Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in
← Formalpedia

Proposition 5 — acquihiring if v_a > v_s + (7−3√5)B/2, else direct hiring with poaching probability (v_a−v_s+B)/(3B); the employee prefers direct hiring

Proved
AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo.proposition_5

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

acquihiringmonopsonyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1private-informationwage-competition

Consider the private-benefit model of §6: an employee produces vav_ava​ at an acquirer and vsv_svs​ at a startup, enjoys a private benefit b∼U[0,B]b \sim U[0,B]b∼U[0,B] at the startup that only she observes, and has an outside option worth 000, with

0<B<min⁡{va,vs},vs−B<va<vs+2B.0 < B < \min\{v_a,v_s\}, \qquad v_s - B < v_a < v_s + 2B .0<B<min{va​,vs​},vs​−B<va​<vs​+2B.

The acquirer chooses between acquihiring (buying the startup, then hiring her; its profit is max⁡{0,va−vs}\max\{0, v_a - v_s\}max{0,va​−vs​} by Lemma 2 with wage floor 000) and direct hiring (a simultaneous wage game with the startup, played at Lemma 5's equilibrium wages wa∗=(2va+vs−B)/3w_a^* = (2v_a+v_s-B)/3wa∗​=(2va​+vs​−B)/3, ws∗=(2vs+va−2B)/3w_s^* = (2v_s+v_a-2B)/3ws∗​=(2vs​+va​−2B)/3). Let

v^a=vs+7−352 B.\hat v_a = v_s + \frac{7-3\sqrt5}{2}\,B .v^a​=vs​+27−35​​B.

Then:

  1. v^a>vs\hat v_a > v_sv^a​>vs​;
  2. (wa∗,ws∗)(w_a^*, w_s^*)(wa∗​,ws∗​) is an equilibrium of the direct-hiring wage game;
  3. if va>v^av_a > \hat v_ava​>v^a​, the acquirer's expected profit under direct hiring is strictly below its acquihiring profit, so it engages in acquihiring;
  4. if va<v^av_a < \hat v_ava​<v^a​, the direct-hiring profit is strictly above the acquihiring profit, so it engages in direct hiring, and it poaches the employee with probability
va−vs+B3B;\frac{v_a - v_s + B}{3B};3Bva​−vs​+B​;
  1. the employee always prefers direct hiring: for every type b∈[0,B]b \in [0,B]b∈[0,B] her payoff under acquihiring is strictly below her payoff max⁡{wa∗,ws∗+b,0}\max\{w_a^*, w_s^* + b, 0\}max{wa∗​,ws∗​+b,0} under direct hiring.

The result shows that private information softens wage competition enough that acquihiring is no longer always chosen, while the employee is still worse off whenever it is.

Formalization Note The direct-hiring branch is evaluated at Lemma 5's equilibrium wages, the continuation equilibrium the paper uses; the statement does not claim this equilibrium is unique. The acquihiring profit and the employee's acquihiring payoff are Lemma 2's outcomes with wage floor 000, which the paper invokes in §6 and which the milestone on the monopsonistic wage supports. At va=vsv_a = v_sva​=vs​ (inside the direct-hiring branch) the acquisition is taken to fail, so the employee keeps bbb; either outcome of that tie is below her direct-hiring payoff. Clause 5 is pointwise in the type, which is the paper's "she earns a strictly positive wage and may receive a private benefit".

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_PrivateInfo_Model
Formal statement
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo

theorem proposition_5 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
    P.vs < vHat P ∧
    IsDHEquilibrium P (waStar P) (wsStar P) ∧
    (vHat P < P.va → profitA P (waStar P) (wsStar P) < ahProfitA P) ∧
    (P.va < vHat P → ahProfitA P < profitA P (waStar P) (wsStar P) ∧
      poachProb P (waStar P) (wsStar P) = (P.va - P.vs + P.B) / (3 * P.B)) ∧
    (∀ b ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) P.B, ahPayoffE P b < dhPayoffE (waStar P) (wsStar P) b) := by sorry

end AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
Source
Bar-Isaac, Johnson, Nocke, Acquihiring for Monopsony Power, CRC TR 224 DP No. 500 (Jan. 2024), pp. 16–17 (PDF 17–18), Proposition 5 and its proof
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

View graph

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me