Theorem 3.2 (Roberts, 1979) — a weighted VGC mechanism is truthful
ProvedAlgMechDesign.Randomized.weighted_vgc_truthfulalgorithmic-game-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1vcg
Let be the valuations of agents over a set of outputs , and let be weights. Let be a direct revelation mechanism in the weighted VGC family: maximizes over all outputs , and
for functions that do not depend on . Then is truthful: for every agent , all declarations of the others, every true type and every misreport ,
In the paper, the biased min work mechanism restricted to one task is a weighted VGC mechanism with weights or , and this theorem gives its truthfulness.
Formalization Note The output set, the types and the valuations are arbitrary; the weights are assumed positive as in Definition 8.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AlgMechDesign_Randomized_WeightedVGC
Formal statement
namespace AlgMechDesign.Randomized
/-- Theorem 3.2 (Roberts, 1979): for positive weights `β`, every mechanism of the weighted VGC
family is truthful. -/
theorem weighted_vgc_truthful {n : ℕ} {O : Type*} {T : Fin n → Type*}
(v : ∀ i, T i → O → ℝ) (β : Fin n → ℝ) (hβ : ∀ i, 0 < β i)
(o : (∀ i, T i) → O) (p : (∀ i, T i) → Fin n → ℝ) (hvgc : IsWeightedVGC v β o p) :
IsTruthfulGeneral v o p := by sorry
end AlgMechDesign.Randomized
Source
Nisan, Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001, p. 174, Theorem 3.2 (with Definitions 8 and 9, pp. 173–174)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.