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Definitions for On the role of coherent attacks in a type of strategic problem related to quantum key distribution

Definition
QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakethird100_P18

by Gohan · Nov 1, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

The objects the formalized statements of On the role of coherent attacks in a type of strategic problem related to quantum key distribution (arXiv:quant-ph/0110089) are stated in. Each was checked against the paper by a blind read-back and a moderator.

  • LocalProtocol: PDF pp.1–3: one local prepare-and-measure protocol, including local sifting. The three independent draws are the secret raw symbol, Alice's preparation choice, and Bob's measurement choice. Public announcements depend only on the last two choices. All retained ideal signals decode correctly; all errors in an attack are consequently channel errors, including Eve's action.
  • QkdLabel: PDF pp.1–3: a local secret symbol and the two local settings.
  • qkdRetainedMass: PDF p.2: probability of retaining a local signal under basis reconciliation; this is basis sifting, not a disturbance test or an acceptance event.
  • qkdLabelWeight: PDF pp.2–3: the actual normalized distribution of a retained local input.
  • Inputs: PDF pp.1–3: independent retained local inputs; the local distributions may differ.
  • Raw: PDF pp.1–3: the entire raw string.
  • Public: PDF pp.2–3: publicly revealed settings, with no secret raw symbols.
  • Signal: PDF pp.1–3: computational coordinates on the tensor product signal register.
  • qkdInputWeight: PDF p.3: actual ensemble probability of the independent local inputs.
  • inputAmplitude: PDF pp.1–2: Alice's independent joint signal is the tensor product of the local normalized preparations. No identical-distribution assumption is made.
  • publicInput: PDF p.2: the public basis/sifting announcement associated with an input.
  • rawInput: PDF pp.2,5: the secret raw string is not public conditioning information.
  • JointSpace: PDF p.2: finite signal register tensored with an arbitrary Hilbert ancilla, represented as a finite Hilbert direct sum of copies of the ancilla.
  • AncillaPOVM: PDF p.2: arbitrary-outcome POVM on an arbitrary Hilbert ancilla. The scalar measures are pinned on every measurable set by the Born formula; their being measures expresses weak countable additivity of the operator POVM. They are not free probability kernels or an assumed information interface. Normalization makes the law of a unit vector a probability measure.
  • Attack: PDF pp.2–3: an unrestricted coherent attack. The ancilla dimension and POVM outcome space are arbitrary. The initial ancilla and joint unitary do not depend on the secret input or on unrevealed settings. The delayed final POVM may depend on the public announcement, but not on any secret raw symbol.
  • qkdOutputState: PDF p.2: the unitary output on Alice's tensor product and Eve's fixed probe.
  • qkdOutcomeLaw: PDF pp.2–3: Eve's Born outcome law after tracing out Bob's signal register. The sum over Bob's computational coordinates is the partial trace; Eve can choose any joint POVM on her retained probe after the announcement.
  • bobCorrect: PDF pp.2–3: probability that Bob's independent local measurement reads the correct raw symbol at coordinate i. The Kronecker deltas leave other signals untouched. This computes the local Born probability from the actual output.
  • qkdDisturbance: PDF pp.2–4: the entire vector of ensemble-average local raw-symbol errors. No scalar mean, finite test sample, or passing-test conditioning replaces it.
  • qkdShannonBits: PDF pp.3,5: Shannon entropy in bits, with 0 log 0 = 0.
  • priorMass: PDF pp.3,5: subprobability mass of a raw word and public announcement, computed from Alice's independent ensemble and the protocol's local sifting.
  • publicMass: PDF p.3: probability of a public configuration; zero-probability configurations have zero contribution to the average information.
  • qkdJointOutcome: PDF pp.3,5: the joint submeasure of a secret raw word and Eve's outcome, with a specified public announcement. Every weight uses the actual ensemble.
  • publicOutcome: PDF pp.3,5: Eve's outcome submeasure for a fixed public announcement.
  • posterior: PDF p.5, eqs.(0.3),(0.5): the posterior raw-word probabilities given Eve's outcome and only the public announcement. Radon–Nikodym derivatives allow arbitrary measurable POVM outcome spaces; null outcomes do not affect averages.
  • experimentInformation: PDF pp.3,5–6: ensemble-average total classical Shannon information about the whole raw string. It is H(raw|public) minus H(raw|public,Eve outcome), averaging both configurations and outcomes. This is measured classical information, not Holevo information or a final secret-key rate.
  • qkdInformation: PDF p.3: Eve's information in the physical attack, using its computed Born law.
  • qkdOneSite: PDF p.4: the single-signal protocol associated with one coordinate.
  • SingleAttack: PDF p.4: a physical individual attack on one signal.
  • singleDisturbance: PDF p.4: disturbance of a single-signal attack.
  • OptimalAt: PDF p.4: being individually optimal at the exact prescribed disturbance. The comparison ranges over every physical single-signal attack, with arbitrary probe and delayed POVM. This predicate asserts optimality, not existence.
  • QkdFeasible: PDF pp.3–4: a disturbance vector is feasible precisely when some physical attack on this protocol induces it. No numerical interval is substituted.
  • ProductAttack: PDF pp.3–4, eq.(0.2): product of individual attacks, represented by the local unitaries, independent initial probes, and local POVMs. Both stages factor.
  • singleLaw: PDF pp.3–4: the local Born law of one factor in a product attack.
  • qkdProductLaw: PDF pp.3–4: actual joint outcome law of the tensor product attacking scheme. The finite product measure preserves every local outcome and announcement; there is no joint measurement substituted for the individual measurements.
  • productDisturbance: PDF pp.3–4: local errors of the operational tensor product scheme.
  • productInformation: PDF pp.3–5: the product scheme's information is computed from its product Born law and posterior entropy, rather than defined to be the sum.
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Defs_Ensemble

/-!
Wang, arXiv:quant-ph/0110089v6, PDF pp.1–7.

The protocol describes independent finite signal ensembles and local sifting.
An attack has an arbitrary complete Hilbert ancilla and an arbitrary measurable
POVM outcome space. Its interaction is fixed before the secret input is drawn;
only its final POVM can depend on the public local announcements. The product
scheme is represented by its actual local physical attacks and the product of
their Born laws. It does not require a choice of coordinates on their tensor
product ancilla. All information quantities concern the raw string, in bits.
-/

noncomputable section

open MeasureTheory
open scoped BigOperators

namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18

/-- PDF pp.1–3: one local prepare-and-measure protocol, including local sifting.
The three independent draws are the secret raw symbol, Alice's preparation
choice, and Bob's measurement choice. Public announcements depend only on the
last two choices. All retained ideal signals decode correctly; all errors in
an attack are consequently channel errors, including Eve's action. -/
structure LocalProtocol where
  rawSize : ℕ
  prepSize : ℕ
  bobSize : ℕ
  publicSize : ℕ
  dimension : ℕ
  raw_pos : 0 < rawSize
  prep_pos : 0 < prepSize
  bob_pos : 0 < bobSize
  public_pos : 0 < publicSize
  dimension_pos : 0 < dimension
  rawWeight : Fin rawSize → ℝ
  prepWeight : Fin prepSize → ℝ
  bobWeight : Fin bobSize → ℝ
  raw_nonneg : ∀ x, 0 ≤ rawWeight x
  prep_nonneg : ∀ a, 0 ≤ prepWeight a
  bob_nonneg : ∀ b, 0 ≤ bobWeight b
  raw_total : ∑ x, rawWeight x = 1
  prep_total : ∑ a, prepWeight a = 1
  bob_total : ∑ b, bobWeight b = 1
  prepare : Fin rawSize → Fin prepSize → EuclideanSpace ℂ (Fin dimension)
  prepare_unit : ∀ x a, QAlgorithms.IsState (prepare x a)
  bobPOVM : Fin bobSize → Fin rawSize → Matrix (Fin dimension) (Fin dimension) ℂ
  bob_valid : ∀ b, QAlgorithms.IsPOVM (bobPOVM b)
  keep : Fin prepSize → Fin bobSize → Bool
  announce : Fin prepSize → Fin bobSize → Fin publicSize
  retained_positive : 0 < ∑ a, ∑ b,
    if keep a b then prepWeight a * bobWeight b else 0
  ideal_correct : ∀ x a b, keep a b = true →
    QAlgorithms.effectProb (bobPOVM b x) (QAlgorithms.pureDensity (prepare x a)) = 1

/-- PDF pp.1–3: a local secret symbol and the two local settings. -/
abbrev QkdLabel (P : LocalProtocol) :=
  Fin P.rawSize × Fin P.prepSize × Fin P.bobSize

/-- PDF p.2: probability of retaining a local signal under basis reconciliation;
this is basis sifting, not a disturbance test or an acceptance event. -/
def qkdRetainedMass (P : LocalProtocol) : ℝ :=
  ∑ a, ∑ b, if P.keep a b then P.prepWeight a * P.bobWeight b else 0

/-- PDF pp.2–3: the actual normalized distribution of a retained local input. -/
def qkdLabelWeight (P : LocalProtocol) (l : QkdLabel P) : ℝ :=
  if P.keep l.2.1 l.2.2 then
    P.rawWeight l.1 * P.prepWeight l.2.1 * P.bobWeight l.2.2 / qkdRetainedMass P
  else 0

/-- PDF pp.1–3: independent retained local inputs; the local distributions may differ. -/
abbrev Inputs {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) := ∀ i, QkdLabel (P i)

/-- PDF pp.1–3: the entire raw string. -/
abbrev Raw {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) := ∀ i, Fin (P i).rawSize

/-- PDF pp.2–3: publicly revealed settings, with no secret raw symbols. -/
abbrev Public {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) := ∀ i, Fin (P i).publicSize

/-- PDF pp.1–3: computational coordinates on the tensor product signal register. -/
abbrev Signal {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) := ∀ i, Fin (P i).dimension

/-- PDF p.3: actual ensemble probability of the independent local inputs. -/
def qkdInputWeight {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (l : Inputs P) : ℝ :=
  ∏ i, qkdLabelWeight (P i) (l i)

/-- PDF pp.1–2: Alice's independent joint signal is the tensor product of the
local normalized preparations. No identical-distribution assumption is made. -/
def inputAmplitude {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (l : Inputs P)
    (z : Signal P) : ℂ :=
  ∏ i, (P i).prepare (l i).1 (l i).2.1 (z i)

/-- PDF p.2: the public basis/sifting announcement associated with an input. -/
def publicInput {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (l : Inputs P) : Public P :=
  fun i => (P i).announce (l i).2.1 (l i).2.2

/-- PDF pp.2,5: the secret raw string is not public conditioning information. -/
def rawInput {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (l : Inputs P) : Raw P :=
  fun i => (l i).1

/-- PDF p.2: finite signal register tensored with an arbitrary Hilbert ancilla,
represented as a finite Hilbert direct sum of copies of the ancilla. -/
abbrev JointSpace {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (E : Type)
    [NormedAddCommGroup E] := PiLp 2 (fun _ : Signal P => E)

/-- PDF p.2: arbitrary-outcome POVM on an arbitrary Hilbert ancilla.
The scalar measures are pinned on every measurable set by the Born formula;
their being measures expresses weak countable additivity of the operator POVM.
They are not free probability kernels or an assumed information interface.
Normalization makes the law of a unit vector a probability measure. -/
structure AncillaPOVM (E O : Type) [NormedAddCommGroup E]
    [InnerProductSpace ℂ E] [MeasurableSpace O] where
  effect : Set O → E →L[ℂ] E
  positive : ∀ B, MeasurableSet B → ∀ v,
    (inner ℂ v (effect B v)).im = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ (inner ℂ v (effect B v)).re
  normalized : effect Set.univ = ContinuousLinearMap.id ℂ E
  law : E → Measure O
  born : ∀ v B, MeasurableSet B →
    law v B = ENNReal.ofReal (inner ℂ v (effect B v)).re

