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Theorem 6.4 — non-identical bidders: a two-price lottery guarantees (1/(32n)−δ) OPT(1/(32n)-\delta)\,\mathrm{OPT}(1/(32n)−δ)OPT

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LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement.theorem_6_4

by mikedeng1 · Nov 15, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auction-theorymechanism-designp2o-batch-stoc27sp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1 bidders have independent, possibly non-identical regular value laws D1,…,DnD_1,\dots,D_nD1​,…,Dn​ (densities on possibly unbounded intervals, optional finite terminal atoms), each with vPr⁡[Vi>v]→0v\Pr[V_i>v]\to0vPr[Vi​>v]→0, and OPT>0\mathrm{OPT}>0OPT>0. For every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 there are 0≤a≤b0\le a\le b0≤a≤b and λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1] such that the two-price menu M=M(a,b,λ)M=M(a,b,\lambda)M=M(a,b,λ) has an intermediary best response and

RandMI(M) ≥ (132n−δ)OPT\mathrm{RandMI}(M)\ \ge\ \Big(\frac1{32n}-\delta\Big)\mathrm{OPT}RandMI(M) ≥ (32n1​−δ)OPT

against every revenue-maximizing intermediary; OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is finite.

The paper writes Ω(1/n) OPT\Omega(1/n)\,\mathrm{OPT}Ω(1/n)OPT; the proof yields 1/(32n)−δ1/(32n)-\delta1/(32n)−δ for every δ>0\delta>0δ>0 (Lemma 6.2 with H=τ=2OPTH=\tau=2\mathrm{OPT}H=τ=2OPT, natural logarithm, and the menu bound OPTτ/(8n)\mathrm{OPT}_\tau/(8n)OPTτ​/(8n) after ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0). This extends the i.i.d. goal Theorem 6.3 to non-identical bidders at the cost of a factor nnn.

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: RandMI(MS) = Omega(1/n) OPT → the explicit coefficient 1/(32 n) - delta for every delta > 0; reason: Lemma 6.2 with H = tau = 2 OPT gives DET log 4 + OPT_tau >= OPT/2, and the p.23 menu gives OPT_tau/(8n) - eps terms, so min{1/(4 log 4), (1/(8n))/4} = 1/(32n) up to delta; delta = 1/(64 n) gives the source's Omega(1/n) with an absolute constant
  • reading: two-price randomized mechanism → at most two support prices, equal prices and endpoint weights allowed; reason: Lemma 6.2 allows a posted price; same reading as the published goal
  • encoding: finite positive OPT → finiteness is a conclusion; reason: it follows from the hypotheses
  • generalization: Assumption 3.2 restricts intermediary tie-breaking → the guarantee holds against every revenue-maximizing BIC/IR intermediary (RandMI is the infimum over all best responses); reason: a bound on all best responses implies the bound on the source subclass
  • encoding: the intermediary is presumed to best respond → RandMI is minus infinity when best responses are absent, and existence is stated explicitly in menu guarantees; reason: an empty best-response set cannot certify a guarantee
  • encoding: independent nonnegative bidder values and expected revenues → Fin n, product probability measures, EReal optima, and measurable mechanisms with integrable payments and all report sections; reason: these represent the same stochastic auction; unbounded optima and undefined real integrals cannot default to zero
  • encoding: Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality → truthful inequalities for almost every original value against every real report; reason: null types do not affect revenue; reports outside the support extend the mechanism without changing its attainable revenues
  • encoding: regular distribution with a PDF on its support [a, b] (Definition A.2 with alpha = 0) → the published ValueDist (density positive on (a, b), optional terminal atom, phi(b) = b) with Regular asking phi nondecreasing on (a, b]; reason: the density value at the single point a does not change the law; the two classes of laws coincide (same encoding as the published mission)
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_LotteryInterm_IID_Intermediary

open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement

/-- Theorem 6.4: independent, possibly non-identical bidders; a menu with at most two
prices guarantees `(1/(32 n) - δ) · OPT` against every best response, every `δ > 0`. -/
theorem theorem_6_4 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (D : Fin n → ValueDist)
    (hreg : ∀ i, Regular (D i)) (htail : ∀ i, VanishingTail (D i))
    (hopt : 0 < OPT D) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) :
    OPT D < ⊤ ∧
    ∃ (a b weight : ℝ) (ha : 0 ≤ a) (hab : a ≤ b) (hw : weight ∈ Set.Icc 0 1),
      let M := twoPrice a b weight ha hab hw
      (∃ I, BestResponse D M I) ∧
      (((1 / (32 * (n : ℝ)) - δ : ℝ) : EReal) * OPT D) ≤ RandMI D M := by sorry

end LotteryInterm.IID.Supplement
Source
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas, Matt Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang, STOC 2027 submission #623 (October 2026), Theorem 6.4, p.21 (PDF p.22); proof pp.21–23 (PDF pp.22–24); https://github.com/sigact-stoc/stoc2027/releases/download/papers-1/623.pdf

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