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p. 24, proof of Lemma 6 — a strategy whose block's matching strategy has probability 0 earns at most maxₛ|μ(s)|

Proved
FixpNash.Blocks.purePayoff_le_of_matching_prob_zero

by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymatching-penniesnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let players i,i′i,i'i,i′ of a finite game form a block matching-pennies pair (block map β\betaβ, first term μ\muμ, constant MMM, parameter nnn), and let xxx be any mixed profile (not necessarily an equilibrium). Let j∈Sij\in S_ij∈Si​ be a strategy of iii whose block corresponds to a strategy of i′i'i′ that has probability 000 in xxx, i.e. xi′(β(j))=0x_{i'}(\beta(j))=0xi′​(β(j))=0. Then the expected payoff of jjj for player iii against the rest of the profile satisfies

ui((i:j);x−i)≤max⁡s∣μ(s)∣.u_i((i{:}j);x_{-i})\le \max_s|\mu(s)| .ui​((i:j);x−i​)≤smax​∣μ(s)∣.

In the proof of Lemma 6 this is applied to strategies in a block of maximum probability, whose matching strategies of i′i'i′ have probability 000 by the preceding step; the statement here isolates the only property of such blocks that the bound uses.

Formalization Note. max⁡s∣μ(s)∣\max_s|\mu(s)|maxs​∣μ(s)∣ is the supremum of ∣μ(s)∣|\mu(s)|∣μ(s)∣ over the finite set of pure profiles. The paper's sentence speaks of "any strategy in a block in RRR"; the hypothesis xi′(β(j))=0x_{i'}(\beta(j))=0xi′​(β(j))=0 is the general form of it.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_agt_games
import Definitions.Def_DGPNash_NashMap_nashMap
import Definitions.Def_FixpNash_Blocks_Form
Formal statement
namespace FixpNash.Blocks

/-- Proof of Lemma 6, p. 24, first payoff bound: for any mixed profile `x`, if the
strategy `β j` of `i'` corresponding to the block of the strategy `j` of `i` has
probability `0`, then the expected payoff of `j` for player `i` against the rest of `x`
is at most `max_s |μ(s)|`. -/
theorem purePayoff_le_of_matching_prob_zero {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ k, Fintype (S k)] [∀ k, DecidableEq (S k)]
    (u : ι → (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (i i' : ι) (β : S i → S i')
    (μ : (∀ k, S k) → ℝ) (M : ℝ) (n : ℕ) (hG : IsBlockPair u i i' β μ M n)
    (x : ∀ k, S k → ℝ) (hx : AGT.IsMixedProfile x)
    (j : S i) (hj : x i' (β j) = 0) :
    DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff u x i j ≤ ⨆ s : (∀ k, S k), |μ s| := by sorry

end FixpNash.Blocks
Source
Etessami & Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, author manuscript (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)), proof of Lemma 6, part 1, p. 24
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 8, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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