Proposition 5 — acquihiring if v_a > v_s + (7−3√5)B/2, else direct hiring with poaching probability (v_a−v_s+B)/(3B); the employee prefers direct hiring
ProvedAcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo.proposition_5Consider the private-benefit model of §6: an employee produces at an acquirer and at a startup, enjoys a private benefit at the startup that only she observes, and has an outside option worth , with
The acquirer chooses between acquihiring (buying the startup, then hiring her; its profit is by Lemma 2 with wage floor ) and direct hiring (a simultaneous wage game with the startup, played at Lemma 5's equilibrium wages , ). Let
Then:
- ;
- is an equilibrium of the direct-hiring wage game;
- if , the acquirer's expected profit under direct hiring is strictly below its acquihiring profit, so it engages in acquihiring;
- if , the direct-hiring profit is strictly above the acquihiring profit, so it engages in direct hiring, and it poaches the employee with probability
- the employee always prefers direct hiring: for every type her payoff under acquihiring is strictly below her payoff under direct hiring.
The result shows that private information softens wage competition enough that acquihiring is no longer always chosen, while the employee is still worse off whenever it is.
Formalization Note The direct-hiring branch is evaluated at Lemma 5's equilibrium wages, the continuation equilibrium the paper uses; the statement does not claim this equilibrium is unique. The acquihiring profit and the employee's acquihiring payoff are Lemma 2's outcomes with wage floor , which the paper invokes in §6 and which the milestone on the monopsonistic wage supports. At (inside the direct-hiring branch) the acquisition is taken to fail, so the employee keeps ; either outcome of that tie is below her direct-hiring payoff. Clause 5 is pointwise in the type, which is the paper's "she earns a strictly positive wage and may receive a private benefit".
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AcquihiringMonopsony_PrivateInfo_Model
namespace AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
theorem proposition_5 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
P.vs < vHat P ∧
IsDHEquilibrium P (waStar P) (wsStar P) ∧
(vHat P < P.va → profitA P (waStar P) (wsStar P) < ahProfitA P) ∧
(P.va < vHat P → ahProfitA P < profitA P (waStar P) (wsStar P) ∧
poachProb P (waStar P) (wsStar P) = (P.va - P.vs + P.B) / (3 * P.B)) ∧
(∀ b ∈ Set.Icc (0:ℝ) P.B, ahPayoffE P b < dhPayoffE (waStar P) (wsStar P) b) := by sorry
end AcquihiringMonopsony.PrivateInfo
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.