(18), p. 14 (PDF p. 17) — ∂λ/∂s = 2θsβ(β − s)/[(β − s)² + θs²]²
ProvedCommonOwnership.Governance.eq18_lam_derivcalculuscommon-ownershipp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let and , and let be the common-ownership weight (17). Then is differentiable at every real , with
The derivative vanishes at and and is positive in between; this is why the softening-of-competition effect vanishes at both ends of the ownership range.
Formalization Note The denominator is positive for every because and , so the derivative is stated at every real .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CommonOwnership_Governance_Model
Formal statement
namespace CommonOwnership.Governance
/-- (18), p. 14: `∂λ/∂s = 2θsβ(β − s) / [(β − s)² + θs²]²`. -/
theorem eq18_lam_deriv (θ β s : ℝ) (hθ : 0 < θ) (hβ : 0 < β) :
HasDerivAt (fun x => lam θ β x)
(2 * θ * s * β * (β - s) / ((β - s) ^ 2 + θ * s ^ 2) ^ 2) s := by sorry
end CommonOwnership.Governance
Source
Denicolò & Panunzi, Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance, ECGI Finance Working Paper 927/2023 (SSRN 4523644, July 24, 2023; Management Science DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467), p. 14 (PDF p. 17), (18); λ from (17), p. 13 (PDF p. 16)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.