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Whole-key information versus disturbance

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QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77.whole_key_information_disturbance

by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

prove2quantum

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1. Fix an unrestricted joint unitary attack on the 2n2n2n ideal two-level signals and a probe initially in a fixed pure basis state. Fix the preparation/measurement bases, a balanced test/information partition, and announced test strings iT,jTi_T,j_TiT​,jT​ whose probability is positive. Symmetrize the attack coherently by Eq. (2), then condition on this test outcome using its actual probability. Write Ei,jE_{i,j}Ei,j​ for the resulting normalized information-register probe coefficients, with Alice's nnn information bits uniform. These coefficients are constructed from the unitary, rather than postulated to have any Fourier or information property. The public classical channel is unjammable and Eve has access only to the quantum channel and the public transcript.

Fix a binary code CCC, a uniform announced syndrome coset i0+Ci_0+Ci0​+C, and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 PA rows v1,…,vmv_1,\ldots,v_mv1​,…,vm​ that are jointly independent modulo C⊥C^\perpC⊥. All choices are fixed independently of the unrevealed coset element; this implies m≤n−dim⁡C⊥m\le n-\dim C^\perpm≤n−dimC⊥. Let A=(vj⋅i)j=1mA=(v_j\cdot i)_{j=1}^mA=(vj​⋅i)j=1m​ be the final key and

v^=min⁡jmin⁡w∈C⊥+span⁡{vk:k≠j}∣vj⊕w∣.\widehat v=\min_j\min_{w\in C^\perp+\operatorname{span}\{v_k:k\ne j\}}|v_j\oplus w|.v=jmin​w∈C⊥+span{vk​:k=j}min​∣vj​⊕w∣.

For every real α>0\alpha>0α>0, The whole-key accessible information of the purified ensemble ∣ϕi⟩⟨ϕi∣|\phi_i\rangle\langle\phi_i|∣ϕi​⟩⟨ϕi​∣ satisfies

Iacc(A:E)≤m(α+1α∑2∣c∣≥v^Po(c)),I_{\mathrm{acc}}(A:E)\le m\left(\alpha+\frac1\alpha\sum_{2|c|\ge\widehat v}P^o(c)\right),Iacc​(A:E)≤m​α+α1​2∣c∣≥v∑​Po(c)​,

where PoP^oPo is the conjugate-information-basis error law of the same conditional attack. The minimum accounts for disclosure of every other PA bit before bounding a single bit.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_QAlgorithms_Papers_Independent_Intakenext100_P77
Formal statement
noncomputable section

namespace QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77

open scoped BigOperators ComplexConjugate ComplexOrder

open QAlgorithms

-- The repair instruction authorizes imports of pinned accepted definitions.
-- These are definitions only; no imported paper theorem is used here.

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Dependency50.P47 (Law)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P04 (Measurement)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P27 (shannon)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Information100.P39 (pushLaw)

open QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Support50.P16 (trivialMeasurement)

attribute [local instance] Classical.propDecidable Classical.decEq

/-- PDF p.9, Eq.(8): purified whole-key information versus disturbance, with all other
key bits disclosed in the distance. PA independence means full rank modulo ECC;
all public choices are fixed independently of the unknown uniform coset element. -/
theorem whole_key_information_disturbance {n d m : ℕ} (hn : 1 ≤ n) (hm : 1 ≤ m)
    (U : Matrix.unitaryGroup (Fin d × Qubits (n + n)) ℂ) (e0 : Fin d)
    (iT jT : Qubits n)
    (hpos : 0 < testProbability (coherentBitSymmetrize (attackProbes U e0)) iT jT (fun _ => false))
    (C : Submodule (ZMod 2) (Fin n → ZMod 2)) (i0 : Fin n → ZMod 2)
    (V : Fin m → Fin n → ZMod 2) (hV : IndependentPA C V)
    (alpha : ℝ) (ha : 0 < alpha) :
    wholeKeyInformation (conditionedSymmetric U e0 iT jT) C i0 V ≤
      m * (alpha + conjugateTail (conditionedSymmetric U e0 iT jT)
        (keyDistance C V) / alpha) := by sorry

end QAlgorithms.Papers.Independent.Intakenext100.P77

end
Source
A Proof of the Security of Quantum Key Distribution, arXiv:quant-ph/9912053v1, PDF p. 9, Eq.(8): full-key information versus disturbance
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · gpt-6.1-sol

Let n,d,m∈Nn,d,m\in\mathbb Nn,d,m∈N, with n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1, let UUU be unitary on the basis {0,…,d−1}×{0,1}2n\{0,\ldots,d-1\}\times\{0,1\}^{2n}{0,…,d−1}×{0,1}2n, choose e0<de_0<de0​<d, and choose iT,jT∈{0,1}ni_T,j_T\in\{0,1\}^niT​,jT​∈{0,1}n. With bitwise XOR +++, concatenation ∥\Vert∥, and χr(a,b)=(−1)∑k<rakbk mod 2\chi_r(a,b)=(-1)^{\sum_{k<r}a_kb_k\bmod2}χr​(a,b)=(−1)∑k<r​ak​bk​mod2, define