/-- PDF pp.2–3: an unrestricted coherent attack. The ancilla dimension and
POVM outcome space are arbitrary. The initial ancilla and joint unitary do not
depend on the secret input or on unrevealed settings. The delayed final POVM
may depend on the public announcement, but not on any secret raw symbol. -/
structure Attack {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) where
  Ancilla : Type
  [ancillaNorm : NormedAddCommGroup Ancilla]
  [ancillaInner : InnerProductSpace ℂ Ancilla]
  [ancillaComplete : CompleteSpace Ancilla]
  initial : Ancilla
  initial_unit : ‖initial‖ = 1
  unitary : JointSpace P Ancilla ≃ₗᵢ[ℂ] JointSpace P Ancilla
  Outcome : Type
  [outcomeMeasurable : MeasurableSpace Outcome]
  measurement : Public P → AncillaPOVM Ancilla Outcome

attribute [instance] Attack.ancillaNorm Attack.ancillaInner Attack.ancillaComplete
attribute [instance] Attack.outcomeMeasurable

/-- PDF p.2: the unitary output on Alice's tensor product and Eve's fixed probe. -/
def qkdOutputState {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P)
    (l : Inputs P) : JointSpace P A.Ancilla :=
  A.unitary (WithLp.toLp 2 (fun z => inputAmplitude P l z • A.initial))

/-- PDF pp.2–3: Eve's Born outcome law after tracing out Bob's signal register.
The sum over Bob's computational coordinates is the partial trace; Eve can
choose any joint POVM on her retained probe after the announcement. -/
def qkdOutcomeLaw {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P)
    (l : Inputs P) (c : Public P) : Measure A.Outcome :=
  ∑ z : Signal P, (A.measurement c).law (qkdOutputState A l z)

/-- PDF pp.2–3: probability that Bob's independent local measurement reads the
correct raw symbol at coordinate i. The Kronecker deltas leave other signals
untouched. This computes the local Born probability from the actual output. -/
def bobCorrect {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P)
    (l : Inputs P) (i : Fin n) : ℝ :=
  (∑ z : Signal P, ∑ w : Signal P,
    if ∀ j, j ≠ i → z j = w j then
      (P i).bobPOVM (l i).2.2 (l i).1 (z i) (w i) *
        inner ℂ (qkdOutputState A l z) (qkdOutputState A l w)
    else 0).re

/-- PDF pp.2–4: the entire vector of ensemble-average local raw-symbol errors.
No scalar mean, finite test sample, or passing-test conditioning replaces it. -/
def qkdDisturbance {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P) : Fin n → ℝ :=
  fun i => ∑ l : Inputs P, qkdInputWeight P l * (1 - bobCorrect A l i)

/-- PDF pp.3,5: Shannon entropy in bits, with 0 log 0 = 0. -/
def qkdShannonBits {X : Type} [Fintype X] (p : X → ℝ) : ℝ :=
  -∑ x, p x * (Real.log (p x) / Real.log 2)

/-- PDF pp.3,5: subprobability mass of a raw word and public announcement,
computed from Alice's independent ensemble and the protocol's local sifting. -/
def priorMass {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (c : Public P) (x : Raw P) : ℝ :=
  ∑ l : Inputs P,
    if publicInput P l = c ∧ rawInput P l = x then qkdInputWeight P l else 0

/-- PDF p.3: probability of a public configuration; zero-probability configurations
have zero contribution to the average information. -/
def publicMass {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (c : Public P) : ℝ :=
  ∑ x : Raw P, priorMass P c x

/-- PDF pp.3,5: the joint submeasure of a secret raw word and Eve's outcome,
with a specified public announcement. Every weight uses the actual ensemble. -/
def qkdJointOutcome {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) {O : Type}
    [MeasurableSpace O] (law : Inputs P → Public P → Measure O)
    (c : Public P) (x : Raw P) : Measure O :=
  ∑ l : Inputs P,
    if publicInput P l = c ∧ rawInput P l = x then
      ENNReal.ofReal (qkdInputWeight P l) • law l c
    else 0

/-- PDF pp.3,5: Eve's outcome submeasure for a fixed public announcement. -/
def publicOutcome {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) {O : Type}
    [MeasurableSpace O] (law : Inputs P → Public P → Measure O)
    (c : Public P) : Measure O :=
  ∑ x : Raw P, qkdJointOutcome P law c x

/-- PDF p.5, eqs.(0.3),(0.5): the posterior raw-word probabilities given Eve's
outcome and only the public announcement. Radon–Nikodym derivatives allow
arbitrary measurable POVM outcome spaces; null outcomes do not affect averages. -/
def posterior {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) {O : Type}
    [MeasurableSpace O] (law : Inputs P → Public P → Measure O)
    (c : Public P) (y : O) (x : Raw P) : ℝ :=
  ((qkdJointOutcome P law c x).rnDeriv (publicOutcome P law c) y).toReal

/-- PDF pp.3,5–6: ensemble-average total classical Shannon information about
the whole raw string. It is H(raw|public) minus H(raw|public,Eve outcome),
averaging both configurations and outcomes. This is measured classical
information, not Holevo information or a final secret-key rate. -/
def experimentInformation {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) {O : Type}
    [MeasurableSpace O] (law : Inputs P → Public P → Measure O) : ℝ :=
  ∑ c : Public P,
    (publicMass P c * qkdShannonBits (fun x => priorMass P c x / publicMass P c) -
      ∫ y, qkdShannonBits (posterior P law c y) ∂(publicOutcome P law c))

/-- PDF p.3: Eve's information in the physical attack, using its computed Born law. -/
def qkdInformation {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P) : ℝ :=
  experimentInformation P (qkdOutcomeLaw A)

/-- PDF p.4: the single-signal protocol associated with one coordinate. -/
def qkdOneSite (P : LocalProtocol) : Fin 1 → LocalProtocol := fun _ => P

/-- PDF p.4: a physical individual attack on one signal. -/
abbrev SingleAttack (P : LocalProtocol) := Attack (qkdOneSite P)

/-- PDF p.4: disturbance of a single-signal attack. -/
def singleDisturbance {P : LocalProtocol} (A : SingleAttack P) : ℝ :=
  qkdDisturbance A 0

/-- PDF p.4: being individually optimal at the exact prescribed disturbance.
The comparison ranges over every physical single-signal attack, with arbitrary
probe and delayed POVM. This predicate asserts optimality, not existence. -/
def OptimalAt (P : LocalProtocol) (d : ℝ) (A : SingleAttack P) : Prop :=
  singleDisturbance A = d ∧
    ∀ B : SingleAttack P, singleDisturbance B = d → qkdInformation B ≤ qkdInformation A

/-- PDF pp.3–4: a disturbance vector is feasible precisely when some physical
attack on this protocol induces it. No numerical interval is substituted. -/
def QkdFeasible {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) (d : Fin n → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∃ A : Attack P, qkdDisturbance A = d

/-- PDF pp.3–4, eq.(0.2): product of individual attacks, represented by the local
unitaries, independent initial probes, and local POVMs. Both stages factor. -/
abbrev ProductAttack {n : ℕ} (P : Fin n → LocalProtocol) :=
  ∀ i, SingleAttack (P i)

/-- PDF pp.3–4: the local Born law of one factor in a product attack. -/
def singleLaw {P : LocalProtocol} (A : SingleAttack P) (l : QkdLabel P)
    (c : Fin P.publicSize) : Measure A.Outcome :=
  qkdOutcomeLaw A (fun _ => l) (fun _ => c)

/-- PDF pp.3–4: actual joint outcome law of the tensor product attacking scheme.
The finite product measure preserves every local outcome and announcement;
there is no joint measurement substituted for the individual measurements. -/
def qkdProductLaw {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : ProductAttack P)
    (l : Inputs P) (c : Public P) : Measure (∀ i, (A i).Outcome) :=
  Measure.pi (fun i => singleLaw (A i) (l i) (c i))

/-- PDF pp.3–4: local errors of the operational tensor product scheme. -/
def productDisturbance {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol}
    (A : ProductAttack P) : Fin n → ℝ :=
  fun i => singleDisturbance (A i)

/-- PDF pp.3–5: the product scheme's information is computed from its product
Born law and posterior entropy, rather than defined to be the sum. -/
def productInformation {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol}
    (A : ProductAttack P) : ℝ :=
  experimentInformation P (qkdProductLaw A)

/-- Sanity check for PDF p.5: a deterministic distribution has zero uncertainty. -/
example : qkdShannonBits (fun _ : Unit => (1 : ℝ)) = 0 := by
  simp [qkdShannonBits]

/-- Sanity check: a zero-probability symbol contributes zero, without log singularities. -/
example : (0 : ℝ) * (Real.log 0 / Real.log 2) = 0 := by
  simp

/-- Sanity check: arbitrary-outcome POVM laws really use the normalized Born rule. -/
example {E O : Type} [NormedAddCommGroup E] [InnerProductSpace ℂ E]
    [MeasurableSpace O] (M : AncillaPOVM E O) (v : E) :
    M.law v Set.univ = ENNReal.ofReal (inner ℂ v v).re := by
  rw [M.born v Set.univ MeasurableSet.univ, M.normalized]
  rfl

/-- Sanity check: an empty measurable event has zero outcome probability. -/
example {E O : Type} [NormedAddCommGroup E] [InnerProductSpace ℂ E]
    [MeasurableSpace O] (M : AncillaPOVM E O) (v : E) : M.law v ∅ = 0 := by
  exact measure_empty

/-- Sanity check: the physical interaction preserves norms on the whole joint space. -/
example {n : ℕ} {P : Fin n → LocalProtocol} (A : Attack P)
    (v : JointSpace P A.Ancilla) : ‖A.unitary v‖ = ‖v‖ := by
  exact A.unitary.norm_map v

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18
Source
On the role of coherent attacks in a type of strategic problem related to quantum key distribution, arXiv:quant-ph/0110089v6, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0110089v6
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.AncillaPOVM

For any normed additive commutative group EEE equipped with a complex inner product space structure, and any type OOO equipped with a measurable space structure, an ancilla measurement consists of a continuous complex linear operator FB:E→EF_B:E\to EFB​:E→E for every subset B⊆OB\subseteq OB⊆O, together with a measure μv\mu_vμv​ on OOO for every vector v∈Ev\in Ev∈E. These data must satisfy

Im⁡⟨v,FBv⟩=0,0≤Re⁡⟨v,FBv⟩,μv(B)=ofReal⁡ ⁣(Re⁡⟨v,FBv⟩)\operatorname{Im}\langle v,F_Bv\rangle=0,\qquad 0\leq\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_Bv\rangle,\qquad \mu_v(B)=\operatorname{ofReal}\!\left(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_Bv\rangle\right)Im⟨v,FB​v⟩=0,0≤Re⟨v,FB​v⟩,μv​(B)=ofReal(Re⟨v,FB​v⟩)

for every measurable BBB and every vvv, and FO=idEF_O=\mathrm{id}_EFO​=idE​. Here ofReal⁡(r)\operatorname{ofReal}(r)ofReal(r) is the nonnegative extended real number obtained by replacing a negative real rrr with zero. The operators are supplied on all subsets, but positivity and the displayed measure identity are required only on measurable subsets. Vectors need not be normalized; completeness of EEE, finiteness of OOO, and nonemptiness of OOO are not assumed.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.Attack

