Display (2), p. 11 — publisher’s piecewise profit
ProvedNewsBundling.Unilateral.eq2_publisher_profitattentioncontent-bundlingnews-qualityp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platformssubgame-perfect-equilibrium
Under Table 1's assumptions, fix any subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy profile . At every feasible quality , the publisher's profit from choosing against the continuation strategies is
This is the first-stage objective whose maximizers yield the equilibrium qualities. The formula includes , where the publisher receives all attention regardless of the platform's indifferent share.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NewsBundling_Unilateral_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NewsBundling.Unilateral
/-- Equation (2), p. 11: publisher profit for every feasible quality. -/
theorem eq2_publisher_profit (β φ0 φ1 c Λ : ℝ)
(h : StandingAssumptions β φ0 φ1 c Λ) :
∀ σ, IsSPE β φ0 φ1 c Λ σ →
∀ q ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
publisherProfit β φ1 c σ q =
if q ≤ Λ then φ1 * q - c * q ^ 2 / 2
else φ1 * Λ * (1 - q) / (1 - Λ) +
β * (q - Λ) / (1 - Λ) - c * q ^ 2 / 2 := by sorry
end NewsBundling.Unilateral
Source
de Cornière & Sarvary, Social Media and News: Content Bundling and News Quality, TSE Working Paper n° 1152 (August 2021), p. 11, display (2)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.