Section 6, p. 1503 — with transferable utility and σ = 0, every core allocation maximizes total product
ProvedKelsoCrawford.NoCore.core_maximizes_total_productConsider a job-matching market with finitely many workers and firms in which utility is transferable, for every worker , firm and salary , and every reservation salary is zero, . Let be a core allocation (D3) of the market with continuously variable salaries, with assignment . Then maximizes total product over all assignments of workers to firms: for every ,
In the example of Section 6 this is the first step of the proof that the core is empty: it restricts any core allocation to the assignments of maximal total product.
Formalization Note The paper states this inside the example ("because utility is transferable for both firms and workers, and because for all workers, any core allocation must, by its Pareto efficiency, maximize total product over all feasible assignments"); it is stated here for every market with the two properties the sentence names. Assignments are total functions, so every worker is employed both in and in the competing assignment , as in D1.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Notions
namespace KelsoCrawford.NoCore
theorem core_maximizes_total_product {W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W]
[Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] (M : Market W F)
(hu : ∀ i j s, M.u i j s = s) (hσ : ∀ i j, M.σ i j = 0)
(A : Allocation W F) (hA : M.IsCore KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore.anySalary A) (g : W → F) :
M.totalProduct g ≤ M.totalProduct A.assign := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.NoCore
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.