnorr(tx,S,i,t,τ,e)\mathrm{sigHashSchnorr}(\mathrm{tx}, S, i, t, \tau, e)sigHashSchnorr(tx,S,i,t,τ,e) — if that is none\mathrm{none}none, false\mathrm{false}false; if it is some(h)\mathrm{some}(h)some(h), the result is schnorrVerify(pk,h,sig′)\mathrm{schnorrVerify}(\mathrm{pk}, h, \mathrm{sig}')schnorrVerify(pk,h,sig′).

schnorrVerify(pk,m,σ)\mathrm{schnorrVerify}(\mathrm{pk}, m, \sigma)schnorrVerify(pk,m,σ) is: false\mathrm{false}false if ∣pk∣≠32|\mathrm{pk}| \neq 32∣pk∣=32 or ∣σ∣≠64|\sigma| \neq 64∣σ∣=64; let r:=BE(σ[0:32])r := \mathrm{BE}(\sigma[0{:}32])r:=BE(σ[0:32]) and s:=BE(σ[32:64])s := \mathrm{BE}(\sigma[32{:}64])s:=BE(σ[32:64]) (big-endian values); false\mathrm{false}false if p≤rp \le rp≤r or n≤sn \le sn≤s (p=2256−232−977p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977p=2256−232−977 the field prime, nnn the secp256k1 group order); let P:=liftX(BE(pk))P := \mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{BE}(\mathrm{pk}))P:=liftX(BE(pk)), which is none\mathrm{none}none if BE(pk)≥p\mathrm{BE}(\mathrm{pk}) \ge pBE(pk)≥p, and otherwise, with x:=BE(pk)x := \mathrm{BE}(\mathrm{pk})x:=BE(pk) and y:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4 mod py := (x^3 + 7)^{(p+1)/4} \bmod py:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4modp, is the point (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) if yyy is even, or (x,p−y)(x, p - y)(x,p−y) if yyy is odd, provided y2≡x3+7(modp)y^2 \equiv x^3 + 7 \pmod py2≡x3+7(modp), and none\mathrm{none}none otherwise; false\mathrm{false}false if PPP is none\mathrm{none}none; let c:=BE(tagged("BIP0340/challenge",σ[0:32] ∥ pk ∥ m)) mod nc := \mathrm{BE}\big(\mathrm{tagged}(\texttt{"BIP0340/challenge"}, \sigma[0{:}32] \,\Vert\, \mathrm{pk} \,\Vert\, m)\big) \bmod nc:=BE(tagged("BIP0340/challenge",σ[0:32]∥pk∥m))modn; let R:=s⋅G+((n−c) mod n)⋅PR := s\cdot G + ((n - c) \bmod n)\cdot PR:=s⋅G+((n−c)modn)⋅P computed with the bundle's affine addition/doubling formulas (with the point at infinity as none\mathrm{none}none) and a 257-step double-and-add; false\mathrm{false}false if RRR is none\mathrm{none}none; otherwise true\mathrm{true}true iff yRy_RyR​ is even and xR=rx_R = rxR​=r.

sigHashSchnorr(tx,S,i,t,τ,e)\mathrm{sigHashSchnorr}(\mathrm{tx}, S, i, t, \tau, e)sigHashSchnorr(tx,S,i,t,τ,e), with e=(a,A,L,κ)e = (a, A, L, \kappa)e=(a,A,L,κ) (annex present, annex hash, tapleaf hash, code-separator position), is: none\mathrm{none}none unless t∈{0,1,2,3,0x81,0x82,0x83}t \in \{0,1,2,3,\texttt{0x81},\texttt{0x82},\texttt{0x83}\}t∈{0,1,2,3,0x81,0x82,0x83}; let o:=1o := 1o:=1 if t=0t = 0t=0 else t & 3t \,\&\, 3t&3; ι:=t & 0x80\iota := t \,\&\, \texttt{0x80}ι:=t&0x80; ς:=2 [τ]+[a]\varsigma := 2\,[\tau] + [a]ς:=2[τ]+[a] (so 000, 111, 222 or 333); I:=I :=I:= the iii-th input of tx\mathrm{tx}tx, or, if i≥∣vin∣i \ge |\mathrm{vin}|i≥∣vin∣, the default input (prevout with empty hash and index 000, empty scriptSig, sequence 000, empty witness); if o=3o = 3o=3 then single:=\mathrm{single} :=single:= none\mathrm{none}none when ∣vout∣≤i|\mathrm{vout}| \le i∣vout∣≤i and otherwise SHA256(serTxOut(vouti))\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{serTxOut}(\mathrm{vout}_i))SHA256(serTxOut(vouti​)), else single:=[ ]\mathrm{single} := [\,]single:=[]; if single\mathrm{single}single is none\mathrm{none}none the result is none\mathrm{none}none; otherwise the result is some\mathrm{some}some of

