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§III unnumbered: secret key versus net common randomness

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QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Gap48.P35.key_common_randomness_tradeoff

by Goku · Oct 22, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

All systems are finite nonzero-dimensional complex quantum systems. Density states are positive semidefinite with trace one, and SSS is von Neumann entropy in bits. Write EfE_fEf​ for formation, I←I^{\leftarrow}I← for maximal Holevo correlation measured on the second party, ECE_CEC​ for asymptotic singlet preparation cost, EDE_DED​ for EPR distillation rate, CDC_DCD​ for net common randomness, and KKK for secret-key rate. A left arrow means communication from the second legitimate party to the first. Key secrecy includes all public transcripts. Asymptotic tasks use independent copies, vanishing error and no extra initially shared resource.

Let ρABC\rho_{ABC}ρABC​ be any density state. In the key task CCC is Eve; in the second task CCC is a legitimate party, and the right side lets BCBCBC cooperate.

K←(A:B∣C)ρ+CD←(ρAC)≤CD←(ρA:BC).K^{\leftarrow}(A:B\mid C)_\rho+C_D^{\leftarrow}(\rho_{AC})\le C_D^{\leftarrow}(\rho_{A:BC}).K←(A:B∣C)ρ​+CD←​(ρAC​)≤CD←​(ρA:BC​).

The common randomness is net of communication, and the grouping A:BCA:BCA:BC retains both factors.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Gap48_P35
Formal statement
namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Gap48.P35

open scoped Matrix ComplexConjugate ComplexOrder

open Filter Topology

open Information100.P21 (Op)

open Information100.P08 (IsPure formation measuredCorrelation)

open Dependency50.P19 (marginalRA marginalRB)

noncomputable section

/-- PDF p.5, §III following Eq.(12): key on AB secret against C, plus net common randomness on AC, bounded by net common randomness on A:BC. -/
theorem key_common_randomness_tradeoff {A : Type} {B : Type} {C : Type}
    [Fintype A] [DecidableEq A] [Nonempty A] [Fintype B] [DecidableEq B] [Nonempty B] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
    (rho : Op (A × (B × C))) (hrho : IsDensityMatrix rho) :
    keyLeft rho + commonLeft (marginalRB rho) ≤ commonLeft rho := by sorry

end

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Gap48.P35
Source
Monogamy of entanglement and other correlations, arXiv:quant-ph/0310037v1, PDF p. 5, §III unnumbered: secret key versus net common randomness
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

For all finite, nonempty A,B,CA,B,CA,B,C, each with decidable equality, and every positive semidefinite trace-one matrix ρ\rhoρ on A⊗B⊗CA\otimes B\otimes CA⊗B⊗C, put ρAC=Tr⁡Bρ\rho_{AC}=\operatorname{Tr}_B\rhoρAC​=TrB​ρ. Then

KB→A ∣ C(ρ)+JC→A(ρAC)≤JBC→A(ρ).K_{B\to A\,|\,C}(\rho)+J_{C\to A}(\rho_{AC})\le J_{BC\to A}(\rho).KB→A∣C​(ρ)+JC→A​(ρAC​)≤JBC→A​(ρ).

