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Lemma 4.4 — preprocessing keeps at least half of each valuation

Proved
SatiationFisherNSW.lemma_4_4

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

approximation-algorithmsfisher-marketmarket-equilibriumnash-social-welfarep2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Under the standing assumptions of §4.1 (an instance with v≤cv\le cv≤c, a money-clearing Fisher market, a thrifty and modest equilibrium (x,p)(x,p)(x,p), normalized valuations), consider any run of the rounding procedure and the trees of (B∖B0)×(G∖G0)(B\setminus B_0)\times(G\setminus G_0)(B∖B0​)×(G∖G0​). After preprocessing:

  1. the valuation of each root agent rrr is at least vr(x)/2v_r(x)/2vr​(x)/2;
  2. the valuation of every other agent iii is at least vi(x)v_i(x)vi​(x);
  3. if good jjj has child agents and pj>1p_j>1pj​>1, then jjj keeps a child agent.

Here vi(x)=min⁡(ci,∑jvijxij)v_i(x)=\min(c_i,\sum_jv_{ij}x_{ij})vi​(x)=min(ci​,∑j​vij​xij​), and the valuation after preprocessing is the same expression summed over the goods still adjacent to iii.

Formalization Note "Root agents" after preprocessing are the original roots and the agents cut off from their parent good.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: a demand bundle maximizes ui(xi)u_i(\mathbf x_i)ui​(xi​) over bundles with ∑jpjxij≤mi\sum_j p_jx_{ij}\le m_i∑j​pj​xij​≤mi​, bundles having xij∈[0,1]x_{ij}\in[0,1]xij​∈[0,1] (p.6) → the maximum is taken over all y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 with ∑jpjyj≤mi\sum_j p_jy_j\le m_i∑j​pj​yj​≤mi​, without the box yj≤1y_j\le 1yj​≤1; reason: with the box Lemma 4.3(a) fails (one agent, one item, v=1v=1v=1, c=5c=5c=5, p=1/2p=1/2p=1/2, x=1x=1x=1 would be an equilibrium in which the uncapped agent spends 1/21/21/2); the paper computes the maximal utility as min⁡{ci,miαi}\min\{c_i,m_i\alpha_i\}min{ci​,mi​αi​} (proof of Lemma 3.5, p.14), the unboxed maximum; unit supply is enforced by xj≤ejx_j\le e_jxj​≤ej​
  • reading: an allocation has ∑ixij=1\sum_{i}x_{ij}=1∑i​xij​=1 for every good (p.6) → only ∑ixij≤ej\sum_i x_{ij}\le e_j∑i​xij​≤ej​ (Definition 2.1 (3)); reason: Definition 2.1 (3) and (5) force xj=ej<1x_j=e_j<1xj​=ej​<1 when pj>djp_j>d_jpj​>dj​, and Proposition 3.1 (Property 1) has x11=1/2x_{11}=1/2x11​=1/2
  • encoding: jjj is an MBB good of iii if uij/pj=αiu_{ij}/p_j=\alpha_iuij​/pj​=αi​, with αi=∞\alpha_i=\inftyαi​=∞ for buyers interested in a zero-price good and 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 (p.6) → uij>0u_{ij}>0uij​>0 and uikpj≤uijpku_{ik}p_j\le u_{ij}p_kuik​pj​≤uij​pk​ for all kkk; reason: no ∞\infty∞ in R\mathbb RR; the same MBB goods for every buyer with some positive value; it differs only for a buyer whose values are all 000, who then buys nothing (such a buyer violates money clearing, and in the goal makes every product 000)
  • encoding: modest supply ej=min⁡(1,dj/pj)e_j=\min(1,d_j/p_j)ej​=min(1,dj​/pj​) (p.6) → ej=1e_j=1ej​=1 when pj=0p_j=0pj​=0, else min⁡(1,dj/pj)\min(1,d_j/p_j)min(1,dj​/pj​); reason: at pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 the paper's dj/pjd_j/p_jdj​/pj​ is +∞+\infty+∞, while Lean's dj/0d_j/0dj​/0 is 000
  • encoding: "we normalize vij′=vij/αiv'_{ij}=v_{ij}/\alpha_ivij′​=vij​/αi​ and ci′=ci/αic'_i=c_i/\alpha_ici′​=ci​/αi​" for i∈B∖B0i\in B\setminus B_0i∈B∖B0​ and "assume that vvv and ccc fulfill these conditions directly" (p.24) → hypothesis IsNormalized: every buyer outside B0B_0B0​ has MBB ratio αi=max⁡kuik/pk=1\alpha_i=\max_k u_{ik}/p_k=1αi​=maxk​uik​/pk​=1; reason: the paper's own convention; every normalized instance arises this way and the rescaling preserves money clearing, v≤cv\le cv≤c and the equilibrium
  • encoding: the procedure of §4.1.2 (pp.26–27) and Appendix B (pp.33–34), with arbitrary root choice and tie-breaks, run recursively → a relation RoundingRun.IsValid on the choices (an orientation of the allocation forest from root agents, a largest child per good, a greedy pick per agent), the kept child forced by the threshold, and the output defined from the recursion path; reason: the choices are exactly those the paper leaves free, and every valid run is covered; the recursion of Rounding (b) assigns the picked goods along the path to their parents and every other remaining good to its child agent
  • encoding: "the valuation" after preprocessing → min⁡(ci,∑juijxij)\min(c_i,\sum_j u_{ij}x_{ij})min(ci​,∑j​uij​xij​) over the goods adjacent to iii in the forest after preprocessing; reason: the fractional allocation restricted to the edges that are not cut
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SatiationFisherNSW_NSWInstance
import Definitions.Def_SatiationFisherNSW_RoundingRun
open scoped Classical
Formal statement
namespace SatiationFisherNSW