For any natural number nnn and family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, write di>0d_i>0di​>0 and ci>0c_i>0ci​>0 for their recorded signal dimensions and public alphabet sizes, and put Z=∏i{0,…,di−1}Z=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,d_i-1\}Z=∏i​{0,…,di​−1} and C=∏i{0,…,ci−1}C=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,c_i-1\}C=∏i​{0,…,ci​−1}. An attack consists of a complete complex inner product space EEE, with its normed additive commutative group structure; an initial vector e∈Ee\in Ee∈E satisfying ∥e∥=1\|e\|=1∥e∥=1; a bijective complex linear isometry

U:ℓ2(Z;E)⟶ℓ2(Z;E);U:\ell^2(Z;E)\longrightarrow\ell^2(Z;E);U:ℓ2(Z;E)⟶ℓ2(Z;E);

an outcome type OOO equipped with a measurable space structure; and, for every c∈Cc\in Cc∈C, a family of continuous complex linear operators Fc,B:E→EF_{c,B}:E\to EFc,B​:E→E, indexed by all subsets B⊆OB\subseteq OB⊆O, and measures μc,v\mu_{c,v}μc,v​ on OOO, indexed by v∈Ev\in Ev∈E. For every measurable BBB and every vvv, these satisfy Im⁡⟨v,Fc,Bv⟩=0\operatorname{Im}\langle v,F_{c,B}v\rangle=0Im⟨v,Fc,B​v⟩=0, Re⁡⟨v,Fc,Bv⟩≥0\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_{c,B}v\rangle\geq0Re⟨v,Fc,B​v⟩≥0, and μc,v(B)=ofReal⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc,Bv⟩)\mu_{c,v}(B)=\operatorname{ofReal}(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_{c,B}v\rangle)μc,v​(B)=ofReal(Re⟨v,Fc,B​v⟩), while Fc,O=idEF_{c,O}=\mathrm{id}_EFc,O​=idE​. Here ℓ2(Z;E)\ell^2(Z;E)ℓ2(Z;E) is the space of EEE-valued functions on ZZZ, with squared norm ∑z∥v(z)∥2\sum_z\|v(z)\|^2∑z​∥v(z)∥2. No finite dimensionality of EEE or finiteness of OOO is required. The case n=0n=0n=0 is included: both ZZZ and CCC then contain one empty tuple, and UUU acts on a space with one EEE-valued coordinate.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.Inputs

For every natural number nnn, including 000, and every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by 0≤i<n0\le i<n0≤i<n, an input is a family l=(li)i<nl=(l_i)_{i<n}l=(li​)i<n​ with li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​), where 0≤xi<Pi.rawSize0\le x_i<P_i.\mathrm{rawSize}0≤xi​<Pi​.rawSize, 0≤ai<Pi.prepSize0\le a_i<P_i.\mathrm{prepSize}0≤ai​<Pi​.prepSize, and 0≤bi<Pi.bobSize0\le b_i<P_i.\mathrm{bobSize}0≤bi​<Pi​.bobSize. There is no restriction requiring retained choices or positive weights. For n=0n=0n=0, there is exactly one such family, the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.JointSpace

For any natural number nnn, any family PiP_iPi​ of local protocols indexed by i∈{0,…,n−1}i\in\{0,\ldots,n-1\}i∈{0,…,n−1}, and any type EEE equipped with a normed additive commutative group structure, let di>0d_i>0di​>0 be the signal dimension recorded by PiP_iPi​. The joint space is the space of functions from

Z=∏i=0n−1{0,…,di−1}Z=\prod_{i=0}^{n-1}\{0,\ldots,d_i-1\}Z=i=0∏n−1​{0,…,di​−1}

to EEE, equipped with the finite ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 norm

∥v∥=(∑z∈Z∥v(z)∥2)1/2.\|v\|=\left(\sum_{z\in Z}\|v(z)\|^2\right)^{1/2}.∥v∥=(z∈Z∑​∥v(z)∥2)1/2.

This definition requires neither a complex vector space structure nor completeness on EEE. It includes n=0n=0n=0: then ZZZ consists of the single empty tuple, so the joint space has one EEE-valued coordinate.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.LocalProtocol

A local protocol consists of five strictly positive natural numbers r,s,t,u,Dr,s,t,u,Dr,s,t,u,D, specifying respectively the numbers of raw labels, preparation choices, Bob choices, public labels, and complex vector coordinates; three families of real weights pxp_xpx​, qaq_aqa​, and vbv_bvb​, indexed respectively by 0≤x<r0\le x<r0≤x<r, 0≤a<s0\le a<s0≤a<s, and 0≤b<t0\le b<t0≤b<t, with every weight nonnegative and ∑xpx=∑aqa=∑bvb=1\sum_xp_x=\sum_aq_a=\sum_bv_b=1∑x​px​=∑a​qa​=∑b​vb​=1; a vector ψx,a∈CD\psi_{x,a}\in\mathbb C^Dψx,a​∈CD for every x,ax,ax,a, satisfying ∥ψx,a∥=1\|\psi_{x,a}\|=1∥ψx,a​∥=1; and, for every bbb, matrices Mb,x∈CD×DM_{b,x}\in\mathbb C^{D\times D}Mb,x​∈CD×D indexed by raw labels xxx, each positive semidefinite and satisfying ∑xMb,x=ID\sum_xM_{b,x}=I_D∑x​Mb,x​=ID​. It also includes a Boolean function K(a,b)K(a,b)K(a,b) and a public-label function C(a,b)∈{0,…,u−1}C(a,b)\in\{0,\ldots,u-1\}C(a,b)∈{0,…,u−1}, subject to ∑a,b: K(a,b)=trueqavb>0\sum_{a,b:\,K(a,b)=\mathrm{true}}q_av_b>0∑a,b:K(a,b)=true​qa​vb​>0. Finally, for every x,a,bx,a,bx,a,b with K(a,b)=trueK(a,b)=\mathrm{true}K(a,b)=true, it requires Re⁡tr⁡(Mb,xρx,a)=1\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(M_{b,x}\rho_{x,a})=1Retr(Mb,x​ρx,a​)=1, where (ρx,a)j,k=ψx,a(j)ψx,a(k)‾(\rho_{x,a})_{j,k}=\psi_{x,a}(j)\overline{\psi_{x,a}(k)}(ρx,a​)j,k​=ψx,a​(j)ψx,a​(k)​. This last requirement applies even when any of the corresponding weights is zero.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.OptimalAt

For a local protocol PPP, any real number ddd, and a single attack AAA on PPP, this predicate means that D(A)=dD(A)=dD(A)=d and that every single attack BBB on PPP satisfying D(B)=dD(B)=dD(B)=d also satisfies I(B)≤I(A)I(B)\le I(A)I(B)≤I(A). Here single attacks may have their own complete complex inner-product ancilla spaces EEE, unit initial vectors eee, surjective complex-linear isometries UUU on the one-site signal–ancilla space, measurable outcome types OOO, and public-dependent measurements with positive normalized operator set maps FcF_cFc​ and measures λc,v\lambda_{c,v}λc,v​ satisfying λc,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{c,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle,0)λc,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩,0) for measurable BBB. To specify the two real quantities, write ℓ=(r,a,b)\ell=(r,a,b)ℓ=(r,a,b), let u,p,qu,p,qu,p,q be the protocol’s raw, preparation and Bob-setting weights, let K=∑a,b1keep(a,b)p(a)q(b)>0K=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}(a,b)}p(a)q(b)>0K=∑a,b​1keep(a,b)​p(a)q(b)>0, and put w(ℓ)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/Kw(\ell)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/Kw(ℓ)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/K when retained and 000 otherwise. For each attack CCC, identify the one-site signal tuples with the signal index set SSS, and set vℓC=UC(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)eC)v_\ell^C=U_C(s\mapsto\mathrm{prepare}(r,a)(s)e_C)vℓC​=UC​(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)eC​). Its disturbance is

D(C)=∑ℓ=(r,a,b)w(ℓ)[1−Re⁡∑s,t∈SMb(r)s,t⟨vℓC(s),vℓC(t)⟩],D(C)=\sum_{\ell=(r,a,b)}w(\ell) \left[1-\operatorname{Re}\sum_{s,t\in S} M_b(r)_{s,t}\langle v_\ell^C(s),v_\ell^C(t)\rangle\right],D(C)=ℓ=(r,a,b)∑​w(ℓ)​1−Res,t∈S∑​Mb​(r)s,t​⟨vℓC​(s),vℓC​(t)⟩​,

where Mb(r)M_b(r)Mb​(r) is Bob’s raw-outcome effect. For public value ccc and raw value xxx, set mc,x=∑ℓ: announce(a,b)=c, r=xw(ℓ)m_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,\mathrm{announce}(a,b)=c,\ r=x}w(\ell)mc,x​=∑ℓ:announce(a,b)=c, r=x​w(ℓ), mc=∑xmc,xm_c=\sum_xm_{c,x}mc​=∑x​mc,x​, νc,xC=∑ℓ: announce(a,b)=c, r=xmax⁡(w(ℓ),0)∑sλc,vℓC(s)C\nu_{c,x}^C=\sum_{\ell:\,\mathrm{announce}(a,b)=c,\ r=x}\max(w(\ell),0)\sum_s\lambda^C_{c,v_\ell^C(s)}νc,xC​=∑ℓ:announce(a,b)=c, r=x​max(w(ℓ),0)∑s​λc,vℓC​(s)C​, and νcC=∑xνc,xC\nu_c^C=\sum_x\nu_{c,x}^CνcC​=∑x​νc,xC​. With H(p)=−∑xp(x)log⁡(p(x))/log⁡2H(p)=-\sum_xp(x)\log(p(x))/\log2H(p)=−∑x​p(x)log(p(x))/log2, its information is

I(C)=∑c[mcH ⁣(x↦mc,xmc)−∫H ⁣(x↦(dνc,xCdνcC(y))R)dνcC(y)].I(C)=\sum_c\left[ m_cH\!\left(x\mapsto\frac{m_{c,x}}{m_c}\right) -\int H\!\left(x\mapsto \left(\frac{d\nu_{c,x}^C}{d\nu_c^C}(y)\right)_{\mathbb R}\right)d\nu_c^C(y) \right].I(C)=c∑​[mc​H(x↦mc​mc,x​​)−∫H(x↦(dνcC​dνc,xC​​(y))R​)dνcC​(y)].

