Proof of Proposition 2, Step 1 (uniqueness), oa6 (PDF 38) — in an SPE, one contractor at q̲/N in every period forces all to q̲/N
ProvedAssemblyCoord.Feedback.prop_2_step1_best_responsebest-responseminimum-effort-gamep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1subgame-perfect-equilibrium
In the -contractor, -period coordination game with information feedback started from zero effort, under the standing assumptions, let be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and suppose some contractor exerts in every period along 's path. Then every contractor exerts in every period along that path:
This is the best-response step of the uniqueness argument in Proposition 2(i): once one contractor stays at the minimum, the project level is and any extra effort by another contractor is wasted cost.
Formalization Note. Periods are 0-based (pathHist σ n). No bound relating and is needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AssemblyCoord_Feedback_Model
Formal statement
namespace AssemblyCoord.Feedback
theorem prop_2_step1_best_response (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) (σ : Profile P.M)
(hσ : P.IsSPE 0 σ) (j : Fin P.M)
(hj : ∀ n, n < P.N → σ j (pathHist σ n) = P.qlo / P.N) :
∀ n, n < P.N → ∀ i : Fin P.M, σ i (pathHist σ n) = P.qlo / P.N := by sorry
end AssemblyCoord.Feedback
Source
Zhang, Shokoohyar, Qi & Katok, Coordination for assembly, author manuscript (10 July 2025) of MSOM doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0342, p. oa6 (PDF 38), proof of Proposition 2, Step 1, uniqueness paragraph
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.