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Proposition 2, p. 1003 — returns alone, linear rebates alone or target rebates alone cannot coordinate effort and quantity

Proved
ChannelRebate.NoCoord.proposition2_no_single_instrument

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-coordinationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1returnssales-effortsupply-chain-contractstarget-rebate

Let 0<c<w<p0 < c < w < p0<c<w<p and s<cs < cs<c (Assumption A1). Demand is eξe\xieξ, where the retailer's effort is e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 and ξ\xiξ has a density φ\varphiφ with φ=0\varphi = 0φ=0 on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), φ>0\varphi > 0φ>0 on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Assumption A4) and finite mean. Effort costs V(e)V(e)V(e), where V(0)=0V(0) = 0V(0)=0 and VVV is strictly increasing and strictly convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Assumption A5) and differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Let (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) maximize the integrated channel's profit

Π(Q,e)=−cQ+pEmin⁡(Q,eξ)+sE(Q−eξ)+−V(e)\Pi(Q, e) = -cQ + pE\min(Q, e\xi) + sE(Q - e\xi)^+ - V(e)Π(Q,e)=−cQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+sE(Q−eξ)+−V(e)

over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0, e≥0e \ge 0e≥0, with eˉ>0\bar e > 0eˉ>0. Write the retailer's profit under wholesale price www, rebate uuu per unit sold beyond the target TTT, and return credit bbb per unsold unit as

R(Q,e∣T)=−wQ+pEmin⁡(Q,eξ)+uE(min⁡(Q,eξ)−T)++bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).R(Q, e \mid T) = -wQ + pE\min(Q, e\xi) + uE(\min(Q, e\xi) - T)^+ + bE(Q - e\xi)^+ - V(e).R(Q,e∣T)=−wQ+pEmin(Q,eξ)+uE(min(Q,eξ)−T)++bE(Q−eξ)+−V(e).

Then (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) maximizes RRR over Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0, e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 under none of the following contracts:

  1. returns alone: u=0u = 0u=0 and any return credit b∈[s,w)b \in [s, w)b∈[s,w);
  2. a linear rebate alone: T=0T = 0T=0, any u>0u > 0u>0, and no returns (b=sb = sb=s);
  3. a target rebate alone: any T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, any u>0u > 0u>0, and no returns (b=sb = sb=s).

In each case the retailer's optimal decisions cannot be the integrated channel's, so channel coordination in effort and quantity cannot be achieved. By contrast, the paper's Theorem 2 shows that a target rebate combined with returns can coordinate, and a linear rebate combined with returns coordinates only at u=w−cu = w - cu=w−c, b=s+w−cb = s + w - cb=s+w−c, which leaves the manufacturer no profit.

Formalization Note The existence of the integrated optimum is assumed in the paper in words (p. 999) and is a hypothesis here; its positivity eˉ>0\bar e > 0eˉ>0 is a disclosed hypothesis, because the paper's optimum is interior (characterized by first-order conditions) and with eˉ=0\bar e = 0eˉ=0 the channel would sell nothing. Differentiability of VVV on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is carried by the effort-cost structure: the paper's argument compares first-order conditions in eee, and a kink of VVV at eˉ\bar eeˉ could otherwise let both the channel and the retailer stop at eˉ\bar eeˉ. "Not an optimal pair" is stronger than "the retailer's optimum is not unique or not (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ)": it excludes (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q, \bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) from the retailer's maximizers altogether.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_NoCoord_Setting

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.NoCoord

theorem proposition2_no_single_instrument (p c s w : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcw : c < w) (hwp : w < p)
    (hsc : s < c) (D : Demand) (V : EffortCost)
    (Qbar ebar : ℝ) (hopt : ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (chainProfit p c s D V) Qbar ebar) (hebar : 0 < ebar) :
    (∀ b : ℝ, s ≤ b → b < w →
      ¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w 0 b 0 D V) Qbar ebar) ∧
    (∀ u : ℝ, 0 < u →
      ¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w u s 0 D V) Qbar ebar) ∧
    (∀ u T : ℝ, 0 < u → 0 ≤ T →
      ¬ ChannelRebate.Effort.IsOptimalPair (retailerProfit p w u s T D V) Qbar ebar) := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.NoCoord
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 1003, Proposition 2; model p. 994 (A1, A4), p. 999 (A5, Π), p. 1000 (R(Q, e|T)); proof in the Appendix, p. 1006
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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