The real conversion sends +∞+\infty+∞ to 000, division by 000 and log⁡0\log0log0 are 000, and a nonintegrable real-valued integral is assigned 000. There is no separate restriction on ddd, no uniqueness requirement, and competitors are compared only when their disturbance is exactly ddd.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.ProductAttack

For every natural number nnn, including 000, and every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, i<ni<ni<n, a product attack means a choice, for each i<ni<ni<n, of an attack on the singleton family containing PiP_iPi​. Each choice supplies its own complete complex inner-product ancilla space EiE_iEi​, unit initial vector, surjective complex-linear isometry on its one-site signal–ancilla ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space, measurable outcome type OiO_iOi​, and measurement for every one-site public tuple. A measurement assigns continuous complex-linear operators Fc(B)F_c(B)Fc​(B) to outcome subsets, has real nonnegative quadratic forms on measurable BBB, satisfies Fc(Oi)=IF_c(O_i)=IFc​(Oi​)=I, and supplies measures λc,v\lambda_{c,v}λc,v​ with λc,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{c,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle,0)λc,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩,0) on measurable sets. The component spaces and outcome types may vary with iii; the abbreviation itself specifies a family of single attacks. For n=0n=0n=0, it is the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.Public

For every natural number nnn, including 000, and every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by 0≤i<n0\le i<n0≤i<n, a public value is a family c=(ci)i<nc=(c_i)_{i<n}c=(ci​)i<n​ with ci∈{0,…,Pi.publicSize−1}c_i\in\{0,\ldots,P_i.\mathrm{publicSize}-1\}ci​∈{0,…,Pi​.publicSize−1}. These values need not arise from the protocols’ announcement functions. For n=0n=0n=0, this set contains exactly the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.QkdFeasible

For every natural number nnn, including 000, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, i<ni<ni<n, and every real-valued function ddd on those indices, this predicate asserts the existence of an attack whose disturbance equals ddd at every coordinate. Such an attack consists of a complete complex inner-product ancilla space EEE, a unit initial vector eee, a surjective complex-linear isometry UUU on the ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space of EEE-valued functions on the signal-tuple set SSS, a measurable outcome type, and public-dependent measurements with positive normalized operator set maps and measures satisfying the Born quadratic-form formula. For a label ℓ=((ri,ai,bi))i\ell=((r_i,a_i,b_i))_iℓ=((ri​,ai​,bi​))i​, let vℓ=U(z↦[∏ipreparei(ri,ai)(zi)]e)v_\ell=U(z\mapsto[\prod_i\mathrm{prepare}_i(r_i,a_i)(z_i)]e)vℓ​=U(z↦[∏i​preparei​(ri​,ai​)(zi​)]e), let Ki=∑a,b1keepi(a,b)pi(a)qi(b)>0K_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}_i(a,b)}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0Ki​=∑a,b​1keepi​(a,b)​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0, and let w(ℓ)=∏iui(ri)pi(ai)qi(bi)/Kiw(\ell)=\prod_i u_i(r_i)p_i(a_i)q_i(b_i)/K_iw(ℓ)=∏i​ui​(ri​)pi​(ai​)qi​(bi​)/Ki​ if every local pair is retained and 000 otherwise, using the local raw, preparation and Bob-setting weights. Writing Mi,bi(ri)M_{i,b_i}(r_i)Mi,bi​​(ri​) for Bob’s local raw-outcome effect, the required coordinate equations are

di=∑ℓw(ℓ)[1−Re⁡∑z,t∈Szj=tj for all j≠iMi,bi(ri)zi,ti ⟨vℓ(z),vℓ(t)⟩](i<n).d_i=\sum_\ell w(\ell)\left[ 1-\operatorname{Re} \sum_{\substack{z,t\in S\\z_j=t_j\ \text{for all }j\ne i}} M_{i,b_i}(r_i)_{z_i,t_i}\, \langle v_\ell(z),v_\ell(t)\rangle \right] \qquad(i<n).di​=ℓ∑​w(ℓ)​1−Rez,t∈Szj​=tj​ for all j=i​∑​Mi,bi​​(ri​)zi​,ti​​⟨vℓ​(z),vℓ​(t)⟩​(i<n).

The measurements are part of the existentially quantified attack even though they do not occur in these equations. No range restriction on ddd is separately imposed. At n=0n=0n=0, there are no coordinate equations, while existence of an attack remains part of the definition.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.QkdLabel

For a local protocol PPP, a label is a triple (x,a,b)(x,a,b)(x,a,b), where x∈{0,…,P.rawSize−1}x\in\{0,\ldots,P.\mathrm{rawSize}-1\}x∈{0,…,P.rawSize−1}, a∈{0,…,P.prepSize−1}a\in\{0,\ldots,P.\mathrm{prepSize}-1\}a∈{0,…,P.prepSize−1}, and b∈{0,…,P.bobSize−1}b\in\{0,\ldots,P.\mathrm{bobSize}-1\}b∈{0,…,P.bobSize−1}. All such triples are included, regardless of their weights or whether P.keep(a,b)P.\mathrm{keep}(a,b)P.keep(a,b) is true.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.Raw

For every natural number nnn, including 000, and every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by 0≤i<n0\le i<n0≤i<n, a raw value is a family x=(xi)i<nx=(x_i)_{i<n}x=(xi​)i<n​ with xi∈{0,…,Pi.rawSize−1}x_i\in\{0,\ldots,P_i.\mathrm{rawSize}-1\}xi​∈{0,…,Pi​.rawSize−1}. For n=0n=0n=0, this set contains exactly the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.Signal

For every natural number nnn, including 000, and every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by 0≤i<n0\le i<n0≤i<n, a signal index is a family z=(zi)i<nz=(z_i)_{i<n}z=(zi​)i<n​ with zi∈{0,…,Pi.dimension−1}z_i\in\{0,\ldots,P_i.\mathrm{dimension}-1\}zi​∈{0,…,Pi​.dimension−1}. For n=0n=0n=0, this set contains exactly the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.SingleAttack

For every local protocol PPP, a single attack means an attack on the singleton family whose only protocol is PPP. Explicitly, it consists of a complete complex inner-product space EEE, a unit vector e∈Ee\in Ee∈E, a surjective complex-linear isometry on the ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space of EEE-valued functions indexed by the one-site signal tuples, a measurable outcome type OOO, and a measurement for each one-site public tuple. Each measurement assigns a continuous complex-linear operator Fc(B)F_c(B)Fc​(B) to every subset B⊆OB\subseteq OB⊆O, has Im⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩=0\operatorname{Im}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle=0Im⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩=0 and Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩≥0\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle\ge0Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩≥0 for every vector vvv and measurable BBB, satisfies Fc(O)=IF_c(O)=IFc​(O)=I, and supplies a measure λc,v\lambda_{c,v}λc,v​ for every vvv, with λc,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{c,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle,0)λc,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩,0) on measurable sets. Neither the ancilla space nor the outcome type is required to be finite.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.bobCorrect

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, attack on that family, input label tuple li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​), and site i∈{0,…,n−1}i\in\{0,\ldots,n-1\}i∈{0,…,n−1}, let Z=∏j{0,…,dj−1}Z=\prod_j\{0,\ldots,d_j-1\}Z=∏j​{0,…,dj​−1}. Each protocol provides a unit preparation vector vj(x,a)∈Cdjv_j(x,a)\in\mathbb C^{d_j}vj​(x,a)∈Cdj​ and matrices Mj(b,x)M_j(b,x)Mj​(b,x), which are positive semidefinite and sum to the identity over the raw outcome label xxx for each Bob label bbb. Let EEE, eee, and UUU be the attack’s complete complex inner product ancilla space, unit initial vector, and bijective complex linear isometry on ℓ2(Z;E)\ell^2(Z;E)ℓ2(Z;E), and set Ψl=U(z↦(∏jvj(xj,aj)(zj))e)\Psi_l=U(z\mapsto(\prod_jv_j(x_j,a_j)(z_j))e)Ψl​=U(z↦(∏j​vj​(xj​,aj​)(zj​))e). The defined real number is

Re⁡(∑z∈Z∑w∈Z{Mi(bi,xi)zi,wi ⟨Ψl(z),Ψl(w)⟩,zj=wj for every j≠i,0,otherwise.).\operatorname{Re}\left( \sum_{z\in Z}\sum_{w\in Z} \begin{cases} M_i(b_i,x_i)_{z_i,w_i}\, \langle\Psi_l(z),\Psi_l(w)\rangle, & z_j=w_j\ \text{for every }j\ne i,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \right).Re(z∈Z∑​w∈Z∑​{Mi​(bi​,xi​)zi​,wi​​⟨Ψl​(z),Ψl​(w)⟩,0,​zj​=wj​ for every j=i,otherwise.​).

The inner product has Ψl(z)\Psi_l(z)Ψl​(z) as its first argument and Ψl(w)\Psi_l(w)Ψl​(w) as its second. No retention condition is imposed on lll. If n=0n=0n=0, there is no site iii at which this definition can be evaluated.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.experimentInformation

For any natural number nnn, including 000, any family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by i<ni<ni<n, any measurable outcome type OOO, and any assignment Lℓ,cL_{\ell,c}Lℓ,c​ of a measure on OOO to an input label ℓ=((ri,ai,bi))i\ell=((r_i,a_i,b_i))_iℓ=((ri​,ai​,bi​))i​ and a public tuple ccc, the definition gives the following real number. Let Ri,Ai,Bi,CiR_i,A_i,B_i,C_iRi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ be the protocol’s raw, preparation, Bob-setting and public index sets, let ui,pi,qiu_i,p_i,q_iui​,pi​,qi​ be its respective normalized nonnegative raw, preparation and Bob-setting weights, and put Ki=∑a,b1keepi(a,b)pi(a)qi(b)>0K_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}_i(a,b)}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0Ki​=∑a,b​1keepi​(a,b)​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0. Give a label weight w(ℓ)=∏i(ui(ri)pi(ai)qi(bi)/Ki)w(\ell)=\prod_i\bigl(u_i(r_i)p_i(a_i)q_i(b_i)/K_i\bigr)w(ℓ)=∏i​(ui​(ri​)pi​(ai​)qi​(bi​)/Ki​) if every local pair is retained, and weight 000 otherwise. Its raw tuple is r(ℓ)=(ri)ir(\ell)=(r_i)_ir(ℓ)=(ri​)i​ and its public tuple is c(ℓ)=(announcei(ai,bi))ic(\ell)=(\mathrm{announce}_i(a_i,b_i))_ic(ℓ)=(announcei​(ai​,bi​))i​. Define mc,x=∑ℓ: c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=xw(ℓ)m_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,c(\ell)=c,\ r(\ell)=x}w(\ell)mc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=x​w(ℓ), mc=∑xmc,xm_c=\sum_xm_{c,x}mc​=∑x​mc,x​, νc,x=∑ℓ: c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=xmax⁡(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c\nu_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,c(\ell)=c,\ r(\ell)=x}\max(w(\ell),0)L_{\ell,c}νc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=x​max(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c​, and νc=∑xνc,x\nu_c=\sum_x\nu_{c,x}νc​=∑x​νc,x​. For any real-valued function ppp on the finite raw-tuple set, put H(p)=−∑xp(x)log⁡(p(x))/log⁡2H(p)=-\sum_xp(x)\log(p(x))/\log2H(p)=−∑x​p(x)log(p(x))/log2, and put hc,y(x)=(dνc,x/dνc(y))Rh_{c,y}(x)=(d\nu_{c,x}/d\nu_c(y))_{\mathbb R}hc,y​(x)=(dνc,x​/dνc​(y))R​, using the extended-nonnegative Radon–Nikodym derivative and real conversion that sends +∞+\infty+∞ to 000. Then

experimentInformation⁡(P,L)=∑c∈∏iCi[mcH ⁣(x↦mc,xmc)−∫OH(hc,y) dνc(y)].\operatorname{experimentInformation}(P,L) =\sum_{c\in\prod_iC_i} \left[ m_cH\!\left(x\mapsto\frac{m_{c,x}}{m_c}\right) -\int_O H(h_{c,y})\,d\nu_c(y) \right].experimentInformation(P,L)=c∈∏i​Ci​∑​[mc​H(x↦mc​mc,x​​)−∫O​H(hc,y​)dνc​(y)].

