Appendix E.1.3, p. 47, with (36), p. 43 — if γ(1 − λ) ≤ 27/8, a net fee satisfying (20) is a best response in the Logit duopoly
ProvedNetFeePlatform.InteropDominance.foc_best_responsebest-responseinteroperabilitylogit-demandp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-competition
Consider the Logit duopoly without outside option, with marginal cost , network-interaction value and interoperability , and assume
Let be a fee profile and a platform whose net fee satisfies the first-order condition (20), . Then is a best response to the other platform's fee: for every ,
In the appendix the second derivative of profit in the own share is , with diversion ratio here; since on (display (36)), the condition makes profit concave in the own share, so the first-order condition is sufficient.
Formalization Note The bound is the paper's , half the minimum of attained at ((36), p. 43).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NetFeePlatform_Competition_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NetFeePlatform.InteropDominance
theorem foc_best_response (c γ lam : ℝ) (hlam0 : 0 ≤ lam) (hlam1 : lam ≤ 1)
(hreg : γ * (1 - lam) ≤ 27 / 8) (t : Fin 2 → ℝ) (j : Fin 2)
(hfoc : t j = c + 1 / (1 - NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) - 2 * γ * NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j
- γ * lam * (1 - NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) + γ * lam * NetFeePlatform.Competition.demand 0 t j) :
∀ s : ℝ, NetFeePlatform.Competition.profit 0 c γ lam (Function.update t j s) j ≤ NetFeePlatform.Competition.profit 0 c γ lam t j := by sorry
end NetFeePlatform.InteropDominance
Source
Ekmekci, White & Wu, Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model, accepted working-paper version (December 12, 2024), pp. 46–47, Appendix E.1.3; p. 43, (36)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.