Proposition 8, p. 23 — seller and buyer payoff rankings and their fixed-cost reversals
ProvedCustomerVoice.Payoffs.proposition_8Consider the paper's two-type customization model with , , and . Let be the seller's expected gross payoffs and the type- buyer's gross payoffs at the A-Learning and O-Learning equilibrium qualities. Proposition 8 states four comparisons:
- The seller receives more under A-Learning: .
- For every , some makes for every .
- Each type receives more under O-Learning: for .
- For every and each type , some makes for every .
The proposition compares gross benefits from the two design rights and explains when a positive incremental fixed cost reverses each preference.
Formalization Note In the small- clauses only changes, and each threshold is selected before the varying . The statements hold for all parameters satisfying the section's standing assumptions without separately assuming the existence thresholds for both separating equilibria. The price stage is represented by the printed reduced-form payoffs, and the buyer payoffs retain their maxima with zero.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CustomerVoice_Payoffs_Setting
namespace CustomerVoice.Payoffs
theorem proposition_8 (M : Model) (hM : M.Standing) :
M.VA > M.VO ∧
(∀ F : ℝ, F > 0 → ∃ sF : ℝ, sF > 0 ∧
∀ s' : ℝ, 0 < s' → s' < sF →
(M.withS s').VA - F < (M.withS s').VO) ∧
(∀ t : CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType, M.UA t < M.UO t) ∧
(∀ G : ℝ, G > 0 → ∀ t : CustomerVoice.ALearn.BType, ∃ sG : ℝ, sG > 0 ∧
∀ s' : ℝ, 0 < s' → s' < sG →
(M.withS s').UA t > (M.withS s').UO t - G) := by sorry
end CustomerVoice.Payoffs
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.