Section 6, p. 1502 — firm j's unique preferred sets: {1, 2} at (3, 3, 3) with profit 1½, {3} at (3, 4, 3) with profit 1¼
ProvedKelsoCrawford.NoCore.firm_j_unique_demandscounterexamplegross-substitutesmatchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be firm 's technology from the example of Section 6, and consider the salary vectors and (salaries of workers ). Then is the unique profit-maximizing set of workers at , and is the unique one at :
This is the computation behind the failure of (GS) for firm : raising only worker 2's salary makes the firm drop worker 1, whose salary did not change.
Formalization Note "Unique preferred set" is stated as: a set is demanded (maximizes profit over all sets) if and only if (respectively ). Workers are 0, 1, 2.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_NoCore_Example
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.NoCore
theorem firm_j_unique_demands :
(∀ C : Finset (Fin 3), KelsoCrawford.Process.IsDemanded techJ ![3, 3, 3] C ↔ C = {0, 1}) ∧
KelsoCrawford.Process.profit techJ {0, 1} ![3, 3, 3] = 3 / 2 ∧
(∀ C : Finset (Fin 3), KelsoCrawford.Process.IsDemanded techJ ![3, 4, 3] C ↔ C = {2}) ∧
KelsoCrawford.Process.profit techJ {2} ![3, 4, 3] = 5 / 4 := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.NoCore
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1502, Section 6
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.