Theorem 1, p. 12 — optimal prices equalize aggregate markups; the optimal profit is the unique fixed point of H(z) = sup_r H(r; z), strictly decreasing for S ≠ ∅
ProvedCrossSell.Pricing.theorem_1Consider the sequential multinomial logit model of cross-category retailing: a firm offers a finite set of main products, with ; after the first-stage outcome a consumer may buy one secondary product from , chosen from finitely many secondary products. Main product has intrinsic utility and cost ; secondary product has cost and intrinsic utility after outcome . With main prices and secondary prices the total expected profit is of eq. (5), the secondary profit of is
and
Then:
- (a) at every joint maximizer of , the aggregate markup is the same for all ;
- for every , is bounded above, so is finite;
- (b) the equation has exactly one solution , and is the optimal total profit: the least upper bound of ;
- if , is strictly decreasing in .
The theorem reduces the joint pricing problem, which has up to variables and is not concave, to a secondary-price problem and a one-dimensional fixed-point search.
Formalization Note. "Optimality" is global maximization of over all real price vectors with and fixed. The optimal total profit is stated as the least upper bound of the profit values (the paper's "max" presumes attainment, which the page does not show; the companion milestone on the p. 13 price formula gives attainment whenever has a maximizer). is a real supremum, made meaningful by clause 2. Clause 4 carries the hypothesis , not printed on the page: for , is constant, so strict decrease fails; the other clauses hold for every .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CrossSell_Pricing_Model
namespace CrossSell.Pricing
theorem theorem_1 {ι κ : Type*} [Fintype κ] (S : Finset ι) (T : Option ι → Finset κ)
(u c : ι → ℝ) (s : κ → ℝ) (v : Option ι → κ → ℝ) :
(∀ (p : ι → ℝ) (r : κ → ℝ),
(∀ (p' : ι → ℝ) (r' : κ → ℝ), profit S T u c s v p' r' ≤ profit S T u c s v p r) →
∀ i ∈ S, ∀ j ∈ S, aggMarkup T c s v p r i = aggMarkup T c s v p r j) ∧
(∀ z : ℝ, BddAbove (Set.range fun r : κ → ℝ => Hr S T u c s v r z)) ∧
(∃ zstar : ℝ, zstar = Hmax S T u c s v zstar ∧
(∀ z : ℝ, z = Hmax S T u c s v z → z = zstar) ∧
IsLUB (Set.range fun pr : (ι → ℝ) × (κ → ℝ) => profit S T u c s v pr.1 pr.2) zstar) ∧
(S.Nonempty → StrictAnti (Hmax S T u c s v)) := by sorry
end CrossSell.Pricing
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.