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Proof of Theorem 4, p. 1495 — without ties, every equilibrium of the salary-adjustment process is a discrete strict core allocation

Proved
KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal.equilibrium_is_discrete_strict_core

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

ascending-processcoregross-substitutesmatchingp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Consider a discrete market with salary unit δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 satisfying the standing assumptions — strictly increasing continuous utilities, (MP), (NFL), and (GS) for every firm on the permitted salary vectors — together with the no-ties conditions (NTW) and (NTF). Let a run of the salary-adjustment process R1–R5 stop in round TTT (no rejections in round TTT), and let (ϕ;s1ϕ(1),…,smϕ(m))(\phi; s_{1\phi(1)}, \dots, s_{m\phi(m)})(ϕ;s1ϕ(1)​,…,smϕ(m)​) be the allocation in which every worker accepts the offer he or she holds in round TTT. Then

(ϕ;s1ϕ(1),…,smϕ(m)) is a discrete strict core allocation (D2).(\phi; s_{1\phi(1)}, \dots, s_{m\phi(m)}) \text{ is a discrete strict core allocation (D2).}(ϕ;s1ϕ(1)​,…,smϕ(m)​) is a discrete strict core allocation (D2).

This is the first half of Theorem 4: the process always stops at a discrete core allocation (Theorem 1), and the no-ties conditions upgrade it to the strict core.

Formalization Note The statement holds for every run, i.e. every admissible tie-breaking by firms and workers, and every stopping round. The standing assumptions of p. 1486, which the sentence does not repeat, are hypotheses.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Model
import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_Process
import Definitions.Def_KelsoCrawford_FirmOptimal_NoTies
Formal statement
namespace KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal

theorem equilibrium_is_discrete_strict_core
    {W F : Type} [Fintype W] [DecidableEq W] [Fintype F] [DecidableEq F] [Nonempty F]
    (M : Market W F) (δ : ℝ) (hδ : 0 < δ) (hu : M.UtilityRegular) (hMP : M.MP) (hNFL : M.NFL)
    (hGS : ∀ j, KelsoCrawford.Process.GrossSubstitutesOn (M.y j) (M.gridVectors δ j))
    (hNTW : M.NTW δ) (hNTF : M.NTF δ) :
    ∀ ρ : Run W F, M.IsRun δ ρ → ∀ T, ρ.Stopped T → M.IsStrictCore (M.grid δ) (ρ.outcome T) := by sorry

end KelsoCrawford.FirmOptimal
Source
Kelso and Crawford, Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes, Econometrica 50 (1982), p. 1495, proof of Theorem 4, first and second paragraphs
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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