tagged("TapSighash", [0x00,t mod 256] ∥ le32(version) ∥ le32(nLockTime) ∥ Hin ∥ Hout ∥ [ς] ∥ D ∥ (A if a else [ ]) ∥ single ∥ (L∥[0x00]∥le32(κ) if τ else [ ]))\mathrm{tagged}\Big(\texttt{"TapSighash"},\ [\texttt{0x00}, t \bmod 256] \,\Vert\, \mathrm{le32}(\mathrm{version}) \,\Vert\, \mathrm{le32}(\mathrm{nLockTime}) \,\Vert\, H_{\mathrm{in}} \,\Vert\, H_{\mathrm{out}} \,\Vert\, [\varsigma] \,\Vert\, D \,\Vert\, (A \text{ if } a \text{ else } [\,]) \,\Vert\, \mathrm{single} \,\Vert\, (L \Vert [\texttt{0x00}] \Vert \mathrm{le32}(\kappa) \text{ if } \tau \text{ else } [\,])\Big)tagged("TapSighash", [0x00,tmod256]∥le32(version)∥le32(nLockTime)∥Hin​∥Hout​∥[ς]∥D∥(A if a else [])∥single∥(L∥[0x00]∥le32(κ) if τ else []))

where HinH_{\mathrm{in}}Hin​ is empty if ι=0x80\iota = \texttt{0x80}ι=0x80 and otherwise is the concatenation of four SHA-256 digests: of all inputs' serialized outpoints (hash ∥\Vert∥ le32 index), of all elements of SSS's values as 8-byte little-endian two's complement, of all elements of SSS's scriptPubKeys each prefixed by its CompactSize length, and of all inputs' le32 sequences; HoutH_{\mathrm{out}}Hout​ is the SHA-256 of all outputs serialized (le64 two's-complement value ∥\Vert∥ CompactSize-prefixed script) if o=1o = 1o=1, and empty otherwise; DDD is serOutPoint(I.prevout) ∥ serTxOut(Si or the default output (−1,[ ]) if i≥∣S∣) ∥ le32(I.nSequence)\mathrm{serOutPoint}(I.\mathrm{prevout}) \,\Vert\, \mathrm{serTxOut}(S_i \text{ or the default output } (-1, [\,]) \text{ if } i \ge |S|) \,\Vert\, \mathrm{le32}(I.\mathrm{nSequence})serOutPoint(I.prevout)∥serTxOut(Si​ or the default output (−1,[]) if i≥∣S∣)∥le32(I.nSequence) if ι=0x80\iota = \texttt{0x80}ι=0x80, and le32(i)\mathrm{le32}(i)le32(i) otherwise. tagged(T,m)=SHA256(SHA256(T)∥SHA256(T)∥m)\mathrm{tagged}(T, m) = \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{SHA256}(T)\Vert\mathrm{SHA256}(T)\Vert m)tagged(T,m)=SHA256(SHA256(T)∥SHA256(T)∥m) with TTT the UTF-8 bytes of the tag; le32(x)\mathrm{le32}(x)le32(x) is the 4-byte little-endian encoding of x mod 232x \bmod 2^{32}xmod232; CompactSize is 1 byte below 253253253, else 0xfd\texttt{0xfd}0xfd + 2 bytes up to 0xffff\texttt{0xffff}0xffff, else 0xfe\texttt{0xfe}0xfe + 4 bytes up to 0xffffffff\texttt{0xffffffff}0xffffffff, else 0xff\texttt{0xff}0xff + 8 bytes. All SHA-256 computations are the bundle's own implementation.

Edge cases the quantifiers include. sig\mathrm{sig}sig of any length, including empty or 65 bytes ending in 0x00\texttt{0x00}0x00 (both sides false\mathrm{false}false); sig\mathrm{sig}sig beginning with 0x50\texttt{0x50}0x50 (no annex, since ∣W∣=1|W| = 1∣W∣=1); qqq of any length; c.nInc.\mathrm{nIn}c.nIn beyond vin\mathrm{vin}vin or spent\mathrm{spent}spent (defaults substituted); spent\mathrm{spent}spent of length unrelated to the inputs; c.flagsc.\mathrm{flags}c.flags arbitrary, including taproot off.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 27, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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