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Section 6, p. 1503 — with transferable utility and σ = 0, every core allocation maximizes total product

Proved
KelsoCrawford.NoCore.core_maximizes_total_product

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

coreefficiencymatchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1transferable-utility

Consider a job-matching market with finitely many workers and firms in which utility is transferable, ui(j;s)=su^i(j; s) = sui(j;s)=s for every worker iii, firm jjj and salary sss, and every reservation salary is zero, σij=0\sigma_{ij} = 0σij​=0. Let AAA be a core allocation (D3) of the market with continuously variable salaries, with assignment fff. Then fff maximizes total product over all assignments of workers to firms: for every g:W→Fg : W \to Fg:W→F,

∑jyj(g−1(j))≤∑jyj(f−1(j)).\sum_{j} y^j\big(g^{-1}(j)\big) \le \sum_{j} y^j\big(f^{-1}(j)\big).j∑​yj(g−1(j))≤j∑​yj(f−1(j)).

In the example of Section 6 this is the first step of the proof that the core is empty: it restricts any core allocation to the assignments of maximal total product.

Formalization Note The paper states this inside the example ("because utility is transferable for both firms and workers, and because σij=σik=0\sigma_{ij} = \sigma_{ik} = 0σij​=σik​=0 for all workers, any core allocation must, by its Pareto efficiency, maximize total product over all feasible assignments"); it is stated here for every market with the two properties the sentence names. Assignments are total functions, so every worker is employed both in AAA and in the competing assignment ggg, as in D1.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Model
import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Notions
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.NoCore

theorem core_maximizes_total_product {W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W]
    [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] (M : Market W F)
    (hu : ∀ i j s, M.u i j s = s) (hσ : ∀ i j, M.σ i j = 0)
    (A : Allocation W F) (hA : M.IsCore KelsoCrawford.ContinuousCore.anySalary A) (g : W → F) :
    M.totalProduct g ≤ M.totalProduct A.assign := by sorry

end KelsoCrawford.NoCore
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1503, Section 6
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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