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Section 3, p. 67 — the equilibrium inequalities (14) for π imply the incentive-compatibility inequalities (6) for π′

Proved
MyersonBargaining.Revelation.induced_isBIC

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

incentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revelation-principle

Let π\piπ be a choice mechanism on nonempty finite response sets S1,…,SnS_1,\dots,S_nS1​,…,Sn​ for a Bayesian collective choice problem, and let (σ1,…,σn)(\sigma_1,\dots,\sigma_n)(σ1​,…,σn​) be a response-plan equilibrium for π\piπ, i.e. response plans satisfying (14). Then the induced direct mechanism

π′(c∣α)=∑sπ(c∣s)∏i=1nσi(si∣αi)\pi'(c\mid\alpha)=\sum_{s}\pi(c\mid s)\prod_{i=1}^n\sigma_i(s_i\mid\alpha_i)π′(c∣α)=s∑​π(c∣s)i=1∏n​σi​(si​∣αi​)

is Bayesian incentive-compatible:

Zi(π′,ai∣ai)≥Zi(π′,bi∣ai)for all i, ai∈Ai, bi∈Ai.Z_i(\pi',a_i\mid a_i)\ge Z_i(\pi',b_i\mid a_i)\qquad\text{for all } i,\ a_i\in A_i,\ b_i\in A_i.Zi​(π′,ai​∣ai​)≥Zi​(π′,bi​∣ai​)for all i, ai​∈Ai​, bi​∈Ai​.

Together with V(π′)=W(π,σ)V(\pi')=W(\pi,\sigma)V(π′)=W(π,σ) this shows F∗∗⊆F∗F^{**}\subseteq F^*F∗∗⊆F∗, the revelation-principle half of Theorem 2.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Model
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_Revelation_Equilibrium
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.Revelation

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

theorem induced_isBIC (G : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.Problem ι A C) {S : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)]
    [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)] (π : C → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (σ : ∀ i, S i → A i → ℝ)
    (hπ : MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsChoiceMechanism π) (hσ : ∀ i, IsResponsePlan (σ i))
    (heq : IsResponsePlanEq G π σ) :
    MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.IsBIC G (induced π σ) := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.Revelation
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 67, Section 3, proof of Theorem 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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