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Proposition 2 — the simultaneous KS equilibrium is unique, equals c+(a−c)/5c+(a-c)/5c+(a−c)/5 resp. c+(1−η)(a−c)/(5−η)c+(1-\eta)(a-c)/(5-\eta)c+(1−η)(a−c)/(5−η), and is the NB equilibrium exactly at retailer power 3/53/53/5

Proved
CompetingKS.proposition_2

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargainingkalai-smorodinskynash-bargainingp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1supply-chain

Let a>ca>ca>c and b>0b>0b>0.

One-to-two channel. Let η∈[0,1]\eta\in[0,1]η∈[0,1] and w^=c+a−c5\hat w=c+\frac{a-c}5w^=c+5a−c​.

  1. The simultaneous Kalai–Smorodinsky equilibrium exists, is unique, and equals (w^,w^)(\hat w,\hat w)(w^,w^).
  2. For θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1], (w^,w^)(\hat w,\hat w)(w^,w^) is a simultaneous Nash bargaining equilibrium with retailer bargaining power θ\thetaθ if and only if θ=35\theta=\frac35θ=53​.
  3. The simultaneous Nash bargaining equilibrium with θ=35\theta=\frac35θ=53​ exists, is unique, and equals (w^,w^)(\hat w,\hat w)(w^,w^).

Two-to-one channel. Let η∈[0,1)\eta\in[0,1)η∈[0,1) and wˇ=c+(1−η)(a−c)5−η\check w=c+\frac{(1-\eta)(a-c)}{5-\eta}wˇ=c+5−η(1−η)(a−c)​. The same three statements hold with wˇ\check wwˇ in place of w^\hat ww^.

So in both channels the Kalai–Smorodinsky equilibrium coincides with the Nash bargaining equilibrium in which the retailer has power 0.60.60.6, not the symmetric 0.50.50.5, whatever the level of competition η\etaη. This is the paper's central finding under simultaneous negotiation without contingency.

Formalization Note A simultaneous equilibrium is a contract pair in C^\hat{\mathcal C}C^ (resp. Cˇ\check{\mathcal C}Cˇ) in which each contract is the solution of its bargaining unit given the other contract, over contracts in [c,a][c,a][c,a]. The Kalai–Smorodinsky solution is individual rationality, Pareto optimality and the proportional-surplus equation.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: η ∈ [0, 1] for the two-to-one channel → η ∈ [0, 1); reason: at η = 1, wᵢ = wⱼ < a Lemma 1(ii)(a) gives qᵢ = 0 and (ii)(c) gives qᵢ = (a − wᵢ)/(2b), and (ii)(b) divides by 1 − η² = 0, so q* and the profits are undefined there; this excludes only that undefined case
  • reading: the negotiated wholesale prices are ŵ, w̌ → the simultaneous KS equilibrium exists, is unique and equals (ŵ, ŵ), resp. (w̌, w̌); reason: "the negotiated prices are" characterizes the equilibrium; the stronger reading; equilibrium is "the Nash equilibrium of the two bargaining problems", p.19
  • reading: prices "equal to the corresponding NB solutions with the retailers' bargaining power being 0.6" → (ŵ, ŵ) is an NB(θ) equilibrium for θ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if θ = 3/5, and the NB(3/5) equilibrium is exactly that pair; same for (w̌, w̌); reason: the proof sets the NB equilibrium price equal to the KS price and solves for θ
  • reading: the KS solution as equation (2) on a non-convex allocation set → individual rationality, Pareto optimality and (2) cross-multiplied; reason: the paper restricts (2) to Pareto allocations (online appendix p.5, pp.14–15); without Pareto every contract with allocation (D, d) satisfies (2) as 0 = 0
  • encoding: contract space, in the channels → w ∈ [c, a]; reason: the contract space stated on p.15
  • encoding: case conditions as ratios, with 2/η and 1/η → the same conditions with cleared denominators; reason: the ratios divide by η and by a − wⱼ; the cleared forms agree with the printed ones wherever those are defined and read 2/η as +∞ at η = 0, which changes no instance
  • generalization: equilibria range over Ĉ, Č of (6), defined for wⱼ < a → the cleared forms also admit pairs with a coordinate equal to a; reason: uniqueness is then claimed over a larger set, which contains the source's; no such pair is an equilibrium
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CompetingKS_unitOT
Formal statement
namespace CompetingKS

/-- Proposition 2 (Simultaneous Bargaining without Contingency), Feng, Li, Shanthikumar,
*Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution*, accepted
manuscript (Management Science, July 3, 2021), SSRN 3447674, pp.19–20.

For every `a > c`, `b > 0`. In the one-to-two channel, for every `η ∈ [0, 1]`, with
`ŵ = c + (a - c)/5`: the simultaneous KS equilibrium exists, is unique and equals `(ŵ, ŵ)`; `(ŵ, ŵ)`
is a simultaneous NB equilibrium with retailer power `θ ∈ [0, 1]` exactly when `θ = 3/5`; and the NB
equilibrium at `θ = 3/5` exists, is unique and equals `(ŵ, ŵ)`. In the two-to-one channel, for every
`η ∈ [0, 1)`, with `w̌ = c + (1 - η)(a - c)/(5 - η)`: the same three statements.

**Formalization Note** The two-to-one channel excludes `η = 1`, where the claimed `w̌ = c` lies on
the diagonal on which Lemma 1(ii) does not define `q*`. Equilibria are `IsKSEqOT`, `IsNBEqOT`,
`IsKSEqTO`, `IsNBEqTO`; the KS solution is `IsKSResponse`, individual rationality, Pareto optimality
and equation (2). -/
theorem proposition_2 {a b c : ℝ} (hac : c < a) (hb : 0 < b) :
    (∀ η : ℝ, 0 ≤ η → η ≤ 1 →
      (∀ w₁ w₂ : ℝ, IsKSEqOT a b c η w₁ w₂ ↔ w₁ = c + (a - c) / 5 ∧ w₂ = c + (a - c) / 5) ∧
      (∀ θ : ℝ, 0 ≤ θ → θ ≤ 1 →
        (IsNBEqOT a b c η θ (c + (a - c) / 5) (c + (a - c) / 5) ↔ θ = 3 / 5)) ∧
      (∀ w₁ w₂ : ℝ, IsNBEqOT a b c η (3 / 5) w₁ w₂ ↔
        w₁ = c + (a - c) / 5 ∧ w₂ = c + (a - c) / 5)) ∧
    (∀ η : ℝ, 0 ≤ η → η < 1 →
      (∀ w₁ w₂ : ℝ, IsKSEqTO a b c η w₁ w₂ ↔
        w₁ = c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η) ∧ w₂ = c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η)) ∧
      (∀ θ : ℝ, 0 ≤ θ → θ ≤ 1 →
        (IsNBEqTO a b c η θ (c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η))
          (c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η)) ↔ θ = 3 / 5)) ∧
      (∀ w₁ w₂ : ℝ, IsNBEqTO a b c η (3 / 5) w₁ w₂ ↔
        w₁ = c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η) ∧ w₂ = c + (1 - η) * (a - c) / (5 - η))) := by sorry

end CompetingKS
Source
Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, Negotiations in Competing Supply Chains: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution, accepted manuscript (Management Science, July 3, 2021), SSRN 3447674, Proposition 2, pp.19–20
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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