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Sect. 1 — Shapley cost shares exactly pay for the designed network

Proved
PriceOfStability.Harmonic.shapley_budget_balance

by mikedeng1 · Oct 4, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

congestion-gamecost-sharingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-stability

Consider the fair (Shapley) cost-sharing game on players 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k and a finite edge set EEE, where the cost ce(xe)c_e(x_e)ce​(xe​) of an edge used by xex_exe​ players is split equally among them. For every strategy vector S=(S1,…,Sk)S=(S_1,\dots,S_k)S=(S1​,…,Sk​), the players' payments add up to the cost of the designed network:

∑i=1kCi(S1,…,Sk)=∑e∈⋃iSice(xe).\sum_{i=1}^k C_i(S_1,\dots,S_k)=\sum_{e\in\bigcup_i S_i} c_e(x_e).i=1∑k​Ci​(S1​,…,Sk​)=e∈⋃i​Si​∑​ce​(xe​).

This budget-balance property identifies the social cost ∑iCi\sum_i C_i∑i​Ci​ with the cost of the network, so bounds stated for either apply to the other.

Formalization Note. The paper states it for constant costs cec_ece​; the statement here allows load-dependent costs ce(x)c_e(x)ce​(x) (constant costs are the special case) and every strategy vector, feasible or not.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_PriceOfStability_Harmonic_Model

open CongestionPoA.AsymSum
Formal statement
namespace PriceOfStability.Harmonic

/-- Anshelevich et al., *The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation*, SIAM J.
Comput. 38 (2008), Sect. 1, p. 1603 (PDF p. 2), unnumbered display: the Shapley cost shares completely pay
for the designed network, `Σᵢ Cᵢ(S₁, …, S_k) = Σ_{e ∈ ∪ᵢ Sᵢ} c_e`.

**Formalization Note.** Stated for load-dependent edge costs `c_e(x)` (constant costs are
`c e x = c_e`) and for every strategy vector, feasible or not: the identity uses neither. -/
theorem shapley_budget_balance {ι E : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Fintype E]
    [DecidableEq E] (strategies : ι → Finset (Finset E)) (c : E → ℕ → ℝ) (S : ι → Finset E) :
    sumCost (fairGame strategies c) S = designCost c S := by sorry

end PriceOfStability.Harmonic
Source
Anshelevich et al., The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), DOI 10.1137/070680096, p. 1603 (PDF p. 2), Sect. 1, unnumbered display
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 5, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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