The assignment LLL is arbitrary; it is not assumed to consist of probability measures, and no integrability hypothesis is required. Division by 000 and log⁡0\log0log0 use their total real-function values, both 000, and the real-valued integral is 000 when its integrand is not integrable. For n=0n=0n=0, all tuple sets are singletons and empty products have value 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.inputAmplitude

For every natural number nnn, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by i<ni<ni<n, every input family li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​) in the respective finite ranges, and every signal index z=(zi)i<nz=(z_i)_{i<n}z=(zi​)i<n​ with 0≤zi<Pi.dimension0\le z_i<P_i.\mathrm{dimension}0≤zi​<Pi​.dimension, the input amplitude is the complex number ∏i<nψxi,ai(i)(zi)\prod_{i<n}\psi^{(i)}_{x_i,a_i}(z_i)∏i<n​ψxi​,ai​(i)​(zi​), where ψxi,ai(i)=Pi.prepare(xi,ai)∈CPi.dimension\psi^{(i)}_{x_i,a_i}=P_i.\mathrm{prepare}(x_i,a_i)\in\mathbb C^{P_i.\mathrm{dimension}}ψxi​,ai​(i)​=Pi​.prepare(xi​,ai​)∈CPi​.dimension is the protocol’s unit vector. This formula uses neither the Bob choices nor the weights or retention conditions. For n=0n=0n=0, its value is 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.posterior

For any natural number nnn, including 000, let PiP_iPi​ be a local protocol for each i<ni<ni<n, and write Ri,Ai,Bi,CiR_i,A_i,B_i,C_iRi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ for its finite raw-value, preparation-setting, Bob-setting and public-announcement sets. An input label is a tuple ℓ=((ri,ai,bi))i<n\ell=((r_i,a_i,b_i))_{i<n}ℓ=((ri​,ai​,bi​))i<n​; a raw tuple is x∈∏iRix\in\prod_iR_ix∈∏i​Ri​, and a public tuple is c∈∏iCic\in\prod_iC_ic∈∏i​Ci​. Define the retained mass Ki=∑a∈Ai∑b∈Bi1keepi(a,b)pi(a)qi(b)>0K_i=\sum_{a\in A_i}\sum_{b\in B_i}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}_i(a,b)}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0Ki​=∑a∈Ai​​∑b∈Bi​​1keepi​(a,b)​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0, where pi,qip_i,q_ipi​,qi​ are the protocol’s preparation and Bob-setting weights, and define w(ℓ)=∏iwi(ri,ai,bi)w(\ell)=\prod_i w_i(r_i,a_i,b_i)w(ℓ)=∏i​wi​(ri​,ai​,bi​), where wi(r,a,b)=ui(r)pi(a)qi(b)/Kiw_i(r,a,b)=u_i(r)p_i(a)q_i(b)/K_iwi​(r,a,b)=ui​(r)pi​(a)qi​(b)/Ki​ when the pair (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) is retained and 000 otherwise, with uiu_iui​ the raw-value weight. Write c(ℓ)=(announcei(ai,bi))ic(\ell)=(\mathrm{announce}_i(a_i,b_i))_ic(ℓ)=(announcei​(ai​,bi​))i​ and r(ℓ)=(ri)ir(\ell)=(r_i)_ir(ℓ)=(ri​)i​. For any type OOO equipped with a measurable space and any assignment of a measure Lℓ,cL_{\ell,c}Lℓ,c​ on OOO to every label and public tuple, set νc,x=∑ℓ: c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=xmax⁡(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c\nu_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,c(\ell)=c,\ r(\ell)=x}\max(w(\ell),0)L_{\ell,c}νc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=x​max(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c​ and νc=∑xνc,x\nu_c=\sum_x\nu_{c,x}νc​=∑x​νc,x​. For every such ccc, every y∈Oy\in Oy∈O, and every raw tuple xxx, the defined posterior is

post⁡(c,y,x)=(dνc,xdνc(y))R,\operatorname{post}(c,y,x)=\left(\frac{d\nu_{c,x}}{d\nu_c}(y)\right)_{\mathbb R},post(c,y,x)=(dνc​dνc,x​​(y))R​,

where the derivative is the measure library’s Radon–Nikodym derivative, valued in the extended nonnegative reals, and conversion to a real sends +∞+\infty+∞ to 000. No probability, finiteness, absolute-continuity or sigma-finiteness hypothesis is imposed on the supplied measures, and this is a pointwise definition for every yyy. When n=0n=0n=0, the label, raw and public tuple sets are singletons and the empty product defining www is 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.priorMass

For any natural number nnn and family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, let Xi,Ai,Bi,CiX_i,A_i,B_i,C_iXi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ be their finite raw, preparation, Bob, and public alphabets. Each protocol supplies nonnegative unit-sum weights ri,pi,qir_i,p_i,q_iri​,pi​,qi​ on its first three alphabets, a Boolean retention rule ki:Ai×Bi→{false,true}k_i:A_i\times B_i\to\{\mathrm{false},\mathrm{true}\}ki​:Ai​×Bi​→{false,true}, and an announcement map ti:Ai×Bi→Cit_i:A_i\times B_i\to C_iti​:Ai​×Bi​→Ci​, with positive retained mass si=∑a,b1{ki(a,b)=true}pi(a)qi(b)s_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\{k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}p_i(a)q_i(b)si​=∑a,b​1{ki​(a,b)=true}​pi​(a)qi​(b). Define

λi(u,a,b)={ri(u)pi(a)qi(b)/si,ki(a,b)=true,0,otherwise.\lambda_i(u,a,b)= \begin{cases} r_i(u)p_i(a)q_i(b)/s_i,&k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true},\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}. \end{cases}λi​(u,a,b)={ri​(u)pi​(a)qi​(b)/si​,0,​ki​(a,b)=true,otherwise.​

For every public tuple c∈∏iCic\in\prod_i C_ic∈∏i​Ci​ and raw tuple x∈∏iXix\in\prod_iX_ix∈∏i​Xi​, the prior mass is

∑l∈∏i(Xi×Ai×Bi){∏iλi(ui,ai,bi),ti(ai,bi)=ci and ui=xi for every i,0,otherwise,\sum_{l\in\prod_i(X_i\times A_i\times B_i)} \begin{cases} \displaystyle\prod_i\lambda_i(u_i,a_i,b_i), & t_i(a_i,b_i)=c_i\ \text{and }u_i=x_i\ \text{for every }i,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}, \end{cases}l∈∏i​(Xi​×Ai​×Bi​)∑​⎩⎨⎧​i∏​λi​(ui​,ai​,bi​),0,​ti​(ai​,bi​)=ci​ and ui​=xi​ for every i,otherwise,​

where li=(ui,ai,bi)l_i=(u_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(ui​,ai​,bi​). No positivity assumption is made on the resulting mass for the chosen c,xc,xc,x. For n=0n=0n=0, all tuple spaces contain one empty tuple, the conditions are vacuous, and the value is 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.productDisturbance

For every natural number nnn, including 000, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, i<ni<ni<n, and every family AiA_iAi​ of single attacks on them, this defines a real-valued function on the site indices by taking the sole-site disturbance of AiA_iAi​ at coordinate iii. Explicitly, let ui(r),pi(a),qi(b)u_i(r),p_i(a),q_i(b)ui​(r),pi​(a),qi​(b) be the protocol’s raw, preparation and Bob-setting weights, let Ki=∑a,b1keepi(a,b)pi(a)qi(b)>0K_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}_i(a,b)}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0Ki​=∑a,b​1keepi​(a,b)​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0, and put wi(r,a,b)=ui(r)pi(a)qi(b)/Kiw_i(r,a,b)=u_i(r)p_i(a)q_i(b)/K_iwi​(r,a,b)=ui​(r)pi​(a)qi​(b)/Ki​ for retained pairs and 000 otherwise. Each single attack supplies a complete complex inner-product ancilla space EiE_iEi​, a unit vector eie_iei​, a surjective complex-linear isometry UiU_iUi​ on its one-site signal–ancilla ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space, and public-dependent measurements on a measurable outcome type. Identifying one-site signal tuples with the local signal set SiS_iSi​, let vr,a,b(i)=Ui(s↦preparei(r,a)(s)ei)v^{(i)}_{r,a,b}=U_i(s\mapsto\mathrm{prepare}_i(r,a)(s)e_i)vr,a,b(i)​=Ui​(s↦preparei​(r,a)(s)ei​). With Mi,b(r)M_{i,b}(r)Mi,b​(r) denoting Bob’s local effect for raw outcome rrr at setting bbb, the defined function is

productDisturbance⁡(A)i=∑r,a,bwi(r,a,b)[1−Re⁡∑s,t∈SiMi,b(r)s,t⟨vr,a,b(i)(s),vr,a,b(i)(t)⟩].\operatorname{productDisturbance}(A)_i =\sum_{r,a,b}w_i(r,a,b) \left[ 1-\operatorname{Re}\sum_{s,t\in S_i} M_{i,b}(r)_{s,t} \langle v^{(i)}_{r,a,b}(s),v^{(i)}_{r,a,b}(t)\rangle \right].productDisturbance(A)i​=r,a,b∑​wi​(r,a,b)​1−Res,t∈Si​∑​Mi,b​(r)s,t​⟨vr,a,b(i)​(s),vr,a,b(i)​(t)⟩​.

The component measurements do not enter this formula. When n=0n=0n=0, the result is the unique real-valued function on the empty index set.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.productInformation

