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Theorem 3.3, proof, Step 2 (player 2, symmetric) — V2(x)=J2(x;φ1∗,φ2∗)V_2(x) = J^2(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)V2​(x)=J2(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​)

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ImpulseGames.Verification.step2_equilibrium_payoff_player_two

by tianyipeng · Nov 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

impulse-controlstochastic-differential-gamesverification-theorem

Assume the hypotheses of Theorem 3.3 on V1,V2,δ1,δ2V_1,V_2,\delta_1,\delta_2V1​,V2​,δ1​,δ2​ — (3.1) with δi\delta_iδi​ continuous on SSS, the QVI system (3.3), (ii) and (iii) — and let x∈Sx\in Sx∈S. Then for every admissible realization of the candidate equilibrium (φ1∗,φ2∗)(\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*)(φ1∗​,φ2∗​), φi∗=(Di,δi)\varphi_i^*=(\mathcal D_i,\delta_i)φi∗​=(Di​,δi​),

V2(x) = J2(x;φ1∗,φ2∗).V_2(x)\ =\ J^2(x;\varphi_1^*,\varphi_2^*).V2​(x) = J2(x;φ1∗​,φ2∗​).

The paper proves Step 2 for player 1 ("we argue as in Step 1, but here all the inequalities are equalities by the properties of φ1∗\varphi_1^*φ1∗​") and states that the arguments for player 2 are symmetric; this is that symmetric statement, the counterpart of ImpulseGames.Verification.step2_equilibrium_payoff.

Formalization Note. The model gives player 1 priority at simultaneous exits, so the statement is not a formal relabelling of the player-1 one and is stated separately.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ImpulseGames_Verification_Game
import Definitions.Def_ImpulseGames_Verification_QVI

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology
open scoped ENNReal NNReal
Formal statement
namespace ImpulseGames.Verification

/-- Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.3, player 2 (the symmetric case): under the hypotheses of
Theorem 3.3, for every admissible realization `Y` of `(φ_1^*, φ_2^*)`,
`V_2(x) = J^2(x; φ_1^*, φ_2^*)`. -/
theorem step2_equilibrium_payoff_player_two {d k : ℕ} {Ω : Type*} [m : MeasurableSpace Ω]
    (P : Measure Ω) (𝔽 : Filtration ℝ≥0 m) (W : ℝ≥0 → Ω → (Fin k → ℝ))
    (hW : IsBrownianBasis P 𝔽 W) (G : Game d k) (hG : G.Standing)
    (V : Player → State d → ℝ) (δ : (i : Player) → State d → G.Imp i)
    (hV : VerificationHypotheses G V δ) (x : State d) (hx : x ∈ G.S)
    (Y : ℕ → ℝ≥0 → Ω → State d) (hY : IsAdmissible P 𝔽 W G x (starProfile G V δ) Y) :
    V .two x = payoff P G x (starProfile G V δ) Y .two := by sorry

end ImpulseGames.Verification
Source
Aïd et al. (2020), Math. Oper. Res. 45(1), accepted manuscript (arXiv:1605.00039v4), proof of Theorem 3.3, Step 2 (p. 12) and the sentence 'the arguments for V2 and J2 being symmetric' (p. 10)

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