Display (1), p. 7 — G(v, α) increases in α for v < û and decreases in α for v > û
ProvedInfoBargaining.Monotone.eq1_G_rotationinformation-acquisitionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1rotation-ordertruth-or-noise
Let be the prior of the buyer's value, with mean , and let be the distribution function of the posterior mean under the truth-or-noise signal of informativeness .
For all with and every :
So the family rotates about the prior mean : more information moves mass from the centre to both tails. This is the sign of the cross effect of the seller's cost on the buyer's marginal value of information.
Formalization Note This is display (1) in difference form. The paper states it with derivatives, , which is for and for ; that form needs a density, which the generalized prior of this mission does not have. Under the paper's density assumption the inequalities are strict and differential.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoBargaining_Monotone_Setting
Formal statement
namespace InfoBargaining.Monotone
/-- Display (1), p. 7, in difference form: `G(v, α)` increases in `α` for `v < û` and
decreases in `α` for `v > û`, for `α` in `(0, 1)`. -/
theorem eq1_G_rotation (M : Model) {α α' : ℝ} (hα : α ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1)
(hα' : α' ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1) (hle : α ≤ α') (v : ℝ) :
(v < M.uhat → M.G v α ≤ M.G v α') ∧ (M.uhat < v → M.G v α' ≤ M.G v α) := by sorry
end InfoBargaining.Monotone
Source
Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, SSRN 3930651 (manuscript of 15 Feb 2022), p. 7, display (1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.