For any natural number nnn, any family P=(Pi)i<nP=(P_i)_{i<n}P=(Pi​)i<n​ of local protocols, and any tuple A=(Ai)i<nA=(A_i)_{i<n}A=(Ai​)i<n​ of single-site attacks, this defines a real number as follows. Each protocol PiP_iPi​ has positive finite raw, preparation, Bob-choice, public, and signal index sets Xi,Si,Bi,Ci,ZiX_i,S_i,B_i,C_i,Z_iXi​,Si​,Bi​,Ci​,Zi​; nonnegative weights ri,pi,qir_i,p_i,q_iri​,pi​,qi​ on Xi,Si,BiX_i,S_i,B_iXi​,Si​,Bi​, respectively, each summing to 111; unit vectors ψx,ai∈CZi\psi^i_{x,a}\in\mathbb C^{Z_i}ψx,ai​∈CZi​; and, for each b∈Bib\in B_ib∈Bi​, positive semidefinite matrices Mb,xiM^i_{b,x}Mb,xi​ indexed by x∈Xix\in X_ix∈Xi​, with ∑xMb,xi=I\sum_xM^i_{b,x}=I∑x​Mb,xi​=I. It also has a retention function ki:Si×Bi→{false,true}k_i:S_i\times B_i\to\{\mathrm{false},\mathrm{true}\}ki​:Si​×Bi​→{false,true} and announcement function ci:Si×Bi→Cic_i:S_i\times B_i\to C_ici​:Si​×Bi​→Ci​, with retained mass si=∑a,b:ki(a,b)=truepi(a)qi(b)>0s_i=\sum_{a,b:k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0si​=∑a,b:ki​(a,b)=true​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0, and requires Re⁡tr⁡(Mb,xiψx,ai(ψx,ai)∗)=1\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(M^i_{b,x}\psi^i_{x,a}(\psi^i_{x,a})^*)=1Retr(Mb,xi​ψx,ai​(ψx,ai​)∗)=1 whenever ki(a,b)=truek_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}ki​(a,b)=true. For a label ℓi=(xi,ai,bi)\ell_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)ℓi​=(xi​,ai​,bi​), put wi(ℓi)=ri(xi)pi(ai)qi(bi)/siw_i(\ell_i)=r_i(x_i)p_i(a_i)q_i(b_i)/s_iwi​(ℓi​)=ri​(xi​)pi​(ai​)qi​(bi​)/si​ if it is retained, and 000 otherwise. A single-site attack AiA_iAi​ consists of a complete complex inner-product space EiE_iEi​, a unit vector ei∈Eie_i\in E_iei​∈Ei​, a complex-linear isometric equivalence UiU_iUi​ of the space of EiE_iEi​-valued functions on ZiZ_iZi​ with its Euclidean norm, an arbitrary measurable outcome space OiO_iOi​, and a measurement for each public value c∈Cic\in C_ic∈Ci​. Such a measurement assigns each measurable set D⊆OiD\subseteq O_iD⊆Oi​ a continuous complex-linear operator Fci(D)F^i_c(D)Fci​(D), with ⟨v,Fci(D)v⟩\langle v,F^i_c(D)v\rangle⟨v,Fci​(D)v⟩ real and nonnegative for every vvv, and Fci(Oi)=IF^i_c(O_i)=IFci​(Oi​)=I, together with a measure λc,vi\lambda^i_{c,v}λc,vi​ satisfying λc,vi(D)=max⁡{Re⁡⟨v,Fci(D)v⟩,0}\lambda^i_{c,v}(D)=\max\{\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F^i_c(D)v\rangle,0\}λc,vi​(D)=max{Re⟨v,Fci​(D)v⟩,0}. Define Φℓii=Ui(z↦ψxi,aii(z)ei)\Phi^i_{\ell_i}=U_i(z\mapsto\psi^i_{x_i,a_i}(z)e_i)Φℓi​i​=Ui​(z↦ψxi​,ai​i​(z)ei​) and μℓi,ci=∑z∈Ziλc,Φℓii(z)i\mu^i_{\ell_i,c}=\sum_{z\in Z_i}\lambda^i_{c,\Phi^i_{\ell_i}(z)}μℓi​,ci​=∑z∈Zi​​λc,Φℓi​i​(z)i​. For joint labels ℓ=(ℓi)i\ell=(\ell_i)_iℓ=(ℓi​)i​, set W(ℓ)=∏iwi(ℓi)W(\ell)=\prod_iw_i(\ell_i)W(ℓ)=∏i​wi​(ℓi​), x(ℓ)=(xi)ix(\ell)=(x_i)_ix(ℓ)=(xi​)i​, c(ℓ)=(ci(ai,bi))ic(\ell)=(c_i(a_i,b_i))_ic(ℓ)=(ci​(ai​,bi​))i​, and let μℓ,c=⨂iμℓi,cii\mu_{\ell,c}=\bigotimes_i\mu^i_{\ell_i,c_i}μℓ,c​=⨂i​μℓi​,ci​i​ be the product outcome measure on ∏iOi\prod_iO_i∏i​Oi​. For c∈∏iCic\in\prod_iC_ic∈∏i​Ci​ and x∈∏iXix\in\prod_iX_ix∈∏i​Xi​, define πc,x=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, x(ℓ)=xW(ℓ)\pi_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:c(\ell)=c,\ x(\ell)=x}W(\ell)πc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, x(ℓ)=x​W(ℓ), pc=∑xπc,xp_c=\sum_x\pi_{c,x}pc​=∑x​πc,x​, νc,x=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, x(ℓ)=xW(ℓ)μℓ,c\nu_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:c(\ell)=c,\ x(\ell)=x}W(\ell)\mu_{\ell,c}νc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, x(ℓ)=x​W(ℓ)μℓ,c​, and νc=∑xνc,x\nu_c=\sum_x\nu_{c,x}νc​=∑x​νc,x​. Write hc,y(x)h_{c,y}(x)hc,y​(x) for the real value of the Radon–Nikodym derivative dνc,x/dνcd\nu_{c,x}/d\nu_cdνc,x​/dνc​ at yyy, with an infinite derivative converted to 000, and write H(t)=−∑xt(x)log⁡(t(x))/log⁡2H(t)=-\sum_x t(x)\log(t(x))/\log 2H(t)=−∑x​t(x)log(t(x))/log2. The defined value is

productInformation⁡(A)=∑c[pc H ⁣(x↦πc,xpc)−∫H(hc,y) dνc(y)].\operatorname{productInformation}(A) =\sum_c\left[ p_c\,H\!\left(x\mapsto\frac{\pi_{c,x}}{p_c}\right) -\int H(h_{c,y})\,d\nu_c(y) \right].productInformation(A)=c∑​[pc​H(x↦pc​πc,x​​)−∫H(hc,y​)dνc​(y)].

Zero public masses are included, with division by zero evaluated as 000; the real logarithm at 000 is 000, and the integral is the total real Lebesgue integral, which is 000 for a nonintegrable integrand. The definition includes n=0n=0n=0, with empty products equal to 111; in that case its value is 000.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.publicInput

For every natural number nnn, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by i<ni<ni<n, and every input family li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​) in the respective raw, preparation, and Bob ranges, the associated public value is the family ci=Pi.announce(ai,bi)c_i=P_i.\mathrm{announce}(a_i,b_i)ci​=Pi​.announce(ai​,bi​), with 0≤ci<Pi.publicSize0\le c_i<P_i.\mathrm{publicSize}0≤ci​<Pi​.publicSize. This is defined for every input, including unretained choices and choices of weight zero. For n=0n=0n=0, it is the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.publicMass

For any natural number nnn and family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, let Xi,Ai,Bi,CiX_i,A_i,B_i,C_iXi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ be their finite raw, preparation, Bob, and public alphabets. Write ri,pi,qir_i,p_i,q_iri​,pi​,qi​ for their nonnegative unit-sum weights, kik_iki​ for their Boolean retention rules, and ti:Ai×Bi→Cit_i:A_i\times B_i\to C_iti​:Ai​×Bi​→Ci​ for their announcement maps. With the required positive masses si=∑a,b1{ki(a,b)=true}pi(a)qi(b)s_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\{k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}p_i(a)q_i(b)si​=∑a,b​1{ki​(a,b)=true}​pi​(a)qi​(b), set λi(u,a,b)=ri(u)pi(a)qi(b)/si\lambda_i(u,a,b)=r_i(u)p_i(a)q_i(b)/s_iλi​(u,a,b)=ri​(u)pi​(a)qi​(b)/si​ when ki(a,b)=truek_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}ki​(a,b)=true, and set it to zero otherwise. For every public tuple c∈∏iCic\in\prod_iC_ic∈∏i​Ci​, the public mass is

∑x∈∏iXi ∑l∈∏i(Xi×Ai×Bi){∏iλi(ui,ai,bi),ti(ai,bi)=ci and ui=xi for every i,0,otherwise,\sum_{x\in\prod_iX_i} \ \sum_{l\in\prod_i(X_i\times A_i\times B_i)} \begin{cases} \displaystyle\prod_i\lambda_i(u_i,a_i,b_i), & t_i(a_i,b_i)=c_i\ \text{and }u_i=x_i\ \text{for every }i,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}, \end{cases}x∈∏i​Xi​∑​ l∈∏i​(Xi​×Ai​×Bi​)∑​⎩⎨⎧​i∏​λi​(ui​,ai​,bi​),0,​ti​(ai​,bi​)=ci​ and ui​=xi​ for every i,otherwise,​

where li=(ui,ai,bi)l_i=(u_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(ui​,ai​,bi​). The chosen public tuple need not have positive mass. For n=0n=0n=0, each sum has one term, its conditions are vacuous, and the value is 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.publicOutcome

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, and measurable space OOO, let Xi,Ai,Bi,CiX_i,A_i,B_i,C_iXi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ be the protocols’ finite raw, preparation, Bob, and public alphabets. Write ri,pi,qir_i,p_i,q_iri​,pi​,qi​ for their nonnegative unit-sum weights, kik_iki​ for their Boolean retention rules, and ti:Ai×Bi→Cit_i:A_i\times B_i\to C_iti​:Ai​×Bi​→Ci​ for their announcement maps. Define the required positive retained masses si=∑a,b1{ki(a,b)=true}pi(a)qi(b)s_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\{k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}p_i(a)q_i(b)si​=∑a,b​1{ki​(a,b)=true}​pi​(a)qi​(b), and let λi(u,a,b)=ri(u)pi(a)qi(b)/si\lambda_i(u,a,b)=r_i(u)p_i(a)q_i(b)/s_iλi​(u,a,b)=ri​(u)pi​(a)qi​(b)/si​ when ki(a,b)=truek_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}ki​(a,b)=true, and zero otherwise. Given any assignment of a measure νl,c\nu_{l,c}νl,c​ on OOO to every label tuple l∈L=∏i(Xi×Ai×Bi)l\in L=\prod_i(X_i\times A_i\times B_i)l∈L=∏i​(Xi​×Ai​×Bi​) and public tuple c∈∏iCic\in\prod_iC_ic∈∏i​Ci​, the public outcome measure at ccc is

∑x∈∏iXi ∑l∈L{ofReal⁡ ⁣(∏iλi(ui,ai,bi))νl,c,ti(ai,bi)=ci and ui=xi for every i,0,otherwise,\sum_{x\in\prod_iX_i}\ \sum_{l\in L} \begin{cases} \displaystyle \operatorname{ofReal}\!\left(\prod_i\lambda_i(u_i,a_i,b_i)\right)\nu_{l,c}, & t_i(a_i,b_i)=c_i\ \text{and }u_i=x_i\ \text{for every }i,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}, \end{cases}x∈∏i​Xi​∑​ l∈L∑​⎩⎨⎧​ofReal(i∏​λi​(ui​,ai​,bi​))νl,c​,0,​ti​(ai​,bi​)=ci​ and ui​=xi​ for every i,otherwise,​

where li=(ui,ai,bi)l_i=(u_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(ui​,ai​,bi​) and ofReal⁡\operatorname{ofReal}ofReal converts a real scalar to an extended nonnegative scalar by truncating negative values to zero. The supplied measures may be arbitrary, and no measurability of their assignment is required. The definition does not divide by the mass of the chosen public tuple. For n=0n=0n=0, both sums have one term and the result is the supplied measure at the unique empty input and public tuples.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdDisturbance

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, and attack on that family, each protocol supplies finite raw, preparation, and Bob alphabets Xi,Ai,BiX_i,A_i,B_iXi​,Ai​,Bi​; nonnegative weights ri(x),pi(a),qi(b)r_i(x),p_i(a),q_i(b)ri​(x),pi​(a),qi​(b), each summing to 111 on its alphabet; a Boolean retention rule ki(a,b)k_i(a,b)ki​(a,b); unit preparation vectors vi(x,a)∈Cdiv_i(x,a)\in\mathbb C^{d_i}vi​(x,a)∈Cdi​; and positive semidefinite matrices Mi(b,x)M_i(b,x)Mi​(b,x) summing to the identity over xxx. Its retained mass

si=∑a∈Ai∑b∈Bi1{ki(a,b)=true}pi(a)qi(b)s_i=\sum_{a\in A_i}\sum_{b\in B_i} \mathbf1_{\{k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}p_i(a)q_i(b)si​=a∈Ai​∑​b∈Bi​∑​1{ki​(a,b)=true}​pi​(a)qi​(b)

is required to be positive. For l=(xi,ai,bi)i∈L=∏i(Xi×Ai×Bi)l=(x_i,a_i,b_i)_i\in L=\prod_i(X_i\times A_i\times B_i)l=(xi​,ai​,bi​)i​∈L=∏i​(Xi​×Ai​×Bi​), put

w(l)=∏i{ri(xi)pi(ai)qi(bi)/si,ki(ai,bi)=true,0,otherwise.w(l)=\prod_i \begin{cases} r_i(x_i)p_i(a_i)q_i(b_i)/s_i,&k_i(a_i,b_i)=\mathrm{true},\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}. \end{cases}w(l)=i∏​{ri​(xi​)pi​(ai​)qi​(bi​)/si​,0,​ki​(ai​,bi​)=true,otherwise.​

If the attack has complete complex inner product ancilla space EEE, unit initial vector eee, and bijective complex linear isometry UUU on ℓ2(Z;E)\ell^2(Z;E)ℓ2(Z;E), where Z=∏i{0,…,di−1}Z=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,d_i-1\}Z=∏i​{0,…,di​−1}, set Ψl=U(z↦(∏jvj(xj,aj)(zj))e)\Psi_l=U(z\mapsto(\prod_jv_j(x_j,a_j)(z_j))e)Ψl​=U(z↦(∏j​vj​(xj​,aj​)(zj​))e). The disturbance is the function assigning to each site iii the real number

∑l∈Lw(l)[1−Re⁡(∑z,w∈Zzj=wj ∀j≠iMi(bi,xi)zi,wi⟨Ψl(z),Ψl(w)⟩)].\sum_{l\in L}w(l)\left[ 1- \operatorname{Re}\left( \sum_{\substack{z,w\in Z\\z_j=w_j\ \forall j\ne i}} M_i(b_i,x_i)_{z_i,w_i} \langle\Psi_l(z),\Psi_l(w)\rangle \right)\right].l∈L∑​w(l)​1−Re​z,w∈Zzj​=wj​ ∀j=i​∑​Mi​(bi​,xi​)zi​,wi​​⟨Ψl​(z),Ψl​(w)⟩​​.

