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Theorem 3.2 (Roberts, 1979) — a weighted VGC mechanism is truthful

Proved
AlgMechDesign.Randomized.weighted_vgc_truthful

by mikedeng1 · Sep 28, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

algorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1vcg

Let vi(ti,o)v^i(t^i, o)vi(ti,o) be the valuations of nnn agents over a set of outputs OOO, and let β1,…,βn>0\beta^1,\dots,\beta^n > 0β1,…,βn>0 be weights. Let m=(o(t),p(t))m = (o(t), p(t))m=(o(t),p(t)) be a direct revelation mechanism in the weighted VGC family: o(t)o(t)o(t) maximizes ∑iβivi(ti,o)\sum_i \beta^i v^i(t^i, o)∑i​βivi(ti,o) over all outputs ooo, and

pi(t)=1βi∑j≠iβjvj(tj,o(t))+hi(t−i)p^i(t) = \frac{1}{\beta^i}\sum_{j \ne i} \beta^j v^j\big(t^j, o(t)\big) + h^i(t^{-i})pi(t)=βi1​j=i∑​βjvj(tj,o(t))+hi(t−i)

for functions hih^ihi that do not depend on tit^iti. Then mmm is truthful: for every agent iii, all declarations t−it^{-i}t−i of the others, every true type tit^iti and every misreport did^idi,

vi(ti,o(t−i,di))+pi(t−i,di)≤vi(ti,o(t−i,ti))+pi(t−i,ti).v^i\big(t^i, o(t^{-i}, d^i)\big) + p^i(t^{-i}, d^i) \le v^i\big(t^i, o(t^{-i}, t^i)\big) + p^i(t^{-i}, t^i).vi(ti,o(t−i,di))+pi(t−i,di)≤vi(ti,o(t−i,ti))+pi(t−i,ti).

In the paper, the biased min work mechanism restricted to one task is a weighted VGC mechanism with weights {1,β}\{1,\beta\}{1,β} or {β,1}\{\beta, 1\}{β,1}, and this theorem gives its truthfulness.

Formalization Note The output set, the types and the valuations are arbitrary; the weights are assumed positive as in Definition 8.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AlgMechDesign_Randomized_WeightedVGC
Formal statement
namespace AlgMechDesign.Randomized

/-- Theorem 3.2 (Roberts, 1979): for positive weights `β`, every mechanism of the weighted VGC
family is truthful. -/
theorem weighted_vgc_truthful {n : ℕ} {O : Type*} {T : Fin n → Type*}
    (v : ∀ i, T i → O → ℝ) (β : Fin n → ℝ) (hβ : ∀ i, 0 < β i)
    (o : (∀ i, T i) → O) (p : (∀ i, T i) → Fin n → ℝ) (hvgc : IsWeightedVGC v β o p) :
    IsTruthfulGeneral v o p := by sorry

end AlgMechDesign.Randomized
Source
Nisan, Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001, p. 174, Theorem 3.2 (with Definitions 8 and 9, pp. 173–174)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 1, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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