Here KS→R ∣ Z(ω)K_{S\to R\,|\,Z}(\omega)KS→R∣Z​(ω) is the supremum over real rrr admitting protocols at every natural block length nnn, with positive integers ln,mnl_n,m_nln​,mn​, a sender POVM {Qtk}\{Q_{tk}\}{Qtk​} on S⊗nS^{\otimes n}S⊗n, and receiver POVMs {Dtj}j<mn\{D_{tj}\}_{j<m_n}{Dtj​}j<mn​​, one for each t<lnt<l_nt<ln​. With τtk=Tr⁡Sn[ω⊗n(Qtk⊗I)]\tau_{tk}=\operatorname{Tr}_{S^n}[\omega^{\otimes n}(Q_{tk}\otimes I)]τtk​=TrSn​[ω⊗n(Qtk​⊗I)], Jkj(n)=∑tRe⁡Tr⁡[DtjTr⁡Znτtk]J_{kj}^{(n)}=\sum_t\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}[D_{tj}\operatorname{Tr}_{Z^n}\tau_{tk}]Jkj(n)​=∑t​ReTr[Dtj​TrZn​τtk​], and sk=∑t∣t⟩⟨t∣⊗Tr⁡Rnτtks_k=\sum_t|t\rangle\langle t|\otimes\operatorname{Tr}_{R^n}\tau_{tk}sk​=∑t​∣t⟩⟨t∣⊗TrRn​τtk​, there must be ϵn≥0\epsilon_n\ge0ϵn​≥0 tending to zero and a fixed F≥0F\ge0F≥0 such that ln≤2nFl_n\le2^{nF}ln​≤2nF, ∑k≠jJkj(n)≤ϵn\sum_{k\ne j}J_{kj}^{(n)}\le\epsilon_n∑k=j​Jkj(n)​≤ϵn​, ∑k∣Re⁡Tr⁡sk−1/mn∣≤ϵn\sum_k|\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}s_k-1/m_n|\le\epsilon_n∑k​∣ReTrsk​−1/mn​∣≤ϵn​, and there exist density matrices ηk,σn\eta_k,\sigma_nηk​,σn​ with (Re⁡Tr⁡sk)ηk=sk(\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}s_k)\eta_k=s_k(ReTrsk​)ηk​=sk​ and ∥ηk−σn∥1≤ϵn\|\eta_k-\sigma_n\|_1\le\epsilon_n∥ηk​−σn​∥1​≤ϵn​ for every kkk; also log⁡2mn/n→r\log_2m_n/n\to rlog2​mn​/n→r. Every POVM consists of positive semidefinite effects summing to the identity, ∥X∥1=Re⁡Tr⁡X†X\|X\|_1=\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}\sqrt{X^\dagger X}∥X∥1​=ReTrX†X​, and zero-mass keys remain subject to the stated existence conditions. The quantity JS→R(σ)J_{S\to R}(\sigma)JS→R​(σ) is sup⁡R0≥0[C(σ,R0)−R0]\sup_{R_0\ge0}[\mathcal C(\sigma,R_0)-R_0]supR0​≥0​[C(σ,R0​)−R0​], where C(σ,R0)\mathcal C(\sigma,R_0)C(σ,R0​) is the supremum over real c0c_0c0​ such that some fixed c≥0c\ge0c≥0 has the following property: for every ϵ,δ>0\epsilon,\delta>0ϵ,δ>0, all sufficiently large positive nnn admit a sender POVM {Mx}\{M_x\}{Mx​}, a message f(x)f(x)f(x) in a positive finite message alphabet, a key g(x)g(x)g(x) in a positive finite alphabet of size KnK_nKn​, and receiver POVMs {Nt,j}j<Kn\{N_{t,j}\}_{j<K_n}{Nt,j​}j<Kn​​, satisfying

log⁡2∣im⁡f∣≤nR0,Kn≤2cn,∑x,jg(x)≠jp(x,j)≤ϵ,c0−δ≤H(q)n,\log_2|\operatorname{im}f|\le nR_0,\quad K_n\le2^{cn},\quad \sum_{\substack{x,j\\g(x)\ne j}}p(x,j)\le\epsilon,\quad c_0-\delta\le\frac{H(q)}n,log2​∣imf∣≤nR0​,Kn​≤2cn,x,jg(x)=j​∑​p(x,j)≤ϵ,c0​−δ≤nH(q)​,

with p(x,j)=Re⁡Tr⁡[(Mx⊗Nf(x),j)σSR⊗n]p(x,j)=\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{Tr}[(M_x\otimes N_{f(x),j})\sigma_{SR}^{\otimes n}]p(x,j)=ReTr[(Mx​⊗Nf(x),j​)σSR⊗n​], qk=∑x:g(x)=k∑jp(x,j)q_k=\sum_{x:g(x)=k}\sum_jp(x,j)qk​=∑x:g(x)=k​∑j​p(x,j), and H(q)=−∑kqklog⁡2qkH(q)=-\sum_kq_k\log_2q_kH(q)=−∑k​qk​log2​qk​. This definition of JJJ imposes the displayed key-entropy and disagreement conditions without requiring a uniform key or an environment secrecy condition. The key-capacity sequence also includes n=0n=0n=0, whose rate quotient is defined as zero.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 22, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Goku · Oct 22, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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