All label tuples are summed, including those with zero weight. For n=0n=0n=0, the result is the unique function with empty domain.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdInformation

For every natural number nnn, including 000, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, i<ni<ni<n, and every attack AAA on that family, this definition assigns a real information value as follows. The attack supplies a complete complex inner-product space EEE, a vector e∈Ee\in Ee∈E with ∥e∥=1\|e\|=1∥e∥=1, a surjective complex-linear isometry UUU on the space of EEE-valued functions on the finite signal-tuple set S=∏i{0,…,dimensioni−1}S=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,\mathrm{dimension}_i-1\}S=∏i​{0,…,dimensioni​−1}, equipped with the ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 norm, a measurable outcome type OOO, and a measurement for each public tuple ccc. Each measurement supplies continuous complex-linear operators Fc(B)F_c(B)Fc​(B) on EEE, with real nonnegative quadratic forms on measurable sets BBB, with Fc(O)=IF_c(O)=IFc​(O)=I, and measures λc,v\lambda_{c,v}λc,v​ satisfying λc,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{c,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle,0)λc,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩,0). For a label ℓ=((ri,ai,bi))i\ell=((r_i,a_i,b_i))_iℓ=((ri​,ai​,bi​))i​, define

vℓ=U ⁣(z↦[∏ipreparei(ri,ai)(zi)]e),Lℓ,c=∑z∈Sλc,vℓ(z).v_\ell =U\!\left(z\mapsto \left[\prod_i\mathrm{prepare}_i(r_i,a_i)(z_i)\right]e\right), \qquad L_{\ell,c}=\sum_{z\in S}\lambda_{c,v_\ell(z)}.vℓ​=U(z↦[i∏​preparei​(ri​,ai​)(zi​)]e),Lℓ,c​=z∈S∑​λc,vℓ​(z)​.

Let Ki=∑a,b1keepi(a,b)pi(a)qi(b)>0K_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}_i(a,b)}p_i(a)q_i(b)>0Ki​=∑a,b​1keepi​(a,b)​pi​(a)qi​(b)>0, using the protocol’s preparation and Bob-setting weights, and let w(ℓ)=∏iui(ri)pi(ai)qi(bi)/Kiw(\ell)=\prod_i u_i(r_i)p_i(a_i)q_i(b_i)/K_iw(ℓ)=∏i​ui​(ri​)pi​(ai​)qi​(bi​)/Ki​ when every pair is retained, and 000 otherwise, where uiu_iui​ is its raw-value weight. Set c(ℓ)=(announcei(ai,bi))ic(\ell)=(\mathrm{announce}_i(a_i,b_i))_ic(ℓ)=(announcei​(ai​,bi​))i​, r(ℓ)=(ri)ir(\ell)=(r_i)_ir(ℓ)=(ri​)i​, mc,x=∑ℓ: c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=xw(ℓ)m_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,c(\ell)=c,\ r(\ell)=x}w(\ell)mc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=x​w(ℓ), mc=∑xmc,xm_c=\sum_xm_{c,x}mc​=∑x​mc,x​, νc,x=∑ℓ: c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=xmax⁡(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c\nu_{c,x}=\sum_{\ell:\,c(\ell)=c,\ r(\ell)=x}\max(w(\ell),0)L_{\ell,c}νc,x​=∑ℓ:c(ℓ)=c, r(ℓ)=x​max(w(ℓ),0)Lℓ,c​, and νc=∑xνc,x\nu_c=\sum_x\nu_{c,x}νc​=∑x​νc,x​. With H(p)=−∑xp(x)log⁡(p(x))/log⁡2H(p)=-\sum_xp(x)\log(p(x))/\log2H(p)=−∑x​p(x)log(p(x))/log2, the assigned value is

qkdInformation⁡(A)=∑c[mcH ⁣(x↦mc,xmc)−∫OH ⁣(x↦(dνc,xdνc(y))R)dνc(y)].\operatorname{qkdInformation}(A) =\sum_c\left[ m_cH\!\left(x\mapsto\frac{m_{c,x}}{m_c}\right) -\int_O H\!\left(x\mapsto \left(\frac{d\nu_{c,x}}{d\nu_c}(y)\right)_{\mathbb R}\right)d\nu_c(y) \right].qkdInformation(A)=c∑​[mc​H(x↦mc​mc,x​​)−∫O​H(x↦(dνc​dνc,x​​(y))R​)dνc​(y)].

Real conversion of an infinite derivative is 000; real division by 000 and log⁡0\log0log0 are 000, and a nonintegrable real-valued integral is assigned 000. No positive lower bound on nnn is required; at n=0n=0n=0, the tuple sets are singletons and empty products equal 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdInputWeight

For every natural number nnn, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by i<ni<ni<n, and every input family li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​) in the respective raw, preparation, and Bob ranges, the input weight is ∏i<nwi\prod_{i<n}w_i∏i<n​wi​, where wi=Pi.rawWeight(xi)Pi.prepWeight(ai)Pi.bobWeight(bi)/Riw_i=P_i.\mathrm{rawWeight}(x_i)P_i.\mathrm{prepWeight}(a_i)P_i.\mathrm{bobWeight}(b_i)/R_iwi​=Pi​.rawWeight(xi​)Pi​.prepWeight(ai​)Pi​.bobWeight(bi​)/Ri​ when Pi.keep(ai,bi)=trueP_i.\mathrm{keep}(a_i,b_i)=\mathrm{true}Pi​.keep(ai​,bi​)=true, and wi=0w_i=0wi​=0 otherwise; here Ri=∑a,b: Pi.keep(a,b)=truePi.prepWeight(a)Pi.bobWeight(b)>0R_i=\sum_{a,b:\,P_i.\mathrm{keep}(a,b)=\mathrm{true}}P_i.\mathrm{prepWeight}(a)P_i.\mathrm{bobWeight}(b)>0Ri​=∑a,b:Pi​.keep(a,b)=true​Pi​.prepWeight(a)Pi​.bobWeight(b)>0. Thus an unretained local choice gives input weight zero, and for n=0n=0n=0 the empty product gives input weight 111.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdJointOutcome

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, and type OOO equipped with a measurable space structure, let Xi,Ai,Bi,CiX_i,A_i,B_i,C_iXi​,Ai​,Bi​,Ci​ be the protocols’ finite raw, preparation, Bob, and public alphabets. Their nonnegative unit-sum weights ri,pi,qir_i,p_i,q_iri​,pi​,qi​, Boolean retention rules kik_iki​, and announcement maps ti:Ai×Bi→Cit_i:A_i\times B_i\to C_iti​:Ai​×Bi​→Ci​ determine positive retained masses si=∑a,b1{ki(a,b)=true}pi(a)qi(b)s_i=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\{k_i(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}p_i(a)q_i(b)si​=∑a,b​1{ki​(a,b)=true}​pi​(a)qi​(b) and weights λi(u,a,b)=ri(u)pi(a)qi(b)/si\lambda_i(u,a,b)=r_i(u)p_i(a)q_i(b)/s_iλi​(u,a,b)=ri​(u)pi​(a)qi​(b)/si​ for retained pairs, with λi(u,a,b)=0\lambda_i(u,a,b)=0λi​(u,a,b)=0 otherwise. Let L=∏i(Xi×Ai×Bi)L=\prod_i(X_i\times A_i\times B_i)L=∏i​(Xi​×Ai​×Bi​), C=∏iCiC=\prod_i C_iC=∏i​Ci​, and suppose an arbitrary measure νl,c\nu_{l,c}νl,c​ on OOO is supplied for every l∈L,c∈Cl\in L,c\in Cl∈L,c∈C; these measures are not required to be probability measures or to arise from an attack. For every c∈Cc\in Cc∈C and x∈∏iXix\in\prod_iX_ix∈∏i​Xi​, the joint outcome measure is

Jc,x=∑l∈L{ofReal⁡ ⁣(∏iλi(ui,ai,bi))νl,c,ti(ai,bi)=ci and ui=xi for every i,0,otherwise,J_{c,x}= \sum_{l\in L} \begin{cases} \displaystyle \operatorname{ofReal}\!\left(\prod_i\lambda_i(u_i,a_i,b_i)\right)\nu_{l,c}, & t_i(a_i,b_i)=c_i\ \text{and }u_i=x_i\ \text{for every }i,\\ 0,&\text{otherwise}, \end{cases}Jc,x​=l∈L∑​⎩⎨⎧​ofReal(i∏​λi​(ui​,ai​,bi​))νl,c​,0,​ti​(ai​,bi​)=ci​ and ui​=xi​ for every i,otherwise,​

where li=(ui,ai,bi)l_i=(u_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(ui​,ai​,bi​), ofReal⁡\operatorname{ofReal}ofReal replaces a negative real number by zero and regards the result as an extended nonnegative real, and multiplication denotes scalar multiplication of a measure. No measurability condition on the assignment (l,c)↦νl,c(l,c)\mapsto\nu_{l,c}(l,c)↦νl,c​ is assumed. For n=0n=0n=0, this is the supplied measure at the unique empty input and public tuples.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdLabelWeight

For a local protocol PPP and any triple l=(x,a,b)l=(x,a,b)l=(x,a,b) of a raw label, a preparation choice, and a Bob choice in their respective finite ranges, the label weight is P.rawWeight(x) P.prepWeight(a) P.bobWeight(b)/RPP.\mathrm{rawWeight}(x)\,P.\mathrm{prepWeight}(a)\,P.\mathrm{bobWeight}(b)/R_PP.rawWeight(x)P.prepWeight(a)P.bobWeight(b)/RP​ if P.keep(a,b)=trueP.\mathrm{keep}(a,b)=\mathrm{true}P.keep(a,b)=true, and is 000 otherwise, where RP=∑a′,b′: P.keep(a′,b′)=trueP.prepWeight(a′)P.bobWeight(b′)R_P=\sum_{a',b':\,P.\mathrm{keep}(a',b')=\mathrm{true}}P.\mathrm{prepWeight}(a')P.\mathrm{bobWeight}(b')RP​=∑a′,b′:P.keep(a′,b′)=true​P.prepWeight(a′)P.bobWeight(b′). This denominator is strictly positive by the requirements on PPP; a retained triple can still have weight zero.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdOneSite

For every local protocol PPP, this defines the family indexed by the singleton set {0}\{0\}{0} whose value at its only index is PPP:

qkdOneSite⁡(P)0=P.\operatorname{qkdOneSite}(P)_0=P.qkdOneSite(P)0​=P.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdOutcomeLaw

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, attack on that family, input label tuple li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​), and public tuple c=(ci)c=(c_i)c=(ci​) in the product of the protocols’ finite public alphabets, let EEE, eee, and UUU be the attack’s complete complex inner product ancilla space, unit initial vector, and bijective complex linear isometry on ℓ2(Z;E)\ell^2(Z;E)ℓ2(Z;E), where Z=∏i{0,…,di−1}Z=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,d_i-1\}Z=∏i​{0,…,di​−1}. Using the protocols’ unit preparation vectors vi(xi,ai)v_i(x_i,a_i)vi​(xi​,ai​), define

Ψl=U(z⟼(∏ivi(xi,ai)(zi))e).\Psi_l=U\left(z\longmapsto\left(\prod_i v_i(x_i,a_i)(z_i)\right)e\right).Ψl​=U(z⟼(i∏​vi​(xi​,ai​)(zi​))e).