/-- Lemma 4.4 (Garg, Hoefer, Mehlhorn, arXiv:1707.04428v3, p.27): after preprocessing, the
valuation of each root agent `r` is at least `v_r(x)/2`; for all other agents `i` the valuation
is at least `v_i(x)`; and if good `j` has child agents and `p_j > 1`, then `j` keeps a child
agent.

**Formalization Note** The lemma concerns the trees in `(B \ B₀) × (G \ G₀)` (p.26), so the
agents are those outside `B₀`. The valuation after preprocessing is
`min(c_i, Σ_j u_{ij} x_{ij})` over the goods still adjacent to `i` (`ppUtility`); `v_i(x)` is
`min(c_i, Σ_j u_{ij} x_{ij})` over all goods. A root after preprocessing is an original root or
an agent cut off from its parent good (`IsPPRoot`).
The standing assumptions of §4.1 are hypotheses: `v_{ij} ≤ c_i`
(p.23, "Henceforth"), the market of the instance (`u = v`, `m_i = d_j = 1`) is money clearing
(p.24, "for the remainder of this section"), `(x, p)` is a thrifty and modest equilibrium of it,
and the valuations are normalized according to `p` (MBB ratio `1` for every buyer outside `B₀`,
p.24).
A run of the procedure is any valid choice of roots, largest children and picks
(`RoundingRun.IsValid`); the statement holds for every run. -/
theorem lemma_4_4
    {B G : Type*} [Fintype B] [Fintype G] (I : NSWInstance B G)
    (hvc : ∀ i j, I.v i j ≤ I.c i) (hMC : I.market.IsMoneyClearing)
    (x : B → G → ℝ) (p : G → ℝ) (hEq : I.market.IsEquilibrium x p) (hN : I.IsNormalized p)
    (R : RoundingRun B G) (hR : R.IsValid I.market x p) :
    (∀ i, ¬ I.market.InB0 p i →
      (R.IsPPRoot I.market x p i → I.market.utility i (x i) / 2 ≤ R.ppUtility I.market x p i) ∧
      (¬ R.IsPPRoot I.market x p i → I.market.utility i (x i) ≤ R.ppUtility I.market x p i)) ∧
    (∀ j, 1 < p j → (∃ i, R.parentGood i = some j) →
      R.keptChild I.market x p j ≠ none) := by sorry

end SatiationFisherNSW
Source
Garg, Hoefer, Mehlhorn, Satiation in Fisher markets and approximation of Nash social welfare, arXiv:1707.04428v3 (31 Jul 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.04428v3, Lemma 4.4, p.27; procedure, pp.26–27
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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