Theorem 2.2 [BWZ26] — random-offerer guarantee: FB ≤ e · ROProfit for every bilateral trade instance
ProvedStratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction.theorem_2_2bilateral-tradegains-from-trademarket-stratificationmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a bilateral trade instance: the buyer's value and the seller's cost are independent, and are continuous distributions supported on . Let be the first-best gains from trade and the random offerer's expected profit at profit-maximizing take-it-or-leave-it prices in . Then
This is a cited result of Bei, Wu and Zhou [BWZ26]; the paper does not prove it. It is Step 3 of the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: F and G are continuous distributions supported on [0, 1], v and c independent → a
BTInstance: probability measures μB, μS with no atoms (NullSingletonClass) and mass 1 on [0, 1]; expectations over the productμS.prod μB; reason: a CDF is continuous exactly when its law has no atoms; same instances - encoding: SellerProfit(c) = (s_c − c) F̄(s_c) and BuyerProfit(v) = (v − b_v) G(b_v) at profit-maximizing prices → the suprema over s ∈ [0, 1] of (s − c) F̄(s) and over b ∈ [0, 1] of (v − b) G(b); reason: the maxima are attained (continuous functions on [0, 1]), so the values agree and no argmax selection is needed
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StratifyMarkets_DoubleAuction_Bilateral open MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction /-- Theorem 2.2 [BWZ26] (p. 8): for every bilateral trade instance, `FB ≤ e · ROProfit`. -/ theorem theorem_2_2 (I : BTInstance) : I.FB ≤ Real.exp 1 * I.roProfit := by sorry end StratifyMarkets.DoubleAuction
Source
Deng, Lin, Schoepflin, Wang, Stratifying Markets for Efficient Trade, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 49372bcf…), p. 8, Theorem 2.2 (cited: [BWZ26])
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.