Lemma OA10 — auditing and one independent supplier beats auditing both independent suppliers
ProvedSupplierAudit.Joint.lemma_OA10auditingjoint-auditingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Consider the joint-auditing coalition with competing buyers (), in the Sec. 4.3 scenario . Let be its aggregate expected profit. For every fixed cost and all efforts , there are efforts with
That is, whatever the coalition earns by auditing both independent suppliers, it earns at least as much by auditing the common supplier together with one independent supplier. With Lemma OA9, this reduces the coalition's choice to three candidate plans: audit and , audit only, or audit nothing.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SupplierAudit_Joint_Model
Formal statement
namespace SupplierAudit.Joint
/-- Lemma OA10, p. ec11: jointly auditing the common supplier and an independent supplier is at
least as good as jointly auditing both independent suppliers. -/
theorem lemma_OA10 (P : SupplierAudit.Competition.Params) (hβ : 0 < P.β) (hscen : Scenario P) (K : ℝ) (hK : 0 ≤ K) :
∀ y ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∀ z ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
∃ y' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∃ z' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
aggProfit P K (y, 0, z) ≤ aggProfit P K (y', z', 0) := by sorry
end SupplierAudit.Joint
Source
Chen, Qi, Dawande, Supplier Centrality and Auditing Priority in Socially-Responsible Supply Chains, accepted manuscript (SSRN 2889889), Lemma OA10, p. ec11 (PDF 39), proof p. ec12 (PDF 40); scenario of Sec. 4.3, p. 13
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.