Interim utility of bidder
DefinitionDSICCompComp_Supplement_interimUtilitycompetition-complexitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization
Let be a product distribution on from which each of bidders draws her value vector independently. For a mechanism , a bidder , values and a report , the interim utility is
the expected utility of bidder when the other bidders report their values truthfully.
Formalization Note The expectation is a Bochner integral of the ex-post utility (interimIntegrand) against the full profile law (the published profileLaw n D). The integrand ignores the -th coordinate, whose law is a probability measure, so this equals the expectation over . The definition takes a proof that the integrand is integrable, excluding Lean's default value for a non-integrable Bochner integral.
Definition code
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_profileLaw
import Definitions.Def_DSICCompComp_Supplement_interimIntegrand
open MeasureTheory
open scoped NNReal
namespace DSICCompComp
namespace Supplement
/-- The interim utility of bidder `i` with values `v_i` reporting `v'_i`, when the other `n − 1`
bidders report truthfully with values drawn iid from the product distribution `D`
(Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Section 2, pp.5–6 (pdf pp.6–7)):
`E_{v_{-i} ∼ D^{n-1}}[∑_j x_ij(v'_i, v_{-i}) · v_ij − p_i(v'_i, v_{-i})]`.
**Formalization Note** The expectation is the Bochner integral of `interimIntegrand M i vi vi'`
against the full profile law `D^n` (the published `profileLaw n D`); since the integrand ignores
the `i`-th coordinate and that coordinate's law is a probability measure, this is the expectation
over `v_{-i} ∼ D^{n-1}`. The proof argument records that the integrand is integrable, excluding
Lean's default value `0` for a non-integrable Bochner integral. -/
noncomputable def interimUtility {n m : ℕ} (D : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0)
(M : MultiItemRev.MultiBuyer.MechanismN n (Fin m)) (i : Fin n) (vi vi' : Fin m → ℝ≥0)
(_h : Integrable (interimIntegrand M i vi vi') (profileLaw n D)) : ℝ :=
∫ v, interimIntegrand M i vi vi' v ∂(profileLaw n D)
end Supplement
end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Section 2, pp.5–6 (pdf pp.6–7)