Lemma 1 — a strategy-proof strict voting procedure satisfies Condition U
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship.lemma_1Consider a strict committee with individuals and alternatives, and a strict voting procedure whose range has elements. If is strategy-proof, then it satisfies Condition U: for every strict ballot set and every ,
In words, if every individual ranks above every other element of the range, the procedure selects . Condition U is the Pareto-type property on which the definition of strong alternative-excluding procedures, and the rest of the proof of Theorem 1, rest.
Formalization Note Strategy-proofness is AGT.IncentiveCompatible. , , are Fintype.card ι, Fintype.card A and (range f).ncard. The paper states and as hypotheses; both are kept, although the conclusion does not need them.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Dictatorship_Basic
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship
open AGT
/-- **Lemma 1** (Satterthwaite, p. 13). For a strict committee with `n ≥ 1`, `m ≥ 3` and
`p ≥ 1`, every strategy-proof strict voting procedure satisfies Condition U. -/
theorem lemma_1 {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
(hn : 1 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(f : (ι → A → A → Prop) → A) (hp : 1 ≤ (range f).ncard)
(hsp : IncentiveCompatible f) :
ConditionU f := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Dictatorship
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.