Proof of Theorem 4, p. 1495 — permitted salaries never exceed the salaries of any strict core allocation
ProvedKelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal.permitted_salary_le_strictly_possibleascending-processcoregross-substitutesmatchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider a discrete market with salary unit satisfying regularity, (MP), (NFL), (GS) for every firm on the permitted salary vectors, (NTW) and (NTF). Let be any discrete strict core allocation. In any run of the salary-adjustment process R1–R5, for every round and every worker ,
In words: every set of workers who are strictly possible for a firm in a strict core allocation is available to that firm, in every round, at permitted salaries no bigger than those at which they are strictly possible.
Formalization Note The strict core allocation pays permitted (grid) salaries, as D2 requires. Every run and every round are covered.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Process import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_NoTies
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
theorem permitted_salary_le_strictly_possible
{W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) (M.gridVectors δ j))
(hNTW : M.NTW δ) (hNTF : M.NTF δ) :
∀ ρ : Run W F, M.IsRun δ ρ → ∀ (t : ℕ) (A : Allocation W F), M.IsStrictCore (M.grid δ) A →
∀ i, ρ.sal t i (A.assign i) ≤ A.sal i := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1495, proof of Theorem 4, third paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.