Proof of Theorem 4, p. 1495 — without ties, every equilibrium of the salary-adjustment process is a discrete strict core allocation
ProvedKelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal.equilibrium_is_discrete_strict_coreConsider a discrete market with salary unit satisfying the standing assumptions — strictly increasing continuous utilities, (MP), (NFL), and (GS) for every firm on the permitted salary vectors — together with the no-ties conditions (NTW) and (NTF). Let a run of the salary-adjustment process R1–R5 stop in round (no rejections in round ), and let be the allocation in which every worker accepts the offer he or she holds in round . Then
This is the first half of Theorem 4: the process always stops at a discrete core allocation (Theorem 1), and the no-ties conditions upgrade it to the strict core.
Formalization Note The statement holds for every run, i.e. every admissible tie-breaking by firms and workers, and every stopping round. The standing assumptions of p. 1486, which the sentence does not repeat, are hypotheses.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Model import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Process import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_NoTies
namespace KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
theorem equilibrium_is_discrete_strict_core
{W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
(M : Market W F) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
(hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) (M.gridVectors δ j))
(hNTW : M.NTW δ) (hNTF : M.NTF δ) :
∀ ρ : Run W F, M.IsRun δ ρ → ∀ T, ρ.Stopped T → M.IsStrictCore (M.grid δ) (ρ.outcome T) := by sorry
end KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.