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Theorem 2, p. 1002 — under ξ ∼ U(0,1), for κ ∈ (0, Π) and small ε the target rebate and returns contract (w*, u(T*), b(T*), T*) exists, coordinates effort and quantity, and gives R* = κ, M* = Π − κ

Proved
ChannelRebate.Effort.theorem2_rebate_returns_coordination

by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

channel-coordinationchannel-rebatep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sales-effortsupply-chain-contracts

Let 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, s<cs<cs<c, a>0a>0a>0, let ξ∼Uniform(0,1)\xi\sim\mathrm{Uniform}(0,1)ξ∼Uniform(0,1) and V(e)=ae2/2V(e)=ae^2/2V(e)=ae2/2. Let Qˉ0\bar Q_0Qˉ​0​ solve Φ(Qˉ0)=p−cp−s\Phi(\bar Q_0)=\frac{p-c}{p-s}Φ(Qˉ​0​)=p−sp−c​, eˉ=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ0)/a\bar e=(p-s)\Gamma(\bar Q_0)/aeˉ=(p−s)Γ(Qˉ​0​)/a, Qˉ=eˉQˉ0\bar Q=\bar e\bar Q_0Qˉ​=eˉQˉ​0​, and let Π=Λ(eˉ)\Pi=\Lambda(\bar e)Π=Λ(eˉ) be the integrated channel's optimal profit. Fix κ∈(0,Π)\kappa\in(0,\Pi)κ∈(0,Π).

For a wholesale price w∈(c,p)w\in(c,p)w∈(c,p) and a target TTT, the contract (w,u(T),b(T),T)(w,u(T),b(T),T)(w,u(T),b(T),T) uses the rebate u(T)u(T)u(T) and return credit b(T)b(T)b(T) of p. 1001; T1(w)T_1(w)T1​(w) and T2(w)T_2(w)T2​(w) are the fixed points of Lemma 6, L‾(T,w)\underline L(T,w)L​(T,w) the retailer's profit at effort e‾\underline ee​ and Lˉ(T)\bar L(T)Lˉ(T) her profit at effort eˉ\bar eeˉ. Say that (w∗,T∗)(w^*,T^*)(w∗,T∗) is set as in Theorem 2 for ε\varepsilonε when

T∗∈(T1,T2),L‾(T∗,w∗)=κ−ε,Lˉ(T∗)=κ.T^*\in(T_1,T_2),\qquad \underline L(T^*,w^*)=\kappa-\varepsilon,\qquad \bar L(T^*)=\kappa .T∗∈(T1​,T2​),L​(T∗,w∗)=κ−ε,Lˉ(T∗)=κ.

Then there is ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0 such that for every ε∈(0,κ)\varepsilon\in(0,\kappa)ε∈(0,κ) with ε<ε0\varepsilon<\varepsilon_0ε<ε0​:

  1. (a) such (w∗,T∗)(w^*,T^*)(w∗,T∗) exist; and for every such pair, with u∗=u(T∗)u^*=u(T^*)u∗=u(T∗) and b∗=b(T∗)b^*=b(T^*)b∗=b(T∗), we have w∗∈(c,p)w^*\in(c,p)w∗∈(c,p), u∗>0u^*>0u∗>0, b∗∈(s,w∗)b^*\in(s,w^*)b∗∈(s,w∗) and T∗>0T^*>0T∗>0;
  2. (b) the contract achieves channel coordination: (Qˉ,eˉ)(\bar Q,\bar e)(Qˉ​,eˉ) is the unique maximizer of the retailer's profit R(Q,e∣T∗)R(Q,e\mid T^*)R(Q,e∣T∗) over Q≥0Q\ge0Q≥0, e≥0e\ge0e≥0;
  3. (c) the resulting profits are R∗=R(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=κR^*=R(\bar Q,\bar e\mid T^*)=\kappaR∗=R(Qˉ​,eˉ∣T∗)=κ for the retailer and M∗=M(Qˉ,eˉ∣T∗)=Π−κM^*=M(\bar Q,\bar e\mid T^*)=\Pi-\kappaM∗=M(Qˉ​,eˉ∣T∗)=Π−κ for the manufacturer.

So a target rebate combined with returns, unlike either instrument alone, aligns both the retailer's effort and her order with the integrated channel's and can split the channel profit in any proportion.

Formalization Note. ε0\varepsilon_0ε0​ depends on p,c,s,a,κp,c,s,a,\kappap,c,s,a,κ only. Part (a) is stated as existence plus, for every pair set this way, the listed inequalities; (b) and (c) are claimed for every such pair. w∈(c,p)w\in(c,p)w∈(c,p) is the standing Assumption A1 and is part of "set as in Theorem 2". T1T_1T1​, T2T_2T2​, L‾\underline LL​, Lˉ\bar LLˉ are given by their defining equations; Lˉ\bar LLˉ depends on www through u(T)u(T)u(T) and b(T)b(T)b(T), though the paper writes Lˉ(T)\bar L(T)Lˉ(T). The manufacturer's profit MMM is not displayed in the paper; it is defined from the cash flows (wholesale revenue, rebate paid, units bought back at bbb and salvaged at sss), so that R+M=ΠR+M=\PiR+M=Π.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Effort_Setting

open MeasureTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace ChannelRebate.Effort

theorem theorem2_rebate_returns_coordination
    (p c s a : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p) (hsc : s < c) (ha : 0 < a)
    (Qb : ℝ) (hQb : IsQbar0 p c s Qb)
    (κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκPi : κ < Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb)) :
    ∃ ε₀ : ℝ, 0 < ε₀ ∧ ∀ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε → ε < ε₀ → ε < κ →
      (∃ w T : ℝ, c < w ∧ w < p ∧
          (∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) ∧
          IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) ∧ IsLbar p c s a w T κ) ∧
      ∀ w T : ℝ, c < w → w < p →
        (∃ T₁ T₂ : ℝ, IsFixed1 p c s a w T₁ ∧ IsFixed2 p c s a w T₂ ∧ T₁ < T ∧ T < T₂) →
        IsLlow p c s a w T (κ - ε) → IsLbar p c s a w T κ →
          (0 < uT p c s a w T ∧ s < bT p c s a w T ∧ bT p c s a w T < w ∧ 0 < T) ∧
          optimalPairs (R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T) =
            {(ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb, ebarOf p s a Qb)} ∧
          R p w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) a T
              (ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = κ ∧
          M c s w (uT p c s a w T) (bT p c s a w T) T
              (ebarOf p s a Qb * Qb) (ebarOf p s a Qb) = Lam a (ebarOf p s a Qb) - κ := by sorry

end ChannelRebate.Effort
Source
Taylor, Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects, Management Science 48(8) (2002), p. 1002, Theorem 2 (with u(T), b(T), T₁, T₂ of p. 1001 and L̲, L̄ of p. 1002); proof pp. 1005–1006
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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