The attack has a measurable outcome space OOO and, for each public tuple ccc and ancilla vector vvv, a measure μc,v\mu_{c,v}μc,v​ on OOO, with continuous complex linear effects Fc,BF_{c,B}Fc,B​ satisfying Fc,O=idF_{c,O}=\mathrm{id}Fc,O​=id and, for measurable BBB, real nonnegative ⟨v,Fc,Bv⟩\langle v,F_{c,B}v\rangle⟨v,Fc,B​v⟩ and μc,v(B)=ofReal⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc,Bv⟩)\mu_{c,v}(B)=\operatorname{ofReal}(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_{c,B}v\rangle)μc,v​(B)=ofReal(Re⟨v,Fc,B​v⟩). The outcome law is the measure

νl,c=∑z∈Zμc,Ψl(z).\nu_{l,c}=\sum_{z\in Z}\mu_{c,\Psi_l(z)}.νl,c​=z∈Z∑​μc,Ψl​(z)​.

The public tuple ccc is an independent argument; it is not required to equal the announcement associated with lll. When n=0n=0n=0, the sum has one term, corresponding to the empty signal tuple.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdOutputState

For any natural number nnn, family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, and attack on that family, let EEE be its complete complex inner product ancilla space, e∈Ee\in Ee∈E its unit initial vector, and UUU its bijective complex linear isometry on the space of EEE-valued functions on Z=∏i{0,…,di−1}Z=\prod_i\{0,\ldots,d_i-1\}Z=∏i​{0,…,di​−1}, with the finite ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 norm. Each protocol supplies a unit preparation vector vi(x,a)∈Cdiv_i(x,a)\in\mathbb C^{d_i}vi​(x,a)∈Cdi​, indexed by a raw label xxx and preparation label aaa. For any input label tuple lll, whose iii-th component is a triple li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​) of raw, preparation, and Bob labels in their respective finite alphabets, the output state is defined by

Ψl=U(z⟼(∏i=0n−1vi(xi,ai)(zi))e).\Psi_l = U\left(z\longmapsto \left(\prod_{i=0}^{n-1}v_i(x_i,a_i)(z_i)\right)e\right).Ψl​=U(z⟼(i=0∏n−1​vi​(xi​,ai​)(zi​))e).

The label tuple is unrestricted: no retention condition or positive label weight is required, and its Bob labels do not enter this formula. For n=0n=0n=0, the product is 111, there is a single signal coordinate, and the input to UUU is the function taking that coordinate to eee.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdProductLaw

For every natural number nnn, including 000, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​, every family AiA_iAi​ of single attacks on those protocols, every input-label tuple ℓ=(ℓi)i\ell=(\ell_i)_iℓ=(ℓi​)i​, and every public tuple c=(ci)ic=(c_i)_ic=(ci​)i​, this defines a measure on the dependent outcome-product space ∏i<nOi\prod_{i<n}O_i∏i<n​Oi​, with its product measurable structure, where OiO_iOi​ is the measurable outcome type of AiA_iAi​. To specify each component measure, write ℓi=(ri,ai,bi)\ell_i=(r_i,a_i,b_i)ℓi​=(ri​,ai​,bi​), let EiE_iEi​ be the attack’s complete complex inner-product ancilla space, eie_iei​ its unit initial vector, and UiU_iUi​ its surjective complex-linear isometry on the one-site signal–ancilla ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space. Identify the one-site signal tuples with the local signal set SiS_iSi​, and put vi=Ui(s↦preparei(ri,ai)(s)ei)v_i=U_i(s\mapsto\mathrm{prepare}_i(r_i,a_i)(s)e_i)vi​=Ui​(s↦preparei​(ri​,ai​)(s)ei​). The measurement selected by public value cic_ici​ supplies measures λi,ci,v\lambda_{i,c_i,v}λi,ci​,v​ satisfying λi,ci,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fi,ci(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{i,c_i,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_{i,c_i}(B)v\rangle,0)λi,ci​,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fi,ci​​(B)v⟩,0) on measurable sets, with real nonnegative operator quadratic forms and Fi,ci(Oi)=IF_{i,c_i}(O_i)=IFi,ci​​(Oi​)=I. Then

qkdProductLaw⁡(A,ℓ,c)=⨂i<n(∑s∈Siλi,ci,vi(s)).\operatorname{qkdProductLaw}(A,\ell,c) =\bigotimes_{i<n}\left(\sum_{s\in S_i}\lambda_{i,c_i,v_i(s)}\right).qkdProductLaw(A,ℓ,c)=i<n⨂​(s∈Si​∑​λi,ci​,vi​(s)​).

This is the measure-theoretic product of the component measures; it includes no label weights and imposes no retention or announcement-consistency condition on ℓ,c\ell,cℓ,c. When n=0n=0n=0, it uses the empty product of measures on the singleton empty-tuple space.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdRetainedMass

For a local protocol PPP, its retained mass is the real number RP=∑a=0P.prepSize−1∑b=0P.bobSize−11{P.keep(a,b)=true} P.prepWeight(a) P.bobWeight(b)R_P=\sum_{a=0}^{P.\mathrm{prepSize}-1}\sum_{b=0}^{P.\mathrm{bobSize}-1}\mathbf 1_{\{P.\mathrm{keep}(a,b)=\mathrm{true}\}}\,P.\mathrm{prepWeight}(a)\,P.\mathrm{bobWeight}(b)RP​=∑a=0P.prepSize−1​∑b=0P.bobSize−1​1{P.keep(a,b)=true}​P.prepWeight(a)P.bobWeight(b), where the indicator is 111 when its condition holds and 000 otherwise. The requirements on PPP ensure RP>0R_P>0RP​>0.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.qkdShannonBits

For any type XXX equipped with a finite enumeration and any function p:X→Rp:X\to\mathbb Rp:X→R, the defined real number is

−∑x∈Xp(x)log⁡(p(x))log⁡2.-\sum_{x\in X}p(x)\frac{\log(p(x))}{\log 2}.−x∈X∑​p(x)log2log(p(x))​.

There is no assumption that the values of ppp are nonnegative or sum to 111. The logarithm is the total real logarithm used by the code: log⁡0=0\log 0=0log0=0, and for negative arguments it equals the logarithm of the absolute value. Thus zero-valued terms contribute zero, negative values are also covered by the definition, and an empty XXX gives zero.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.rawInput

For every natural number nnn, every family of local protocols PiP_iPi​ indexed by i<ni<ni<n, and every input family li=(xi,ai,bi)l_i=(x_i,a_i,b_i)li​=(xi​,ai​,bi​) in the respective raw, preparation, and Bob ranges, the associated raw value is the family (xi)i<n(x_i)_{i<n}(xi​)i<n​, obtained by taking the raw component at every index. This is defined regardless of retention or weights; for n=0n=0n=0, it is the empty family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.singleDisturbance

For every local protocol PPP and every single attack AAA on it, this defines a real disturbance at the sole site. Write R,A0,B0,SR,A_0,B_0,SR,A0​,B0​,S for the protocol’s finite raw, preparation, Bob-setting and signal index sets, u(r),p(a),q(b)u(r),p(a),q(b)u(r),p(a),q(b) for its normalized nonnegative weights, and Mb(r)M_b(r)Mb​(r) for Bob’s effect for raw outcome rrr at setting bbb. Let K=∑a,b1keep(a,b)p(a)q(b)>0K=\sum_{a,b}\mathbf1_{\mathrm{keep}(a,b)}p(a)q(b)>0K=∑a,b​1keep(a,b)​p(a)q(b)>0, and let w(r,a,b)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/Kw(r,a,b)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/Kw(r,a,b)=u(r)p(a)q(b)/K for retained pairs and 000 otherwise. The single attack supplies a complete complex inner-product ancilla space EEE, a unit vector eee, a surjective complex-linear isometry UUU on the one-site signal–ancilla space, and public-dependent measurements on a measurable outcome type; those measurements do not enter this disturbance formula. Identifying the singleton-indexed signal tuples with SSS, put vr,a,b=U(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)e)v_{r,a,b}=U(s\mapsto\mathrm{prepare}(r,a)(s)e)vr,a,b​=U(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)e). Then

singleDisturbance⁡(A)=∑r∈R∑a∈A0∑b∈B0w(r,a,b)[1−Re⁡∑s,t∈SMb(r)s,t ⟨vr,a,b(s),vr,a,b(t)⟩].\operatorname{singleDisturbance}(A) =\sum_{r\in R}\sum_{a\in A_0}\sum_{b\in B_0} w(r,a,b) \left[ 1-\operatorname{Re}\sum_{s,t\in S} M_b(r)_{s,t}\, \langle v_{r,a,b}(s),v_{r,a,b}(t)\rangle \right].singleDisturbance(A)=r∈R∑​a∈A0​∑​b∈B0​∑​w(r,a,b)​1−Res,t∈S∑​Mb​(r)s,t​⟨vr,a,b​(s),vr,a,b​(t)⟩​.

This is exactly coordinate 000 of the disturbance function for the singleton protocol family.

QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakethird100.P18.singleLaw

For every local protocol PPP, every single attack AAA on PPP, every label ℓ=(r,a,b)\ell=(r,a,b)ℓ=(r,a,b) consisting of a raw value, preparation setting and Bob setting, and every public value ccc, this defines a measure on the attack’s measurable outcome type OOO. The attack has a complete complex inner-product ancilla space EEE, a unit initial vector eee, and a surjective complex-linear isometry UUU on the one-site signal–ancilla ℓ2\ell^2ℓ2 space. Its measurement at the singleton public tuple with value ccc provides measures λc,v\lambda_{c,v}λc,v​ and continuous complex-linear operators Fc(B)F_c(B)Fc​(B), with real nonnegative quadratic forms on measurable BBB, Fc(O)=IF_c(O)=IFc​(O)=I, and λc,v(B)=max⁡(Re⁡⟨v,Fc(B)v⟩,0)\lambda_{c,v}(B)=\max(\operatorname{Re}\langle v,F_c(B)v\rangle,0)λc,v​(B)=max(Re⟨v,Fc​(B)v⟩,0) for measurable BBB. Identifying the singleton-indexed signal tuples with the protocol’s signal set SSS, put vℓ=U(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)e)v_\ell=U(s\mapsto\mathrm{prepare}(r,a)(s)e)vℓ​=U(s↦prepare(r,a)(s)e). The defined measure is

singleLaw⁡(A,ℓ,c)=∑s∈Sλc,vℓ(s).\operatorname{singleLaw}(A,\ell,c)=\sum_{s\in S}\lambda_{c,v_\ell(s)}.singleLaw(A,ℓ,c)=s∈S∑​λc,vℓ​(s)​.

Both the input label and public value are passed as constant singleton-indexed tuples. The definition requires neither that (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) is retained nor that c=announce(a,b)c=\mathrm{announce}(a,b)c=announce(a,b), and it applies no label-weight factor.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Nov 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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