Lemma 2, p. OA-5 — forward-looking equilibria ↔ pure-strategy Nash equilibria of G(m)
ProvedDataTrackComp.Surplus.lemma_2data-trackingnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1perfect-bayesian-equilibrium
Let and . A price pair is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if and only if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the forward-looking setting whose product-1 prices are :
Both directions of the lemma are included. Through it, existence, uniqueness and every property of the forward-looking equilibrium prices reduce to the two-player game .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DataTrackComp_Surplus_Game import Definitions.Def_DataTrackComp_Surplus_ReducedGame
Formal statement
namespace DataTrackComp.Surplus
theorem lemma_2 (ubar m pA pB : ℝ) (hu : 0 < ubar) (hm : 0 < m) :
IsPSNE m pA pB ↔ ∃ E : Assessment, IsEquilibrium .forward ubar m E ∧ E.pA = pA ∧ E.pB = pB := by sorry
end DataTrackComp.Surplus
Source
Bimpikis, Morgenstern & Saban, Data Tracking under Competition, authors' manuscript with online appendix (Operations Research, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2489; PDF of 2023-05-04), p. OA-5 (PDF 40), Lemma 2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.