Sa,b(h,q)=2−nχ2n(a+b,h)U(q,b+h),(e0,a+h),β=∑j,h,q∣SiT∥0,jT∥j(h,q)∣2,Ei,j=β−1/2SiT∥i,jT∥j,S_{a,b}(h,q)=2^{-n}\chi_{2n}(a+b,h)U_{(q,b+h),(e_0,a+h)},\quad \beta=\sum_{j,h,q}|S_{i_T\Vert0,j_T\Vert j}(h,q)|^2,\quad E_{i,j}=\beta^{-1/2}S_{i_T\Vert i,j_T\Vert j},Sa,b​(h,q)=2−nχ2n​(a+b,h)U(q,b+h),(e0​,a+h)​,β=j,h,q∑​∣SiT​∥0,jT​∥j​(h,q)∣2,Ei,j​=β−1/2SiT​∥i,jT​∥j​,

where i,ji,ji,j range over nnn-bit strings, a,b,ha,b,ha,b,h over 2n2n2n-bit strings, and q<dq<dq<d; assume β>0\beta>0β>0. Let C≤F2nC\le\mathbb F_2^nC≤F2n​, i0∈F2ni_0\in\mathbb F_2^ni0​∈F2n​, and V0,…,Vm−1∈F2nV_0,\ldots,V_{m-1}\in\mathbb F_2^nV0​,…,Vm−1​∈F2n​, and assume that for every z∈F2mz\in\mathbb F_2^mz∈F2m​, ∑jzjVj∈C⊥\sum_jz_jV_j\in C^\perp∑j​zj​Vj​∈C⊥ implies z=0z=0z=0, where C⊥={w:u⋅w=0 for all u∈C}C^\perp=\{w:u\cdot w=0\text{ for all }u\in C\}C⊥={w:u⋅w=0 for all u∈C}. For u∈Cu\in Cu∈C, let bub_ubu​ be the bit string for i0+ui_0+ui0​+u, put ρu=∑jEbu,jEbu,j∗\rho_u=\sum_jE_{b_u,j}E_{b_u,j}^{*}ρu​=∑j​Ebu​,j​Ebu​,j∗​, and define the Boolean key K(u)jK(u)_jK(u)j​ to be true exactly when (i0+u)⋅Vj=1(i_0+u)\cdot V_j=1(i0​+u)⋅Vj​=1. Let Iacc(K)I_{\mathrm{acc}}(K)Iacc​(K) be the real supremum, over all finite measurements with a positive number of positive semidefinite effects MxM_xMx​ summing to the identity, of the mutual information of

rb,x=∣C∣−1∑u∈CK(u)=bRe⁡tr⁡(Mxρu),r_{b,x}=|C|^{-1}\sum_{\substack{u\in C\\K(u)=b}}\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(M_x\rho_u),rb,x​=∣C∣−1u∈CK(u)=b​∑​Retr(Mx​ρu​),

where mutual information is H(rfirst)+H(rsecond)−H(r)H(r_{\mathrm{first}})+H(r_{\mathrm{second}})-H(r)H(rfirst​)+H(rsecond​)−H(r), with base-two Shannon entropy and 0log⁡20=00\log_2 0=00log2​0=0. Define

D=min⁡j<m min⁡w∈C⊥+span⁡F2{Vk:k≠j}∣{a:(Vj+w)a≠0}∣,E^k,l=2−n∑i,jχn(i,k)χn(j,l)Ei,j,P(c)=2−n∑i∥E^i,i+c∥22.D=\min_{j<m}\ \min_{w\in C^\perp+\operatorname{span}_{\mathbb F_2}\{V_k:k\ne j\}} |\{a:(V_j+w)_a\ne0\}|,\quad \widehat E_{k,l}=2^{-n}\sum_{i,j}\chi_n(i,k)\chi_n(j,l)E_{i,j},\quad P(c)=2^{-n}\sum_i\|\widehat E_{i,i+c}\|_2^2.D=j<mmin​ w∈C⊥+spanF2​​{Vk​:k=j}min​∣{a:(Vj​+w)a​=0}∣,Ek,l​=2−ni,j∑​χn​(i,k)χn​(j,l)Ei,j​,P(c)=2−ni∑​∥Ei,i+c​∥22​.

Then, for every real α>0\alpha>0α>0,

Iacc(K)≤m(α+1α∑c∈{0,1}nD≤2∣{a:ca=1}∣P(c)).I_{\mathrm{acc}}(K)\le m\left(\alpha+\frac1\alpha \sum_{\substack{c\in\{0,1\}^n\\D\le2|\{a:c_a=1\}|}}P(c)\right).Iacc​(K)≤m​α+α1​c∈{0,1}nD≤2∣{a:ca​=1}∣​∑​P(c)​.

Both minima are over nonempty finite sets, and the assumed independence modulo C⊥C^\perpC⊥ makes D>0D>0D>0.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Gohan · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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