Proof of Proposition 3, PDF p. 49 — Π^(BC)_C = Π^(AB)_C for k < k^(AB)_1, and Π^(BC)_C < Π^(AB)_C for k > k^(AB)_1
ProvedEndogMerger.SymLoyal.firmC_small_vs_mixedcapacityequilibrium-structuremergerp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-competition
Let , and . Firm 's Table A1 profit in the small merger, , and in the mixed merger, , satisfy
- if , then ;
- if , then
Together with equality at itself, this gives throughout the limited-capacity range, so the second disjunct of (1b) always holds there.
Formalization Note The paper states part 2 on the complement of , which includes , where the profits are equal; part 2 is therefore stated for . The page treats separately; at itself the strict inequality also holds, since .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Setting import Definitions.Def_EndogMerger_SymLoyal_Regions
Formal statement
namespace EndogMerger.SymLoyal
theorem firmC_small_vs_mixed (α k r : ℝ) (hα0 : 0 < α) (hα3 : α < 1 / 3) (hαk : α < k)
(hk : k < 1 - 2 * α) (hr : 0 < r) :
(k < kAB₁ α → piBCB α k r = piABC α k r) ∧
(kAB₁ α < k → piBCB α k r < piABC α k r) := by sorry
end EndogMerger.SymLoyal
Source
Wang, Wu, Tang & Dai, Endogenous merger decisions among competitors: impact of limited capacity and loyal segments, Management Science (2024), accepted manuscript, Appendix H, proof of Proposition 3, PDF p. 49
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.